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ABSTRACT 
 
T. Parent 
METASEMATICS: On the Limits of Semantic Theory 
(Under the direction of William G. Lycan) 
 
 
METASEMATICS is a wake-up call for semantic theory: It reveals that some semantic 
questions have no adequate answer. (This is meant to be the epistemic point that certain 
semantic questions cannot be “settled”—not a metaphysical point about whether there is a 
fact-of-the-matter.) METASEMATICS thus checks our default “optimism” that any well-formed 
semantic question can be settled (at least in principle).  
Chapter One argues that relative to certain assumptions, a question like “What does 
‘Pollux’ denote?” has no adequate answer. If an answer is to be non-circular, then any 
answer ultimately depends on an uninterpreted term—meaning that this term occurs absent 
an answer to what it denotes. This, I argue, makes the answer uninformative in certain crucial 
respects. The lesson here essentially vindicates Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity 
(though not his behaviorism or semantic nihilism). 
Chapter Two and Three build on this “pessimism” in considering “ontic-idioms,” 
such as ‘exist’, ‘actual’, etc. If Chapter One entails there is no saying what an ontic-idiom’s 
extension is, these chapters show there is no saying what their intension is. Any attempt, I 
claim, will be equivocal. As corollaries, I show that a univocal statement of Realism about x 
is impossible—as well as a criterion of ontological commitment. 
Chapter Four considers truth-conditional semantics, generally speaking. After 
elaborating Davidson’s claim about the “folly” of defining truth, I counter-balance his 
 iv 
pessimism by showing that an informative analysis of ‘true’ is still possible (though only for 
certain translational purposes). 
Finally, Chapter Five evaluates a pessimistic argument concerning mental content. I 
argue that under externalism, a priori knowledge of content is impossible, at least for 
knowing whether a concept is about H2O versus XYZ. But this limit on the a priori should be 
unsurprising; I argue, moreover, that for other purposes we indeed know a priori what we 
think. 
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PREFACE 
 
Jay Rosenberg, to whom half this work is dedicated, was infamous for his cranky, 
opinionated prefaces which greet the reader upon opening his books. In The Thinking Self, he 
starts with a defense of this practice: 
A preface is about the only place left where a serious scholar can write with complete 
candor about what, besides serious scholarship, is on his mind and still be confident 
that it will appear in print. I see it as a sort of right which one has earned by virtue of 
having produced the sober and dignified scholarly work which follows. (p. vii) 
 
Of course, I cannot be confident that the present work will go to press, at least in this form. 
Nor do I feel at liberty to speak with complete candor (though I’m sure Jay did). But Jay 
provides enough of an excuse to speak with more candor than is usual. 
 We lost Jay to esophageal cancer in February last year, and in this philosophy lost a 
loyal and brilliant devotee. It has been written, somewhere other than here, that Jay was the 
most under-appreciated philosopher in recent years. He certainly had an eye for detail like no 
one else. But Jay unfortunately had a knack for alienating himself from others, mostly due to 
his frank and plentiful criticism, which he yelled unmercifully, standing three feet away. I 
have no doubt his work would have received more attention if only he had been more 
personable.  
 I had the (mis?)fortune of taking a writing-intensive seminar with Jay for first-year 
graduate students. It was a trying experience. Indeed, Jay’s meat-grinder mentoring was 
responsible for the immediate departure of two of my classmates. But the seminar rebuilt my 
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brain. His harsh yet penetrating criticism forced me to be highly sensitive to detail, much like 
Jay was (though I make no claim to be as perceptive as he). I am eternally grateful for his 
training in philosophical methodology, thus the dedication. On the matter, I am reminded of 
his own gratitude to Wilfrid Sellars (who apparently was also nasty pedagogue), expressed in 
the preface to Linguistic Representation,  
[O]ne normally says something like ‘The debt that this book owes him is immense’. I 
would say it too, were it not to understate the case. From Wilfrid, I learned to think. 
(p. xi) 
 
I might say the same about Jay, and his attempt to teach me to think was an honor. But for the 
record, I do not think of myself a third-generation Sellarsian: I am not an inferentialist and I 
commit the heresy of ranking Quine as the better philosopher. Moreover, I remain 
unconvinced of the Jay-Sellars claim that good philosophy must be about “everything.” A 
specialized journal article on a focused topic is often very edifying. I agree, however, that 
philosophers should not isolate themselves to their specialties, since Jay is right when he says 
that philosophical problems often illuminate each other. Moreover, I share his lament for the 
disappearance of “systematic” philosophy. Although it is an ambitious undertaking, 
philosophical system-building is still possible in the current profession, over the course of a 
career, while writing in a focused and detail-oriented manner. Not to be flippant, but I think 
of Quine as a shining example here. (And I find disturbing the recent trend to reduce Quine’s 
significance to run-of-the-mill naturalism.) 
Before he died, I emailed Jay to say that my thesis would be dedicated to him, and he 
replied graciously. I hope it is true that he did not cringe at the idea, especially since our 
views are somewhat congenial. Although they are less so these days, thanks to the influence 
of Bill Lycan. 
 viii 
 Bill, of course, is who shares the dedication with Jay. When I think of the hours he 
has devoted to improving this document, I shudder. Bill is in fact a creature is thought to be 
mythical in the philosophy world (and probably in the academy generally): He is the 
dissertation advisor who reads every word with care and returns substantive feedback—all 
within 72 hours. He would occasionally shock me with an apology, in the rare case when he 
took longer than a week.  
 But most importantly, Bill deserves to be commended for his stamina. This is one of 
those dissertations that took entirely too long to write. But contra the usual explanations, this 
is not because I fell into a five-year drinking binge or became habitually lazy. The fact is that 
the topic I chose was hard, and I had an advisor who would not let me half-ass the job. 
(There are close to 50 drafts of Chapter One, not counting drafts with minor edits.) Bill is a 
paragon of intellectual integrity, and a less principled advisor would have approved my 
earlier, less rigorous work. He never wavered in his duty to train me, even though our 
philosophical intuitions and priorities were often at odds. If Jay taught me to think, it was Bill 
who taught me how to express my thinking properly to a present-day audience of academic 
philosophers. And in philosophy, expressing your thoughts properly is virtually as important 
as the thoughts themselves (especially since there is often no clear division between the two). 
 My debts are hardly limited to Bill and Jay however. Yet I chose to limit the 
dedication to them, for fear of diluting what little significance the gesture may have. But I 
would like to note the nearby worlds where I gesture thus to other parties. 
 In at least half of the nearby worlds, this work is dedicated to my parents—and in half 
of those worlds, my siblings are also mentioned. I wish I could properly express my 
appreciation for my family, but that sort of thing is utterly clichéd in a preface; so the task is 
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near impossible. Yet I will report unabashedly that each member of my family is quite 
superior to most human beings. My siblings—Brodie, Aimee, Denise, and Marc—each have 
an uncommon strength of character. I am proud to be related to them. Moreover, I am lucky 
to have parents that I not only love but also like. My father’s generosity is always beyond the 
call of duty, not only financially but also in his emotional support. This dissertation would 
not have been possible without him. As for my mother, she is one of my closest companions. 
She is moreover a true intellectual who has a genuine passion for meaningful reflection—
unlike some philosophers I have met in the profession.  
 I love my family, but I have not dedicated this work to them, mostly because I find it 
a bit gauche. A dedication might imply that the final product is for them. But if I really were 
writing for my family, I would not write on formal semantics. As it is, I wrote this piece for 
Bill Lycan—and Jay gets mentioned because of his profound influence.  
 Other nearby worlds are ones where I dedicate this work to all the wonderful teachers 
I have had over the years. In still others, the dedication is to those who helped me 
intellectually, professionally, and emotionally during the writing of this thesis—including 
(but not limited to) Jim Baillie, Dorit Bar-On, Sarah Blythe, Jason Bowers, Matthew 
Chrisman, Patrick Connolly, Felipe De Brigard, Tamra Frei, David Frost, Don Garrett, Hell 
(the bar, now defunct), Thomas Hofweber, Bryce Huebner, Justin Jeffrey, Betsy Jelinek, 
Kenny Kupers, Norah Martin, Al Martinich, Ram Neta, the Open Eye Café, the Portland 
Brew (in Nashville), John Post, Michael Resnik, Dave Ripley, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Joshua 
Shaw, Keith Simmons, Jeffrey Tlumak, Piers Turner, and (last but certainly not least) Meg 
Wallace. I would also like to give special mention to the makers of Prozac, Celexa, Lexapro, 
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Wellbutrin, Effexor (my current favorite), as well as Michael Ryan, Ph.D. (If not for them, I 
would be dead twice over.) 
 I decided to write about semantic theory because it seemed to me that such theorizing 
these days is often done in a rather unreflective manner. It also struck me that some puzzles 
in semantics, e.g., substitutivity puzzles, could be resolved if we take into account the 
limitations of our semantic theorizing. (Roughly, these phenomena, I believe, are due to 
deficiencies in a speaker’s “background language.”) Unfortunately, I have been unable to 
develop these points in the present work, and mostly have had to rest content with describing 
the basic phenomena that would provide the basis of such insights. (Sometimes having a 
“grand vision” of the philosophical landscape only sets you up for a “grand” amount of 
work.)  I might pursue these matters in the future, though perhaps not until tenure is safely 
behind me. 
 
T. P. 
Chapel Hill 
May 2009 
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FIRST CHAPTER: 
WHAT DOES THE MODEL-THEORETIC ARGUMET SHOW? 
 
     Some men are so impressed by what science knows that they forget what it does not know; 
others are so much more interested in what it does not know that in what it does that they belittle 
its achievements. Those who think that science is everything become complacent and cocksure, 
and decry all interest in problems not having the circumscribed definiteness that is necessary for 
scientific treatment…On the other hand, those who pooh-pooh science revert, as a rule, to some 
ancient and pernicious superstition…Both these attitudes are to be deplored, and it is philosophy 
that shows the right attitude, by making clear at once the scope and limitations of scientific 
knowledge. 
     –Bertrand Russell, “Philosophy for Laymen” 
 
 
Consider Anderson who shows her student Max a map of Iceland. As is usual, 
the map has dots and lines for the major cities and roads, respectively. However, the map 
lacks a legend explaining these marks, and there are no labels to indicate what the names 
of the cities and roads might be. Indeed, there are no words whatsoever on the map, so 
that it is not even stated that the map is a map of Iceland.  
Suppose Anderson attempts to explain the unmarked map to Max by drawing a 
picture of Iceland—but like the map, the picture also lacks any labels or legend. 
Nevertheless, suppose Anderson tries to explain the map just by pointing to a dot on the 
map, and then pointing to the corresponding area in the picture: “See, this dot designates 
this locale.” Suppose she also tries to explain which island is depicted by the map, by 
demonstrating his entire drawing and simply stating: “See, the map depicts this island 
here.” Now clearly, Max won’t learn much from this. If Max cannot identify Iceland as 
represented on the map, then presumably he cannot identify Iceland by the picture.  And 
so, Anderson will be unsuccessful in teaching Max what location the map depicts, what 
cities are found there, etc. 
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In Max’s case, the problem is that he is trying to learn about one representation 
(the map) via another representation (the drawing) for which he had no prior 
understanding. This, I claim, is somewhat analogous to a semanticist who tries to gain a 
certain theoretical understanding of a term, by using some other term that is left 
theoretically untreated. In one kind of case, the semanticist understands a name like 
‘Anderson’ by using the term ‘Anderson’ itself—as in the interpretation ‘ ‘Anderson’ 
denotes Anderson.’ Or following Russell (1905), the name may be analyzed into a 
description such as ‘the teacher with the unmarked map of Iceland’. But either way, the 
semanticist understands a representation only by some other (possibly type-identical) 
representation. And like Max, if there is no appropriate grasp of the latter representation, 
it may seem that we do not learn much from the semanticist. Of course, her analysis will 
indicate how one representation is semantically related to another. But as in the case of 
Max, one might feel that we have not been properly acquainted with the object that 
‘Anderson’ denotes.  
In the course of this chapter, I shall try to make this idea more precise. 
Essentially, I shall argue that certain fundamental questions about denotation lack 
adequate answers. Alternatively, the claim is that in one important sense a question like 
“What does ‘Iceland’ denote?” cannot be answered, even in principle. Of course, I think 
such a question can be answered in other, important senses. Thus, I do not intend to 
suggest there is no fact-of-the-matter as to what ‘Iceland’ denotes. My point here is more 
epistemic than metaphysical: The claim more precisely is that there is no sentence of the 
language which can serve as an informationally adequate answer, to certain questions 
about denotation. Or better, no sentence of the language will be informative in the right 
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way—much like the drawing of Iceland does not appropriately inform Max of what the 
unmarked map represents.  
What drives this claim is something like the metaphor that we cannot “step 
outside” the language to see what our terms correspond to in the world. In particular, I 
think we can ask a question like ‘What does ‘Iceland’ denote?’ in a way that would (per 
impossibile) require us to “step outside” the language. However, I want to replace the 
metaphor here with something more rigorous, viz., with the so-called “model-theoretic” 
argument from Putnam (1976), (1977), and (1981). This argument, I want to suggest, 
does not show the metaphysical thesis of anti-realism, as Putnam claims, but rather the 
epistemic-informational thesis that I want to advocate. That is, the model-theoretic 
argument reveals a way of asking ‘What does ‘Iceland’ denote?’, which makes an 
informationally adequate answer impossible. 
I am not the first to argue for such a thesis. Quine made this kind of claim in the 
second half of “Ontological Relativity,” also based on the model-theoretic argument 
(though in Quine it is better known as the “proxy-function” argument). The problem, 
however, was that Quine’s thesis about the unanswerability of semantic questions arose 
in a context where he assumed not only behaviorism, but also his semantic nihilism. And 
in such a context, it can be easy to dismiss Quine’s remarks. Yet I believe that one can 
use the same sort of argument, to the same effect, without such contentious assumptions. 
So in one sense, my aim is to resuscitate the second half of “Ontological Relativity,” for 
those of us who are neither behaviorists nor semantic nihilists. 
To take another angle, the present chapter can be seen as limiting (what we may 
call) the “default stance” in science, or in semantics more precisely. Our default stance is 
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that any question which can be formulated in the language has an adequate answer, 
except perhaps cases of, e.g.,  presupposition failure (“Have you stopped beating your 
wife?”). Now I think the “optimistic” stance toward questions is normally the 
appropriate one to take in a field of inquiry. Unless we have special reason to think 
otherwise, it is productive to assume that any question in a field of inquiry has an 
answer. Even so, the present chapter aims to show that we do have special reason to 
reject this stance, when it comes to questions about denotation. 
So in pointing to certain limits of semantic theorizing, my view could be called 
“pessimistic” as regards semantic theory. But I do not intend to belittle semantic theory 
as an enterprise, as Russell warned against in the opening quotation. In particular, I do 
not mean to advocate a kind of anti-scientism, or that semantics “rests on a mistake,” or 
that semantics is a failed “social construct” arising in a “Eurocentric paradigm.” Rather, 
I take the present chapter to be part of the scientific enterprise, and in particular, part of 
an inquiry into the epistemic condition of human beings. 
Since the model-theoretic argument is the key element in all this, much of the 
chapter will be spent clarifying what the argument is, and what exactly it shows. I shall 
first give a careful and detailed presentation of (what I take to be) Putnam’s anti-realist 
version of the argument. Then, I shall argue that this version does not survive an 
objection from David Lewis (1984).1 Next, I will consider a different, though less noted, 
version of model-theoretic argument in Putnam, which also attempts to debunk realism. 
This version also fails, we shall see. However, this second version serves as a starting 
point from which I will show that some semantic questions are indeed unanswerable in 
the sense discussed above.  
                                                 
1 References to Lewis throughout will be in relation to this paper. 
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I. Preliminary Sketch of the Argument. 
 The model-theoretic argument, as I understand it, comes in three stages. The first 
stage is the distinctly “model-theoretic” portion. In Putnam (1976), (1977) this model-
theoretic stage purports to show: 
 (C1) A true scientific theory has at least one nonstandard (or “unintended”) 
        interpretation which preserves its truth. 
 
However, in Putnam (1981), the first stage ends with the different claim that:  
(C1.1) For each possible world, sentences in a theory can be given a nonstandard 
           interpretation that conserves the truth-value of each sentence in that world.  
 
The key difference here is that (C1.1) concerns interpretations of a theory in every 
possible world. 
Either way, the second stage of the argument uses (C1) or (C1.1) to present a 
case against metaphysical realism. Putnam’s claim in particular is that, given the model-
theoretic contentions, realism will entail the view that: 
 (C2) The reference (or denotation) of terms is indeterminate.  
Here, terms like ‘determinate’ and ‘fixed’ express metaphysical notions, where x is 
determined or fixed by y just in case x is a (metaphysically) sufficient condition for y. 
Relevant substitutions for ‘x’ in the present case would include ‘a single interpretation of 
a term’ and ‘a term’s denoting an object o,’ etc.   
  Yet for your typical realist, (C2) would be absurd—and so, Putnam takes the 
argument to show that realism is “incoherent” (1976, p. 124). So, as the third stage of the 
argument, Putnam then concludes his brand of anti-realism: 
 (C3) Sentences in an ideal scientific theory cannot be false. 
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Here, ‘ideal’ means “epistemically ideal” (or some such thing); an ideal theory is one 
that is empirically adequate, and maximizes simplicity, conservativeness, utility, etc.  
But as Lewis also notes, it is dubious that (C3) separates realists from anti-
realists. Indeed, it seems to me that even a Berkeleyan may count as a “realist” in 
Putnam’s sense. For if the Berkeleyan holds that if the world consists of nothing but 
God’s ideas, she might still believe that truth is determined by facts about God’s ideas, 
and not by what our best theory says about those ideas. 
However, the denial of (C3) at least is what Putnam sees as most relevant to the 
realist view which the model-theoretic argument attacks. Putnam (1976) writes “The 
most important consequence of metaphysical realism is that truth is supposed to be 
radically non-epistemic…the theory that is ‘ideal’…might be false.” (p. 125). Yet 
because of our Berkeleyan, (C3) apparently does not characterize anti-realism in general; 
rather, it strikes me as a precisification of a pragmatist viewpoint, of the sort William 
James (1907) advocated. If, as Putnam claims, an ideal scientific theory cannot be false, 
then truth seems to be something like “what works in the way of belief.” 
 Still, this pragmatist view would be sufficient for the falsity of realism. For as 
Putnam states, the realist “assumes a theory-independent fact of the matter as to what a 
term in a given theory corresponds to” (1976, p. 136). However, if (C3) is right, then 
such theory-independent facts would not exist; the facts would be dependent on what the 
ideal theory says. So even if (C3) is not characteristically anti-realist, it would still 
undermine realism (perhaps inter alia).  
Since my aim is to determine what exactly the model-theroetic reasoning shows, 
I shall first examine the case for (C1) and (C1.1) in the next two sections, respectively. It 
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turns out that Putnam’s case for (C1) is lacking, as well as his argument for (C1.1) 
[though part of the former argument can be made good.]  However, readers may turn to 
section IV if they wish to skip this technical material and get to more philosophical 
matters. From section IV on, I show that the model-theoretic argument (and one of its 
variants) does not show Anti-Realism, but rather that certain semantic questions lack 
informationally adequate answers. 
 
II. onstandard Interpretations (Part One) 
In Putnam (1976) and (1977), argument for (C1) seems to be based on the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem; this theorem states that if a theory has a model of 
whatever cardinality, then it also has a countable model.2 Interestingly, then, the theorem 
guarantees the existence of countable models for set theory, even though the standard 
model for set theory is uncountable and contains elements which are themselves 
uncountable sets. [Skolem’s (1920) “paradox”]. The sentences of set theory can be made 
true in a countable model, basically, because the predicates can be reinterpreted so that 
the sentences say something different from what they standardly say. For example, 
‘uncountable’ can construed as “uncountable in the model,” or more exactly, “not 
enumerated by any function in the model.” In this manner, the sentence ‘there exist 
uncountable sets’ could be made true in the model if the model does not contain a one-
one pairing between natural numbers and members of some set. 
                                                 
2 I follow the standard habit of model theorists to use the term ‘model’ ambiguously, between models and 
domains of models. In truth, any model has a cardinality of two, since models are pairs with a domain and 
an interpretation-function. Yet talk of uncountable and countable models is meant with respect to the 
domain of a model. Model theory has done just fine with the ambiguity, presumably because 
disambiguation occurs in contexts of use. So under that assumption, I follow the standard usage.  
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Does (C1) follow from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem? Observe that if we 
begin with a theory that has a countable model, then the theorem is utterly trivial. So in 
particular, the theorem does not demonstrate a model with a nonstandard interpretation 
in these cases. But that means we cannot show (C1) from the Löwenheim-Skolem 
theorem.  
One may think, however, that (C1) holds if we are first given that a theory has an 
uncountable model. Yet even that does not follow. Consider a theory which names 
countably many objects, and whose quantificational claims are either trivial or satisfied 
just by the named objects. Then, if the model happens to contain an uncountable number 
of additional, unnamed objects, the theory will obviously have a countable and an 
uncountable model. Nonetheless, the language of the theory may have the same 
interpretation between these two models. 
Thus: If we are merely given that a theory has an uncountable model, then for all 
that tells us, the model is uncountable in virtue of having uncountably many 
“extraneous” objects, such as the model described above. Accordingly, if we then use 
Löwenheim-Skolem to show the theory has a countable model, this does not show that 
the language of the theory has a nonstandard interpretation-function which preserves 
truth. For the uncountable model we started with may just be “overabundant” though it 
shares the same interpretation-function as the countable model. 
A nonstandard interpretation is guaranteed by Löwenheim-Skolem only when a 
theory contains sentences about uncountably many objects, on the standard 
interpretation. That is why set theory is of special interest. But few of our scientific 
theories are like set theory; it is rare for us to stake claims about uncountably many 
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objects. So in fact, Löwenheim-Skolem guarantees nonstandard interpretations for very 
few, if any, of our scientific theories. That is a far cry from (C1). 
In Putnam (1976), however, part of the argument for (C1) seems to be separable 
from considerations relating to Löwenheim-Skolem.3 Putnam writes: 
Pick a model M of the same cardinality as THE WORLD. Map the individuals of M 
one-to-one into the pieces of THE WORLD. The result is a satisfaction relation 
SAT—a “correspondence” between the terms of [a language] L and sets of pieces 
of THE WORLD—such that the theory T1 comes out true—true of THE WORLD—
provided that we just interpret ‘true’ as TRUE(SAT). (p. 126) 
 
The idea is first to map objects in model M to pieces of the world, via some relation G, 
which is (presumably) non-equivalent to identity.4 Then, pick a relation R between terms 
and the worldly pieces such that: a term t bears R to y iff [t denotes x in M, where x is in 
turn is mapped to y (by G)].5 Next, we use R to define the denotation-predicate so that t 
now denotes x instead of y. (N.B., in some but not all instances, x can be identical to y.)  
In this, we have the makings of a model with the set of xs as domain, and R as the 
interpretation function. And in this model, it will be correct to say the theory is satisfied 
by pieces in the world. But since at most one of these interpretations can be the standard 
interpretation, this shows the theory has a nonstandard interpretation which preserves its 
truth. This, I think, is a sound argument for (C1).6 
Of course, semantic terms such as ‘denotes’ and ‘satisfies’ will mean something 
different than what we mean by these terms. Yet possible reinterpretations of ‘satisfies’ 
                                                 
3 Putnam (1976) does not regard these considerations as separate (see his note 3). But my objections to 
each individually also applies to them when conjoined.  
 
4 N.B., there will be such a relation even in uncountable models, since for finite x in a model, we can 
define a relation which maps these x to something other than x—and then map all other y to themselves. 
5 Here I use ‘denotes’ so that a predicate denotes members of its extension, rather than the extension itself. 
For instance, I assume ‘dog’ denotes members of the set of dogs, not the set as such. 
 
6 This argument, or something like it, seems to be what’s behind Lewis’ slogan “(almost) any world can 
satisfy (almost) any theory,” though Lewis also mentions Löwenheim-Skolem unnecessarily (p. 229-230). 
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is exactly what the argument exploits. Even if semantic terms are located in a different 
language, a metalanguage, both languages can subject to various interpretations.  
To illustrate, consider the following simple, little theory: 
(1) Everest is a mountain 
(2) London is not a mountain. 
 
Consider now the standard model for (1)-(2), where: 
(3) ‘Everest’ denotes Everest. 
(4)  ‘London’ denotes London. 
(5) ‘Mountain’ denotes mountains. 
 
Suppose now we map Everest to the number 3 and London to 4. From this, we can 
define a model M* where the terms in (1)-(2) are interpreted as follows:  
(3.1) ‘Everest’ denotes 3. 
(4.1) ‘London’ denotes 4. 
 (5.1) ‘Mountain’ denotes prime numbers. 
 
And under this interpretation, (1) and (2) will still express truths, viz.: 
 
 (1.1) 3 is prime. 
 (2.1) 4 is not prime. 
 
Thus, the theory has a nonstandard interpretation which preserves its truth. And 
basically, (C1) guarantees that this can happen with any scientific theory. 
 
III. onstandard Interpretations (Part Two) 
As I mentioned, the first stage of the model-theoretic argument is notably 
different in Putnam (1981). Here, the aim is to show the claim that:  
(C1.1) For each possible world, sentences in a theory can be given a nonstandard 
           interpretation that conserves the truth-value of each sentence in that world.  
 
Again, (C1.1) differs from (C1) in that the former explicitly concerns interpretations in 
any model whose objects are exactly those of some possible world (hereafter, any 
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“model corresponding to a world”). 7 [Also, (C1.1) is formulated in terms of preserving 
truth and falsity. But since we assume bivalence, this difference is only superficial.] 
Now in Putnam (1981), the argument for (C1.1) appeals to facts about 
permutations instead of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. (Reminder: a function is a 
permutation on a set S iff it is one-one into and onto S.) Let us first define a “nontrivial” 
predicate as one whose extension is neither empty nor universal in a given world. 
Putnam then defines a certain kind of function, where a function f is of this kind iff: 
(6) For any predicate with extension E in a world W, if the predicate is nontrivial, 
     then f(E) ≠ E; otherwise, f(E) = E.  
 
When f meets this condition, Putnam suggests that f can replace the interpretation-
function in the standard model corresponding to W (p. 217). The result, he says, is a 
model that has f as a nonstandard interpretation-function onto objects in W (ibid.). In 
addition, Putnam contends that f will be a permutation on these objects (ibid). This, he 
claims, is sufficient for an isomorphism between the f-model and the standard model. If 
so, then they are models for exactly the same sentences. Further, since f is nonstandard, 
then we know there is a nonstandard interpretation of terms which conserves truth-
values assigned by the standard interpretation in W (assuming that the theory has a 
predicate which is nontrivial in that world) (p. 218).8 This is meant to be sufficient for 
(C1.1). 
                                                 
7 N.B, (C1.1) entails (C1) [but not vice-versa]. Proof: Given a true scientific theory, its standard model 
will correspond to some possible world W. (C1.1) says, then, that there is a nonstandard interpretation 
which conserves the truth-values it has in W. (In this case, the truth-value conserved for each sentence 
would be “true”). So besides the standard interpretation, the theory also has a nonstandard interpretation 
which preserves truth, which is what (C1) says. 
 
8 In Putnam’s first statement of the thesis, the point is restricted to the theories with a nontrivial predicate 
in some world or other. But this seems to be a slip, since Putnam gives a deviant interpretation to a 
predicate in a world only if the predicate is nontrivial in that world. So if we want a deviant interpretation 
for every world, the theory must have a nontrivial predicate in every world. 
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However, I find the argument here confusing in several respects. I think my first 
two concerns can be resolved if we revise the argument (albeit in considerable respects). 
But the third concern I think is more formidable. 
First Concern: The reader may have noticed that fs is defined on certain sets of 
objects in a world (viz., extensions). Yet then, the function is not a permutation of the 
objects themselves, as Putnam seems to imply.  
But maybe this is no big deal. Perhaps this was really the intention all along. In 
that case, you might worry whether one-one correspondence is preserved between the f-
model and the standard model (which is a condition on isomorphism). Yet this worry 
disappears once we remember that the domain is constant between the two models.  
Even so, one may wonder how f is an interpretation-function at all. For such a 
function is defined on predicates, whereas f takes sets as inputs. But charitably, it is not f 
itself which is a deviant interpretation-function, but rather a function that defines a 
deviant function. In particular, given such an f, we can define an interpretation-function 
g such that, for a predicate Pn with E as its standard extension, g(Pn) = {x | x ∈ f(E)}. So 
for a given world, it appears that g(Pn) will be different from E, since f(E) ≠ E for 
nontrivial predicates. And so, g will be a nonstandard interpretation-function. 
Second Concern: Yet whatever the details here, Putnam assumes that any 
function like f gives us the desired sort of interpretation. That is, given a world W, 
Putnam thinks that such a function will afford us an interpretation-function such that, 
when paired with the standard domain, gives us an isomorphic model corresponding to 
W, i.e. a model that makes precisely the same sentences true. But that just isn’t so. For 
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there is not yet a guarantee that his interpretations will “co-ordinate” the predicates 
properly, so to speak. The point can be illustrated by following: 
(7) Everest is a mountain & Everest is snow-capped. 
As it stands, (7) is true in our world. Yet thanks to the relatively weak constraints on f, 
an f-model could make the extensions of ‘is a mountain’ and ‘is snow-capped’ 
completely disjoint, e.g., if ‘mountain’ denotes water and ‘snow-capped’ denotes rocks. 
And in a model which assigns such extensions, (7) will inevitably be false, no matter 
what ‘Everest’ denotes. 
Thus, since isomorphism is not guaranteed, I conclude that Putnam’s argument 
for (C1.1) fails. Nonetheless, considering Putnam’s proof of (C1), one might have an 
educated guess as to what is meant to occur in the present case: Putnam may be just 
trying to generalize the earlier proof of (C1) to an arbitrary world. At this point, this 
would mean defining the deviant function g not just by any permutation f; rather, given a 
world, g would be defined as the relation R mentioned earlier. 
More exactly: Suppose M is the standard model corresponding to an arbitrary 
world W. Then, map the objects of M to objects of W, by some relation non-equivalent 
to identity. [But note that the objects of M and of W are the same, since M corresponds 
to W—so the mapping does turn out to be a permutation f(x) on W-objects.] Now as 
before, consider the relation R such that: a term t bears R to y iff t denotes x in M, where 
f(x) = y. Since f(x) is non-equivalent to identity, it is not the case that tRy iff tRx in a 
given world, at least for some t. So R can stand as a nonstandard interpretation-function 
in a model M* corresponding to W, so that a term t denotes y in M* iff tRy. And since R 
is basically defined to ensure isomorphism, M* will make exactly the same sentences 
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true as in the standard model for W. Thus, for an arbitrary world, we can get a 
nonstandard interpretation of a theory which conserves truth-values in that world. 
Third Concern: However, there is a third objection which affects to both versions 
of the argument to (C1.1). Note that (C1.1) is a claim about any theory in any possible 
world. But at least with the first version of the argument, it is assumed that at least one 
predicate of a theory will be nontrivial in a given world, on the standard interpretation. 
But consider, e.g., that all predicates in (7) will be trivial in a world where there exists 
only a snow-capped Everest (or worlds with any number of additional snow-capped 
mountains). Yet that means Putnam’s strategy will not change the interpretation of the 
predicate in that world. So for all Putnam has shown, there are worlds where some 
theories have no nonstandard interpretation.9  
So much for the first version of the argument, but does the second version fare 
better? Unfortunately, a bit of reflection reveals that R must assign the same extension to 
a trivial predicate in a world. First, suppose the predicate p is empty in the standard 
model M. Then since any term t is such that tRy iff t denotes x in M (where f(x) = y), and 
given that p denotes no x in M, it follows that p will not bear R to anything. Hence the 
predicate will remain empty when R is the interpretation-function. 
Second, suppose a predicate p is universal in a world W. Then, its extension will 
include everything in W. Note, however, that the permutation f(x) maps objects in W to 
objects in W. Because of this, R must assign p a universal extension in W. For again, a 
term t bears R to y iff t denotes x in M (where f(x) = y). And since p denotes every x in M 
                                                 
9 Note that a similar issue does not arise with (C1). In the proof of (C1), but not with (C1.1), our 
nonstandard interpretation can be nonstandard in virtue of having a nonstandard domain of objects. And in 
such a case, even universal predicates will get a nonstandard interpretation. Still, this does not guarantee 
that a theory using only empty predicates will have a nonstandard interpretation which preserves truth. But 
charitably, one may assume that “scientific” theories of concern use at least one nonempty predicate. 
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(and since f(x) is one-one) p will bear R to every y in the nonstandard model. Yet the 
domain is constant between the standard and nonstandard model in these cases, since 
they are both supposed to be models which correspond to W. So p will denote precisely 
the same objects in both models, viz., all the objects in W.  
Is there a way to show (C1.1) in its full generality? There is the thought that we 
could define nonstandard interpretations, where each predicate is assigned its anti-
extension in a world. Then, we could invert the meaning of ‘~’, so that its absence 
means that the predicate is unsatisfied by the object, and its presence means that it is 
satisfied. But at least for Putnam, the argument is supposed to work by keeping the 
logical constants constant. Besides, it looks like (C1.1) would be quite trivial if ‘~’ can 
be reinterpreted. Of course, this may be grist for Putnam’s mill, at least as concerns the 
upcoming argument for (C2). But in any case, it is unclear how one could show (C1.1) 
just by reinterpreting terms. I conclude then that the Putnamian strategy used in the 
argument for (C1.1) is non-demonstrative. 
 
IV. Indeterminacy and the Lewis Objection 
We now come to the second stage of the model-theoretic argument, where 
Putnam contends that (C1) or (C1.1), plus realism, entails (C2). But given the above 
problem with (C1.1), I shall not consider it further. Still, if (C1.1) holds on the condition 
that a theory uses nontrivial predicates in a world, perhaps that would also be enough to 
show (C2) from realism. This conditionalized version of (C1.1) would be: 
(C1.2) For each possible world in which some predicate(s) of a theory are 
nontrivial, that theory can be given a nonstandard interpretation which 
conserves truth-values in that world. 
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Yet whether we assume (C1) or (C1.2), the puzzle now is to figure out how (C2) is 
supposed to follow from this plus realism. 
It is agreed that the model-theoretic considerations suggest that no theory can fix 
the interpretation of its own terms. This is apparently what motivates Putnam to ask the 
realist if anything can fix a theory’s interpretation on her view. But the negative answer 
at (C2) follows only if all other plausible, realist options have been eliminated. Putnam, 
however, has some sensitivity to this and does touch upon a few alternatives. One 
considered in his (1981) is the proposal is that, if a speaker’s intends her use of ‘Everest’ 
to denote Everest, then this intention determines that Everest is the unique object of her 
term. But Putnam objects that there are nonstandard interpretations of her intentions as 
well, e.g., where the speaker intends to use ‘Everest’ to denote the number 0. And thus 
the issue is pushed back onto mental representations. 
Perhaps this response is not entirely effective—but whatever we think here, other 
accounts of reference-fixing still need to be dealt with. In particular, there are two 
accounts mentioned in Lewis (1984) which are fairly compelling options, viz., the causal 
theory of reference, as well as a view Lewis calls “causal descriptivism.” 
As concerns the causal theory: The idea is that the denotation of a term is fixed in 
virtue of a causal-chain (of a specified sort) leading from the object, into the mind of the 
speaker, to tokenings of the term. Granted, the details of such an account may be 
unknown, but many philosophers could agree that some kind of causal-condition is what 
fixes denotation. Note, however, that the causal theorist is not suggesting that the causal 
theory fixes the interpretation of terms. Putnam (1977) rightly emphasizes that this is 
“just more theory;” after all, the model-theoretic reflections show that no theory can fix 
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denotation, including the causal theory. And so instead, the causal theorist is suggesting 
that the casual chains themselves fix denotation, independently of any theory of them. 
 But according to Lewis, the causal theory cannot be the whole story about 
reference (p. 227). Lewis thus favors a view he calls “causal descriptivism” which he 
defines as “descriptivism, global or local, in which the descriptions are largely couched 
in causal terms” (p. 226). However, Lewis admits that if such a descriptivism attempts to 
fix the meaning of nontrivial predicates via description (and nothing else), then the 
model-theoretic considerations show that such a view fails. Lewis thus adds a further 
condition on the determination of reference, which he introduces as follows: 
Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, 
gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so 
that their boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in 
nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents. The 
world—any world—has the makings of many interpretations that satisfy many 
theories; but most of these interpretations are disqualified because they employ 
ineligible referents. (p. 227) 
 
The basic idea is that the world helps determine what terms denote, by the fact that the 
world contains exactly those things (and kinds) which are eligible referents. 
 Part of this restriction is apparently on which domain of objects will be the 
standard domain, viz., only objects with “objective sameness and difference in nature.” 
Yet the previous section revealed that a constant domain does not always safeguard 
against nonstandard interpretations. However, Lewis also constrains things by limiting 
the denotation of terms to real kinds and particulars, as opposed to “gruesome” or 
Cambridge kinds or particulars. The metaphysical essentialism in this is actually 
unpalatable to Putnam (1983, p. xii)—though as Lewis points out, he gives no real 
argument here. [This is especially strange, since it was Putnam (1975) who did much to 
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establish essentialism as the current orthodoxy]. And since Lewis’ view explicitly 
embraces essentialism, Putnam would need more than an incredulous stare to write it off.  
 Still, the restriction on the domain, plus the restriction to real kinds/particulars, 
does not fix a unique extension of all terms in any scientific theory. In fact, Lewis 
himself concedes that a theory may describe two real particulars by the same predicates. 
(p. 223). In such a case, then, a descriptivist will be unable to fix a name for just one of 
these objects. Nonetheless, Lewis claims this is a “moderate” kind of indeterminacy, and 
that “the existence of moderate indeterminacy is not to be denied” (ibid). 
 Yet moderate indeterminacy would seem contentious indeed. In fact, a causal 
theorist might provide exactly the kind of opposition which Lewis discounts. For many 
causal theorists, there would be a fact-of-the-matter as to which real particular is 
causally linked to the introduction of a term (at a “baptism ceremony”), even if our 
descriptions are not definite. Of course, whether this is plausible in every case may be 
disputed. But the point is that moderate indeterminacy could be more of a liability than 
Lewis lets on. 
 Nonetheless, if causal descriptivism is just intended to be an alternative account 
of reference-fixing which enjoys some plausibility, then it seems fair to grant Lewis this 
much. Or at least, one can point to the causal theory of reference as a popular view of 
reference-fixing which Putnam should contend with. Either way, Putnam would not yet 
be warranted in concluding (C2) from the model-theoretic considerations and realism. 
 At various points, however, Putnam addresses the type of account which 
concerns Lewis. In his (1977), for instance, he complains that “the world doesn’t pick 
models or interpret languages. We interpret our languages or nothing does” (p. 24). But 
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this remark strikes me as unfair. For the realist does not endow the world with any 
agency with respect to interpretation. According to the causal theory, we interpret a term 
as denoting a particular object in the world, e.g. at a “baptism ceremony.”  Whereas, for 
causal descriptivism, we interpret a term by describing real kinds/particulars in the 
world. Of course, the world is relevant to the process of interpretation—but the point 
stands that we are the agents in this process. 
 In Putnam (1981), the causal theory is dealt with in a different manner. He first 
identifies a class of reference-fixing accounts which conform to the following schema: 
 (8) x refers to y iff x bears R to y 
In this, “R is a relation definable in natural science vocabulary without using any 
semantical notions” (p. 45) Presumably, the causal theory of reference will be an 
example of an (8)-style account, though Lewis’ causal descriptivism may be as well—if 
talk of “describing” an object can be naturalized appropriately.  
In any case, Putnam’s objection to (8)-style accounts is expressed as follows: 
 
Given that there are many ‘correspondences’ between words and things, even 
many that satisfy our constraints, what singles out one particular correspondence 
R? Not the empirical correctness constraints [which have nonstandard 
interpretations]. Not, as we have seen, our intentions (rather R enters into 
determining what our intentions signify). It seems as if the fact that R is reference 
must be a metaphysically, unexplainable fact, a kind of primitive, surd, 
metaphysical truth. (p. 46) 
 
However, this reply is dubious for two reasons. First, even if certain realist accounts 
have failed to explain reference-fixing, it does not follow that the reference-fixing is 
inexplicable for the realist (though an explanatory challenge would remain, no doubt). 
Second, what’s supposed to undermine the causal theory (among others) is that other 
accounts of reference-fixing have failed, e.g., the “intentions” account. But just because 
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certain other accounts have failed, it of course does not follow that the causal theory, 
etc., also fail. 
Thus the causal accounts seem untouched by Putnam’s objections. And so, there 
remain viable, realist options for reference-fixing which Putnam has not ruled out—
meaning that (C2) will not follow from the model-theoretic considerations plus realism. 
 
V. Another Model-Theoretic Argument. 
 
 I thus conclude that the model-theoretic argument, properly so called, is 
unsuccessful. However, there is another, less noted, anti-realist argument in Putnam 
(1976) and (1977), which also starts from the model-theoretic considerations. This 
second “model-theoretic argument” is outlined in Putnam (1977) as follows: 
The problem with realist semantics—truth-conditional semantics—as Dummett 
has emphasized, is that if we hold that the understanding of the sentences of, say, 
set theory consists in our knowledge of their ‘truth conditions’, then how can we 
possibly say what that knowledge in turn consists in? (It cannot…consist in the 
use of language or ‘mentalese’ under…constraints, be they fixed or evolving, 
since such constraints are too weak to provide a determinate extension for the 
terms…) (p. 20). 
 
The target here is truth-conditional semantics (TCS), based on a Tarskian theory of 
satisfaction for L-terms—a semantics which Putnam also calls “realist semantics.” Such 
a semantics is usually given under the assumption that understanding L consists in 
knowing (at least tacitly) a Tarskian theory for L. [N.B., Putnam switches between 
talking of L-sentences and of L-terms—for simplicity, I’ll just stick to terms.] 
 My best guess is that the argument above has something like the following, basic 
structure. For any language L: 
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(TCS) To understand L is to know (perhaps tacitly) a Tarskian theory of L.10  
                   [Assume for reductio] 
 
(9) A Tarskian theory of L has nonstandard interpretations which conserve truth- 
     values.           `            [from (C1)]11 
 
 (10) If (TCS) and (9), then to understand L is not to know (either tacitly or 
                   explicitly) the extension of an L-term.               [Assumption] 
 
 (11) To understand L is not to know (either tacitly or explicitly) the extension of 
                    an L-term.                             [from (TCS), (9), (10)] 
 
However, (11) is seen as an absurdity. So to use Putnam’s turn of phrase, how can (TCS) 
possibly explain what knowing the extension of a term (perhaps tacitly) consists in? 
But again, I find Putnam’s argument disorienting. The first concern I think can be 
quelled—though the second and third ones are more persistent.  
First Concern: One issue is that falsity of (11) seems disputable. Consider a 
youngster who is competent to a significant degree in using ‘Pollux;’ she can 
competently report, for example, that Pollux is the brightest star in Gemini. But suppose 
she has never heard of Castor (and suppose she would be unable to distinguish Castor 
from Pollux, were we to point them out to her). In such a case, it looks like she would 
not know (not even tacitly) that ‘Pollux’ does not denote Castor. (She probably does not 
even have the concept of Castor.) If so, then she would not know (not even tacitly) a 
unique referent for ‘Pollux.’ ‘Pollux’ may denote Castor for all she knows. 
Ironically, this kind of phenomenon is often cited against Tarskian theory—it 
seems to show that competence does not consist in knowing necessary and sufficient 
                                                 
10 Tacitness is not mentioned in Putnam; yet this is certainly necessary to ensure Putnam is not attacking a 
straw-man. Only readers of Tarski explicitly know a Tarskian theory for L, but of course, children can 
understand L without such explicit knowledge. 
 
11 It may be odd to assume that (C1) applies to a Tarskian theory, since this would assume the Tarskian 
theory is “scientific.” Nonetheless, the argument for (C1) can be made vis-à-vis a Tarskian theory; so in 
that sense, the conditions that suffice for (C1) also suffice for (9). [N.B., (C1.2) would seem to entail (9) as 
well, assuming that a Tarskian theory has a nontrivial predicate in our world.] 
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conditions for the application of a term. But in the present context, the point is used 
against (11) in order to defend the Tarskian theory from Putnam’s argument.  
Regardless, even if (11) is false and Putnam’s argument is unsound, he could still 
make a very similar case against Tarskian semantics. Consider: Putnam’s rival would 
presumably contend that the youngster knows something about the object of ‘Pollux.’ 
Yet if (TCS) and (9) are true, Putnam can insist that she would know nothing about what 
‘Pollux’ denotes.  In this, Putnam would be assuming the following revision of (10): 
(10.1) If (TCS) and (9), then to understand L is not to know anything (not even 
         tacitly) about what L-terms denote. 
 
So given (TCS) and (9), it would then follow: 
 
(11.1) To understand L is not to know anything (not even tacitly) about what 
                       L-terms denote. 
 
Yet (11.1), surely, is absurd. Even our youngster knows something about Pollux, e.g., 
that it is part of Gemini.  
 Second Concern: But this raises the obvious question as to why (10.1) is true. [I 
assume that (10) is now superseded by this premise.] Why should the metaphysical 
claim at (9), plus (TCS), entail the epistemic claim at (11.1)?     
The matter requires us to delve deeper into what (10.1) means. First, as concerns 
its antecedent, (9) says that a Tarskian theory can be satisfied in many different ways. 
And in the present context, this means a Tarskian theory is indeterminate in what it says, 
unless something other than itself determines the extensions of its terms. 
Thus (9) is true because either a Tarskian theory does not say anything—or, a 
Tarskian theory says something given that something else fixes denotation. Now in the 
former scenario, it is clear why (TCS) and (9) would entail the epistemic claim at (11.1); 
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that is to say, in such a case, it is clear why (10.1) is true. For if the Tarskian theory does 
not say anything, then merely being acquainted with its meaningless sentences would not 
suffice for any knowledge of L-terms. And that is precisely what (11.1) says. So (10.1) 
would be on target here, and the absurdity at (11.1) would follow. 
Yet consider the case where (9) is true because something other than a Tarskian 
theory fixes denotation. Would (TCS) and (9) then suffice for (11.1)? No. As we just 
saw, if (TCS) has any chance at surviving the argument, then its talk of “knowing a 
Tarskian theory” should not concern just an acquaintance with meaningless expressions. 
Rather, it should concern knowledge of what these expressions express. Moreover, in the 
present case, we can assume that these expressions do express something, since ex 
hypothesi something (other than a Tarskian theory) fixes the denotation of terms. But 
then if (TCS) is true and read along these lines, it would seem that understanding L does 
mean knowing something about what L-terms denote—even if (9) is true. Knowing what 
a Tarskian theory for L expresses would appear sufficient for knowing something about 
what L-terms denote, contra (11.1). 
 Thus, I find the Putnam argument against (TCS) unsound. Nonetheless, there is a 
closely related, Wittgensteinian problem for (TCS). Suppose with (TCS) that 
understanding L consists in knowing a Tarskian theory of L. Then, if the Tarskian theory 
is in L, understanding L would presuppose understanding L—meaning it would be 
impossible to understand L in the first place. On the other hand, if the Tarskian theory 
consists of sentences in some other language L*, then understanding L would 
presuppose understanding this other language. But if understanding L* consists in 
knowing a Tarskian theory for L*, as (15) implies, then assuming this theory is not given 
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in L or L* (on pain of circularity), understanding L* would require understanding some 
third language. And thus a regress. 
 A defender of (TCS) might reply that if the Tarskian theory is given in thought 
rather than a natural language, then there is no need to worry about a regress. Yet 
plausibly, thought counts as a “language” at least in the minimal sense that it is a set of 
representations where some representations (viz., thoughts) are systematically composed 
from others (viz., concepts or atomic thoughts). [Note that this does not necessarily 
imply there is a “language of thought” in the sense of Fodor (1975).] Yet if thought is a 
language, it cannot function as a regress-stopper if TCS is supposed to account for 
knowledge of any language. Yet TCS is most likely intended to be an account of only 
spoken and written languages. If so, then thought can indeed stop the regress, though of 
course TCS would leave open the question of what we know when we know the use of a 
mental representation. In a loose sense, then, TCS might not count as a complete theory 
of what we know when we know a “language.” 
Third Concern: Yet even if there is a cogent argument against (TCS), it is also 
unclear why Putnam thinks this affects realism. For one, given that he assimilates truth-
conditional semantics to “realist semantics,” Putnam seems to think that any realist will 
accept (TCS). But this is simply incorrect. Realists can follow Wittgenstein instead to 
the view that linguistic competence consists in having certain abilities, and perhaps 
connectionist or dynamical models give a clue as to how all this works.12, 13  
                                                 
12 Apparently, it is also false that only realists accept (TCS)—in itself, truth-conditional semantics seems 
quite metaphysically neutral (see Bar-On et al.).  
 
13 A good introduction to connectionism is Rummelhart (1989). Dynamical models are nicely summarized 
in the Introduction to Port and van Gelder (1998). 
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 Moreover, even if there is a problem of explaining linguistic competence, it 
doubtful that this is a distinctly realist problem. It seems anyone would want an 
explanation of that. Putnam in fact proffers a “verificationist” semantics which promises 
to do better explanatory work than the alternative. However, if Putnam’s view is that 
understanding consists in knowing (at least tacitly) a certain kind of verification-
condition, then it seems knowing a language may also consist in knowing (at least 
tacitly) a certain kind of theory, viz., a theory which gives verification-conditions for 
sentences. But if so, then it the second model-theoretic argument would be just as 
applicable to Putnam’s view as to (TCS). Of course, Putnam can construe knowledge of 
verification-conditions in terms of an ability to use sentences in such-and-such ways. But 
as I mentioned, this move also seems available to the realist—so Putnam has no 
advantage on this point either. 
 
VI. Pessimism about Semantics. 
So even if (TCS) is wrong, it seems that realism would also survive Putnam’s 
second argument from model theory. But even if Putnam’s arguments are unsound, are 
the model-theoretic considerations unimportant outside of model theory? Do they 
indicate anything philosophically significant? As I’ve mentioned, I think in fact they 
support a certain kind of pessimistic claim, viz., that in a fundamental sense (to put it 
roughly), there is no answer to the question of what a term, such as ‘Pollux’, denotes. 
To bring this out, let me crudely borrow from Plato the fictional of “Socrates”—
who asks us innocently enough “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?”14 Now at first, Socrates’ 
question may seem rather contrived. Of course we all know what ‘Pollux’ denotes. But 
                                                 
14 Of course, I do not mean to attribute to Plato or the historical Socrates any of the views discussed here. 
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Socrates grants that we all “know what ‘Pollux’ denotes,” in the sense that we all have a 
Wittgensteinian understanding of the term. Yet understanding the term in that sense does 
not mean we know an interpretation of the term. And Socrates is challenging us to give 
an interpretation which answers his question “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” 
But conjuring up such an interpretation seems very easy. In a Tarskian theory, a 
base clause such as the following would seem to resolve the matter: 
(12) ‘Pollux’ denotes Pollux. 
Or, taking a lead from Field (1972): 
 (13) ‘Pollux’ denotes what it denotes. 
But though these are clearly true, they are quite uninformative. And so, they are not 
well-suited to answer the question of what ‘Pollux’ denotes. (Henceforth, I use ‘answer’ 
in a robust sense, so that an answer is the same as an adequate answer.) After all, if you 
began in ignorance of what ‘Pollux’ denotes, (12) and (13) will not dispel that ignorance.  
 We can take away a few lessons here however. First, given an interrogative with 
the normal form “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?,” an answer (if any) would be a true 
sentence having the normal form “ ‘Pollux’ denotes y,” i.e., a true interpretation of 
‘Pollux’.15 As the more important lesson, however, (12) and (13) show that truth is not 
enough for an interpretation to answer a question; an interpretation must also be 
informative, to say the least. But of course, the additional informativeness requirement 
seems easy enough to meet. For instance, a theory might contain the following: 
(14) ‘Pollux’ denotes Polydeuces. 
                                                 
15 An “interrogative” is a sentence ending with ‘?’, whereas “questions” are what interrogatives express. I 
assume an interrogative might express different questions in different contexts, depending on what is 
assumed as background. If this is a contentious view of questions, you can have the term ‘question’ as 
long as I can coin some term to express the notion here.  
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(15) ‘Pollux’ denotes the red giant in Gemini. 
So again, Socrates seems mistaken if he means to suggest that his question is 
unanswerable. 
However, it depends on the background knowledge or the assumptions in a 
context, as to whether (14) or (15) answer “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?.” The easiest 
way to see this is when ‘Polydeuces’ is a completely unfamiliar term, and the only 
response given to the question is (14). Yet for Socrates, this kind of thing is not going to 
be an issue. We may assume that all terms are understood in the Wittgensteinian sense 
(at least to a non-negligible degree). 
But even so, (14) or (15) may not answer such a question, since an inquisitor 
might have the same sort of question for the right-hand terms. Suppose someone asks 
“What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” for the purpose of locating the object overhead in the 
night sky.16 Suppose further that she is familiar the terms ‘Polydeuces’ and ‘the red giant 
in Gemini’, though she is also unsure of the location of their object as well. In that case, 
neither (14) nor (15) will answer her question, even though they may tell her something 
new. In contrast, however, if she did previously know the location of  “Polydeuces” or 
“the red giant in Gemini,” then (14) or (15) would presumably answer her question. 
A variation on this case is where the inquisitor antecedently knows (14) and (15), 
though is again ignorant about where to look for “Polydeuces” and “the red giant in 
Gemini.”  Here, it is even clearer that (14) or (15) will not resolve her question. When 
given (14) and (15), she may reply “Sure, I knew that already, but I might just as well 
                                                 
16 This illustrates the purpose-relative nature of wh-questions, as discussed by Boër and Lycan (1984).  
Intuitively, since the inquisitor’s purpose is to locate Pollux overhead, x answers her question only if it 
enables her to do this. However, purpose-relativity is a complication which we can avoid in the skeptic’s 
case, and so I mention it here only. 
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ask what ‘Polydeuces’ or ‘the red giant in Gemini’ picks out overhead.” The variant-case 
is notable, since it shows there can be a question about what ‘Pollux’ denotes, even if 
some true, informative interpretation(s) of ‘Pollux’ are antecedently known. 
The upshot is that order to answer what a term denotes, it is not enough if you 
offer a true interpretation which is informative in some way or other. It also must be 
informative in the right way. This at least means: It must be informative in such a way 
that the parallel question for the right-hand term does not arise for the inquisitor.17 And 
whether the question gets “pushed back” onto the right-hand term is largely determined 
by what is previously known or assumed in the context of inquiry.18 
Getting back to Socrates, let us first consider (14) as a possible response to his 
question. Like the stargazer, Socrates might object that (14) merely pushes back the 
issue onto ‘Polydeuces’, given his background.  Perhaps, but what is his background 
exactly? Well, whatever else he assumes, my Socrates asks his question when a certain 
model-theoretic result is on his mind. Indeed, what first prompts his question is: 
(16) ‘Pollux’ could denote any number of things, without effect to the truth- 
        values of sentences. 
 
This is shown in the same way as (C1): (16) is true since there are a variety of models 
isomorphic to the standard model19 where the denotation of ‘Pollux’ differs between 
these models. The models are constructed by first interpreting the names for Pollux as 
                                                 
17 The right-hand term in (14) may be an issue for the stargazer even if she does not ask a follow-up 
question with normal form “What does ‘Polydeuces’ denote?” She may instead ask “Where is 
Polydeuces?.” But the metalinguistic question is still an issue for her, given that an answer to that question 
would obviate the need for the other, non-metalinguistic question. 
 
18 In practice questions of course do not get pushed back ad infinitum; on this point, Boër and Lycan 
(1984) argue forcefully that a term stops the regress if it counts as “important” in a context. (Even so, the 
present section can be seen as arguing that nothing stops the regress in certain model-theoretic inquiries.) 
19 N.B., the standard model is trivially isomorphic to itself. Thus, when I speak of models isomorphic to 
the standard model, this includes standard model. 
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names for an object y, and then stipulating that y satisfies an arbitrary predicate ‘F’ in the 
constructed model iff Pollux satisfies ‘F’ in the standard model.20 
Thus Socrates begins in the recognition that there are several possibilities for 
what ‘Pollux’ denotes, truth-values being what they are. This then prompts the question, 
roughly, as to which possibility is actual. Now Socrates grants that a question about what 
‘Pollux’ denotes might be answered by (14). But in those cases, he worries that the 
question was not a very good one. Suppose, for example, that Socrates antecedently 
knows (14). Further, suppose he knows that in each isomorphism under consideration: 
(17) What ‘Pollux’ denotes = what ‘Polydeuces’ denotes.  
 
Socrates knows (17) must be true, based on his knowledge that (14) is true, and indeed, 
true in any isomorphism.  For the truth of (14) in an isomorphism indicates that its terms 
co-refer.21  And such co-reference is exactly what (17) expresses.  
Now given (16) and (17), Socrates will also be assuming that: 
 (18) ‘Pollux’ and ‘Polydeuces’ could co-denote any number of things, without 
                   effect to the truth-values of sentences. 
 
After all, the various isomorphisms show that what ‘Pollux’ denotes could be any 
number of things, without a change in truth-values. But per (17), ‘Polydeuces’ will 
denote whatever ‘Pollux’ denotes in each of these isomorphisms. And so, what these 
terms co-denote may be any number of things, without a change in truth-values. 
                                                 
20 This differs somewhat from Putnam’s method for constructing isomorphisms, since he operates at the 
“object level” by first mapping the object of ‘Pollux’ onto some y. Yet the upshot is the same since if we 
instead begin by mapping names for Pollux onto y, we will end up with the same isomorphism. 
 
21 This reveals that Socrates is only considering isomorphisms where quote-names and the ‘denotes’ 
predicate are constant in meaning. Socrates could enlarge the set of isomorphisms so that this is not the 
case, but it suffices to . After all, if no candidate-answer “singles out” one possibility in the smaller set, the 
same will be true vis-à-vis the superset. 
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But given his assumption at (17), it is important to note something that Socrates 
will not be assuming. Among the possible objects for ‘Pollux’, Socrates of course does 
not presuppose that any particular possibility is actually what ‘Pollux’ denotes, on pain 
of begging his own question. Yet since he is antecedently aware of (17), he equally does 
not presuppose that any particular possibility is actually what ‘Polydeuces’ denotes. By 
his lights, to do so would also beg the question. 
 So although Socrates is asking a question about ‘Pollux’, he is really putting 
‘Polydeuces’ in question as well. Yet that means (14) does not answer his question. 
Since the question about ‘Polydeuces’ is equally an issue, (14) only pushes her question 
about ‘Pollux’ back onto ‘Polydeuces’. He still accepts truth of (14)—but with all the 
isomorphisms in play, this is only to grant that its terms co-refer. [See Figure 1.] 
 The ineffectiveness of (14) might have been obvious enough; ex hypothesi, my 
Socrates had foreknowledge of its truth after all. But it is important to appreciate the 
reasons as to why his question arises, despite this foreknowledge. These reasons are 
important since, if Socrates had not antecedently known (14), he nonetheless would have 
had similar reasons to be dissatisfied.  
Figure 1: Two Models for (14). In both models depicted, (14) will be evaluated as true (given the co-
reference of the two names), even though the terms are mapped to Castor in one case. Bold and unbold 
arrows show what the terms are mapped onto by the two different interpretation-functions. 
Model A             Model B 
             ‘Pollux’      ‘Polydeuces’ 
    Pollux            Castor     Pollux            Castor 
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So assume for the sake of argument that, although Socrates is familiar with the 
terms ‘Pollux’ and ‘Polydeuces’, he is unaware that they denote the same thing. (Cf. 
Puzzled Pierre’s competence with ‘London’ and ‘Londres’.)  Thus, we may imagine he 
is antecedently unaware that (14) is true. Suppose then that he asks “What does ‘Pollux’ 
denote?” with (16) on his mind. Will (14) then answer his question? Well, let’s suppose 
that instead of (17), Socrates starts with the more general premise that:  
(17.1) If ‘Pollux’ and a name φ co-refer, they do so in each isomorphic model 
          under consideration. 
 
 (17.1) is true for a similar reason as (17): The relevant isomorphisms are simply defined 
as ones where all names for Pollux are interpreted as names for some object y. 
Accordingly, given (16) and (17.1), he also takes as background that for any φ in 
the set N of names which co-refer with ‘Pollux’: 
 (18.1) ‘Pollux’ and φ could co-denote any number of things, without effect to the 
                      truth-values of sentences. 
 
The argument for (18.1) is the same as the argument for (18), mutatis mutandis. Now it 
is also important that in the present case, Socrates makes a further assumption that: 
 (19) If φ is a name and 
┌ 
‘Pollux’ denotes φ
 ┐ is true, then φ ∈ N. 
Though this is fairly trivial, it has a notable consequence when coupled with (18.1). 
 (20) If φ is a name and 
┌ 
‘Pollux’ denotes φ
 ┐ is true, then ‘Pollux’ and φ could 
       co-denote any number of things, without effect to the truth-values of   
       sentences. 
 
The argument for (20) and (18.1) are almost the same; we only need to add per (19) that 
if 
┌ 
‘Pollux’ denotes φ
 ┐
 is true, φ co-refers with ‘Pollux’. 
Now as before, given Socrates’ background in this case, there are a few 
important things he will not be assuming. First: Just as he does not presuppose that some 
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particular object is what ‘Pollux’ denotes, he also does not presuppose that some 
particular object is what a co-referring name denotes. For he is well-aware by (17.1) that 
such an object just is what ‘Pollux’ denotes—a co-referring name is merely another label 
for the same thing. So by his lights, to presuppose that some particular object is what a 
co-referring name denotes would just beg the question he is asking. Second, and as an 
instance of this: He will not make any presupposition as to what is denoted by a name on 
the right-hand side of a true ‘Pollux’-interpretation. For the name will be co-referring, 
per (19). Generally, as far as Socrates is concerned, the identity-relation between the 
object of ‘Pollux’ and the object of an equivalent label is just too obvious to presuppose 
knowledge of one while asking about the other.  
 So again, though his question is about ‘Pollux’, Socrates takes the attitude that 
his question really indicts co-referring names as well, including any names on the right-
side of true ‘Pollux’-interpretations. And so, if this is the background, she will be 
dissatisfied with (14), even if (14) teaches him something new. Once given (14), he can 
accept it is true, and thereby learn that ‘Pollux’ denotes Polydeuces (in the way that 
Puzzled Pierre might learn that ‘Londres’ denotes London). Nonetheless, as with the 
neophyte stargazer, Socrates may still complain that it merely pushes back his question 
about ‘Pollux’ onto ‘Polydeuces’. For given his background, he will hold ‘Polydeuces’ 
in question just as much as ‘Pollux’. After all, Socrates assumed all along that ‘Pollux’ 
and an arbitrary co-referring name will co-denote any number of things between the 
isomorphisms. But he is not simply going to assume that some particular object is what a 
co-referring name denotes, on pain of begging the question. 
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 I have perhaps belabored the inadequacy of (14). But this is only because, if we 
also add a more descriptive interpretation such as (15), it turns out that Socrates can 
make the same kind of complaint. The kind of inquisitor which ultimately concerns me is 
one who accepts a variant of (17.1) which covers not just names, but any term 
ψ including the descriptor used in (15). Thus, assume that Socrates knows : 
(17.2) If ‘Pollux’ and ψ co-refer, they do so in each isomorphic model under 
          consideration. 
 
Now when ψ is a descriptor, it may not be as obvious why this version of (17) is true. 
We know that in each isomorphism under consideration, once the names for Pollux have 
been interpreted as names for some y, it is then stipulated that y satisfies a predicate ‘F’ 
in the isomorphism iff Pollux satisfies ‘F’ in the standard model. Thus, all and only the 
same predicates which Pollux satisfies in the standard model are satisfied by this y. 
Moreover, if a descriptor is satisfied by Pollux in the standard model, it will be satisfied 
by this y in the isomorphism. After all, whether a descriptor is satisfied by an object is 
determined by which predicates it satisfies. Yet since the same predicates are satisfied in 
either model, the descriptor will be satisfied in either case. Thus, a descriptor will be 
satisfied by y in the isomorphism iff it is satisfied by Pollux in the standard model. 
 As the reader may expect, then, under (17.2) my Socrates is also aware that: 
(18.2) If ‘Pollux’ and a term ψ co-refer, then they could co-denote any number of 
                     things, without effect to the truth-values of sentences. 
  
In addition, he will presuppose the truism:  
(19.1) Given an arbitrary term ψ, if 
┌ 
‘Pollux’ denotes ψ
 ┐ is true, then ‘Pollux’ 
          and ψ co-refer. 
 
And so parallel to the case of names, Socrates antecedently makes the inference from 
(18†) and (19.1) to: 
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 (20.1) Given a term ψ, if 
┌ 
‘Pollux’ denotes ψ
 ┐ is true, then ‘Pollux’ and ψ 
                      could co-denote any number of things, without effect to the truth-values of 
          sentences. 
 
But also, like the case of names, Socrates will not assume that any particular object is 
actually what a co-referring term denotes. And in particular, he will not assume that any 
particular object is denoted by a term on the right-side of a true ‘Pollux’-interpretation.  
Again, it seems rather obvious to him that, once we sufficiently comprehend the 
isomorphic possibilities being raised, it begs the question to assume such a thing. 
 So in this set-up, Socrates views his question about ‘Pollux’ as a question about 
its co-referring terms as well—including co-referring terms on the right-side of true 
‘Pollux’-interpretations. This means he will be dissatisfied with (15) as well as (14), 
even if both teach him something new, e.g., that ‘Pollux’ and ‘Polydeuces’ co-refer. And 
as with (14), he can still grant that (15) is true, since relative to his assumptions, this 
only grants the co-reference of its terms. [See Figure II].  Even so, (15) merely pushes 
back the question about ‘Pollux’ onto the descriptor ‘the red giant in Gemini’. For he  
might have known all along that some true interpretations would use a co-referring 
 
Figure 2: (15) in Model A and Model B. If we take models A and B from Figure I, we can also work it 
so that (15) is true in both models. The trick is in Model B: Though ‘in Gemini’ still denotes things in 
Gemini, ‘red giant’ does not denote red giants, but rather objects in a set X, where Castor is uniquely in X 
and in Gemini. (X could be, e.g., the set of things that are such-and-such light-years from the sun.) 
Model A             Model B 
           ‘the  red giant  in Gemini’ 
    Pollux            Castor     Pollux            Castor 
   Red Giants 
  
 
 
        In Gemini 
 
                     In Gemini 
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descriptor—yet he does not assume that any particular object is what such a descriptor 
denotes. Again, that object obviously just is what ‘Pollux’ denotes, meaning that to 
assume such a thing would be to beg the question. 
We can imagine Socrates summing up the situation as follows: 
Since there is an isomorphism where ‘Pollux’ denotes, e.g., Castor, my inquiry 
starts from the assumption that ‘Pollux’ might denote Castor (truth-values being 
what they are). Yet since I acknowledge (18.2), I am equally starting from the 
assumption that any co-referring term might denote Castor. That’s because I 
accept (17.2), which says that in an isomorphism where ‘Pollux’ denotes Castor, 
its co-referring terms all denote Castor as well. And so, since I suspend judgment 
about ‘Pollux’, I equally suspend judgment about its co-referring terms. 
 
In particular, then, she suspends judgment about the right-hand terms in true ‘Pollux’-
interpretations. And so, the right-hand term in (15) is just as much as in question as 
‘Pollux’. Thus (15) will merely push the question about ‘Pollux’ back onto its descriptor.  
Socrates even takes this attitude toward certain demonstratives, occurring in 
sentences like ‘ ‘Pollux’ denotes that’. When accompanied by the appropriate ostension, 
such a sentence may seem to provide a “information link” or “directly acquaint” 
Socrates with the object in a way that would dispel his question. [Cf. Evans (1982).] But 
again, in a nonstandard isomorphism where ‘Pollux’ denotes Castor, the demonstrative 
will also denote Castor, if the truth of the sentence is to remain constant.22 Hence, since 
Socrates is aware of such things, the ostensive definition merely pushes the question 
back onto the demonstrative.   
 As the reader may have anticipated, if (16), (17.2), (18.2), (19.1), and (20.1) 
characterize Socrates’ background, it is not merely (15) which is inadequate to answer 
her question. Rather, it seems that every true ‘Pollux’-interpretation will be inadequate. 
                                                 
22 One may at least re-interpret the act of pointing so that the demonstrative denotes Castor. After all, a 
demonstrative itself has no “standard denotation,” unless it is trivially “whatever is ostended in a context.” 
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That’s because any true interpretation of ‘Pollux’ will only push the question back onto 
the right-hand term, since per Socrates’ background, the parallel question for the right-
hand term will equally be an issue. So in this sense, these interpretations will be just 
more theory that is indicted by his question. But here is the rub: Ex hypothesi, an answer 
to Socrates’ question, if any, must be a true interpretation of ‘Pollux’. So this apparently 
means that there is no answer to Socrates’ question.  
 The argument here may be seen as having the following, basic structure: 
(21) If there is an answer to “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” relative to a set of 
       background assumptions, then it is a true sentence with the normal form 
       “ ‘Pollux’ denotes x”, i.e., it is a true interpretation of ‘Pollux’. [Assumption] 
 
(22) In light of (16), Socrates asks “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” while assuming 
       that the parallel question for its co-referring terms is equally an issue. 
            [Stipulation] 
 
(23) If (22), then no true interpretation of ‘Pollux’ answers “What does ‘Pollux’ 
       denote?” relative to Socrates’ assumptions.   [Assumption] 
 
(24) No true interpretation of ‘Pollux’ answers “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” 
       relative to Socrates’ assumptions.           [from (22), (23)] 
 
(25) There is no answer to “What does ‘Pollux’ denote?” relative to Socrates’ 
        assumptions.               [from (21), (24)] 
 
And (25) just is the “pessimistic,” epistemic-informational claim about semantic 
questions which I have been advertising. Specifically: Relative to certain assumptions, 
some non-trivial questions about denotation lack suitable answers. 
First Concern: One concern with this argument is that the conclusion is 
unsurprising; it is just making the rather obvious point that you cannot put all of your 
terms in question at once. Of course Socrates must assume knowledge of what some 
term denotes, if he wants an answer to his question. However, it is important that 
Socrates is able to ask his question about ‘Pollux’, even when taking most other terms 
 37 
for granted, e.g. ‘Nixon’, ‘water’, ‘sofa’, ‘the fastest antelope in 2008’, etc. For his 
assumptions only call into question ‘Pollux’ and its co-referring terms. Yet this is 
enough to make his question unanswerable.23 Of course, when a co-referring term is a 
descriptor, there must be certain predicates whose denotation is a bit shifty between the 
isomorphisms.24 But for each nonstandard isomorphism, such a predicate need only 
change whether the y denoted by ‘Pollux’ is in its extension. Beyond that, the extension 
need not be any different from what it is in the standard model.25 
Second Concern: Even so, it is one thing to put ‘Pollux’ in question, and it is 
another to put its co-referring terms in question. It may be true enough that if both are in 
question, then nothing can answer Socrates. But that may just show it’s a silly question.  
However, it is a contingent matter as to what the sign-design ‘Pollux’ denotes, 
and so, inquiring into the matter per se is not obviously illegitimate. The issue, then, 
would be whether Socrates’ antecedent assumptions make it illegitimate. Socrates will 
contend, however, that his assumptions are merely the result of reflecting carefully on 
the possibilities. Again, the inquiry was prompted by the fact that ‘Pollux’ could denote 
any number of things, even if the truth-values of sentences are a given. So his 
assumption at (16) just expresses a fact of model theory. In addition, Socrates then 
recognized that its co-referring terms will denote whatever ‘Pollux’ denotes. Since this 
was deduced from facts about the isomorphisms under consideration, (17.2) also seems 
                                                 
23 Socrates does take ‘Pollux’ to be an arbitrary case however. So though the problem can be somewhat 
localized to ‘Pollux’ and co-referring terms, it may arise for any grouping of co-referring terms. 
 
24 Note, however, that one need not regard every predicate in a given descriptor as shifty. Figure 2 
indicates in the case of ‘the red giant in Gemini’, Socrates can keep ‘in Gemini’ constant in meaning while 
raising multiple possibilities for what the descriptor denotes. 
 
25 That is so, unless our theory makes some claim about the cardinality of the extension. Then, the 
extension would also need to exclude exactly one other z, and then semantic adjustments would need to be 
made in relation to z as well. 
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unproblematic as a starting assumption. (18.2) was then deduced, and given the truism at 
(19.1), the claim at (20.1) also was inferred. 
So if Socrates’ assumptions are illegitimate, it is hard to see why. Sure, it is 
possible not to follow Socrates in doubting all co-referring terms when asking about 
‘Pollux’. Yet then my Socrates will accuse you of being insufficiently reflective. 
According to him, if you are considering an isomorphic possibility where ‘Pollux’ 
denotes something nonstandard, you should realize that in such a model certain other 
terms have nonstandard denotations, co-referring terms at the least. Thus, the isomorphic 
possibilities put the co-referring terms up for grabs as much as ‘Pollux’. 
 Third Concern: There is a different worry to the effect that Socrates’ inquiry is 
rather silly. His question arises in light of certain isomorphisms—but when Socrates 
described these isomorphisms, he said inter alia that: 
(26) In an isomorphism, the object y assigned to ‘Pollux’ satisfies a predicate iff: 
       in the standard model, Pollux satisfies the predicate. 
  
But (26) apparently presupposes that ‘Pollux’ denotes Pollux in the standard model. 
Even so, this is an uninformative, homophonic interpretation; hence, it is not as if 
Socrates is presupposing an answer to her own question. Perhaps this point is clearer if, 
instead of (26), Socrates constructs the isomorphisms via the following: 
(26.1) In an isomorphism, the object y assigned to ‘Pollux’ satisfies a predicate 
iff: In the standard model, whatever ‘Pollux’ denotes satisfies the 
predicate. 
 
So it seems Socrates can construct the isomorphisms without prejudging his question. 
Yet, even though (26.1) and (26) may be quite non-committal, they may still 
provide the start of an answer to Socrates’ question. Specifically, it seems we could add 
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various empirical facts about Pollux to “thicken” the conception of what ‘Pollux’ 
denotes, such as:  
(27) Whatever ‘Pollux’ denotes = Pollux = the red giant in Gemini. 
 
So here, it may be that Socrates himself provides the basis for an answer to his question.  
However, Socrates will regard the descriptor in (27) as part of what’s in question. 
Hence, although (27) may be (at least) informative of the co-reference between its terms, 
the right-most term cannot be used to resolve her question about the object referred to—
and so, his question remains an open one. 
Basically, the reason why Socrates’ question is not self-undermining is that he 
can describe the isomorphisms using an idiom that only allows for an uninformative 
response to his question. However, there is something in the area that Socrates should 
concede. Suppose that we use italicized English terms as terms of a distinct 
metalanguage. Then, instead of the English statement at (26) or (26.1), Socrates might 
specify the relevant isomorphisms in the metalangauge as follows: 
 (26.2) In an isomorphism, the object y assigned to ‘ Pollux’ satisfies a predicate 
          iff: in the standard model, Pollux satisfies the predicate. 
 
In assenting to this thought, Socrates would apparently be presupposing the truth of: 
 (28) In the standard model, ‘ Pollux’ denotes Pollux. 
Although (28) resembles an uninformative, homophonic interpretation, strictly speaking 
it would not be. For ‘Pollux’ and ‘Pollux’ are now assumed to be terms of different 
languages; hence, (28) at least informs us of how to translate ‘Pollux’ in the 
metalanguage. (And since our metalangauge need not be “metaEnglish”, as it were, this 
translation is not insignificant.) 
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But if (28) is informative, this makes a significant difference. Unlike the case 
where the metalanguage is English itself, it seems Socrates’ question here would be 
raised while an answer is presupposed. For (29) is a true, informative interpretation 
which uses a term not indicted by his question. That is so, assuming Socrates’ question 
only concerns co-referring terms in English (vs. metaEnglish).26 
I think Socrates should concede this objection, so far as it goes. There is no 
reason to ask what the English term ‘Pollux’ denotes under Socrates’ current 
assumptions, if the isomorphisms are contructed via (28). For in representing those 
isomorphisms, Socrates would in effect presuppose the truth of a sentence which settles 
that question before it arises, such as (28).  
Nonetheless, Socrates may think that the success of (28) is rather superficial. 
Though his question concerned English terms, strictly speaking, his question obviously 
extends to metaEnglish terms as well. Thus, even if (28) answers his initial question, it 
will nonetheless be all too apparent to him that: 
 (17.3) If ‘Pollux’ and ‘Pollux’ co-refer, they do so in each isomorphic model 
          under consideration. 
 
[The argument for (17.3) is virtually the same as for (17.2); that argument remains sound 
if it extends to ‘Pollux’ in addition to non-italicized terms.] So under (17.3), the 
isomorphisms indicate that ‘Pollux’ and ‘Pollux’ could co-denote any number of things. 
Thus, Socrates might have no antecedent assumption as to what either actually denote, 
meaning that under (17.3), (28) will not answer the question. For (28) uses a term which 
now indicted by that question. 
                                                 
26 A similar point holds if the metalanguage is a different natural language instead, e.g., French, Urdu, etc. 
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Still, we could answer the extended question as well, provided there is a term µ 
which is not yet indicted by the inquiry. But even if such a µ remains, Socrates can then 
extend her question to cover µ as well—and indeed, he can continue to extend the 
question until all co-referring terms are indicted, in every language. In this, Socrates is 
not necessarily trying to be uncooperative. He is rather trying to get us to admit the 
rather obvious fact that the object of ‘Pollux’ just is the object of any co-referring term, 
in all the isomorphisms. Once we are clear on that, it is just idle to use such a term in an 
attempt to answer Socrates’ question. 
So even though his question may have an answer in certain cases, Socrates thinks 
this happens only under a certain feigned naivety. After all, it is obvious enough that his 
question can cover any co-referring term. Furthermore, if a co-referring term is not 
indicted by the question, he maintains this is not because the issue has been antecedently 
resolved in case of that term. Rather, he might hold that we simply agree (perhaps 
tacitly) to use the term “blindly,” as it were. It will be a representation which we 
understand in the Wittgenstein sense, but our understanding will occur absent an answer 
to the question of what it denotes. 
In Quine’s (1969) terminology, such a term will be part of a “background 
language”—a language where semantic questions are answered by terms not indicted by 
those questions. However, even if this language affords us answers to certain questions 
about denotation, Socrates has pointed out two undesirable features of those answers: (i) 
they function as answers only if we (perhaps deliberately) ignore the question in relation 
to the terms used in those answers—and as a consequence, (ii) they employ terms that 
we use “blindly,” or terms that we merely “take at face value” (to use Quine’s phrase). 
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Thus, the only questions about denotation we can answer are relatively naïve ones, and 
the answers we give will just be idle when seen in a more honest light. As Jay Rosenberg 
once said, “To terminate a regress of background languages in our own “taken at face 
value” is to cash a forged check with counterfeit currency” (1974, p. 56).  
In subsequent chapters, I shall call “semantic pessimism” the view which (at 
least) acknowledges that some questions about denotation have no answers, except in a 
language whose terms are used unquestioningly. Thus, semantic pessimism is not merely 
the truism that (non-circular) interpretation has to stop somewhere. It is also an 
admission that some questions about denotation will inevitably go unanswered. 
 
VII. Contrast with Cartesian and Quinean Skepticisms. 
It is important to reiterate, however, that the pessimistic view developed here is 
different from Quine’s (1960), (1969) semantic nihilism. Unlike Quine, I am not saying 
there is no fact-of-the-matter as to the semantics of terms. I have not been concerned to 
show such a metaphysical claim, but rather just the epistemic claim that certain semantic 
questions have no informationally adequate answers. And one may grant there is no 
answer to the Socrates’ question, without granting there is no absolute fact-of-the-matter 
about what terms denote.27 It might be a very robust fact that ‘Pollux’ denotes a certain 
object, even if no sentence answers Socrates’ question on the matter. 
There are two other noteworthy differences between semantic pessimism and 
Quinean indeterminism. For one, Quine’s argument for indeterminacy begins in 
                                                 
27 Actually, the epistemic claim would imply the metaphysical claim if the questions were unanswerable 
because there are no truths on the matter. Yet this is not pertinent—I have assumed all along that there are 
true interpretations of ‘Pollux’. Instead, the argument has been that any response to Lucy’s question ends 
up being question-begging, or at least, accepted under a contrived naivety. 
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behaviorist commitments, whereas the pessimistic argument at (21)-(25) does not. Nor is 
behaviorism entailed by that argument; the premises make no mention of behavior at all. 
Second, Quine (op. cit.) apparently thought that questions of denotation might be settled 
by ostension.  “In practice of course we end the regress…by something like pointing” (p. 
49). Ostension would naturally answer our stargazer’s earlier question about what 
‘Pollux’ denotes. But as concerns Socrates’ question, the ostensive definition can only 
function (at best) as a sort of “counterfeit” answer.28 
 It is also important that Socrates’ question is not just a skeptical question about 
what a term denotes. Recall that the Cartesian skeptic presses the question of whether 
our beliefs are completely false, thanks to an evil demon. But Socrates can take for 
granted the truth of what we assert; he can accept the truth of ‘ ‘Pollux’ denotes Pollux,’ 
‘ ‘Pollux’ denotes Polydeuces,’ ‘ ‘Pollux’ denotes that’, etc. Even so, there remains a 
question about what ‘Pollux’ denotes, as illustrated by the various isomorphisms.  
 Still, Socrates’ question seems to take seriously skeptical possibilities where 
‘Pollux’ denotes something other than what believe it denotes. So perhaps Socrates’ 
question is a skeptical question after all. But, assuming our commonsense belief would 
be expressed by an interpretation, Socrates can grant the truth of that belief, since he can 
grant the truth of all interpretations of ‘Pollux’. Again, that’s because the truth of all 
these interpretations does not settle his particular question of what ‘Pollux’ denotes. 
 Relatedly, one can in fact show that Cartesian skepticism is independent of 
semantic pessimism. First, Descartes provides an example of entertaining Cartesian 
                                                 
28 Eventually, Quine also criticizes the ostensive definition, via his thesis about the  inscrutability of 
reference (applied to demonstratives). Yet again, my criticism is not a metaphysical point about there 
being no fact-of-the-matter about what is ostended—it is an epistemic point that the ostensive definition is 
informationally inadequate in the context of Socrates’ question. 
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skepticism while using your terms unquestioningly. (In Descartes, your assertion is 
assumed to be true or false with respect to its standard truth-condition.) But just as you 
can hold the content of an assertion fixed while questioning its truth, so too can you hold 
its truth fixed while questioning its content.29 Thus, Socrates can assume our 
interpretations of ‘Pollux’ are all true (so that there is no possibility of massive error), 
though the worldy-conditions which make them true are put into question. 
 Still, both the skeptic and my Socrates are raising multiple possibilities for what 
the world “in itself” is like. The Cartesian skeptic suggests that an assertion about Pollux 
might not be veridical, whereas Socrates suggests (in a background language) that its 
veridicality might depend on something other than Pollux. Of course, it could be that 
both the assertion is non-veridical, and the assertion is about something other than 
Pollux. But the point is that each character individually calls into question what kind of 
world the assertion occurs in. That is so, even if one questions the veridicality of the 
assertion, whereas the other questions what its veridicality would mean. 
 However, even if semantic pessimism is not Cartesian skepticism, it may seem 
to be nothing new—for Socrates seems just to present a case where “relevant 
alternatives” block knowledge. In this light, my Socrates would be presenting the same 
kind of problem as in Goldman’s fake barns case. In Goldman (1976), we are to imagine 
Henry who drives through a countryside populated with many barn-facades, unaware of 
this strange situation. We then suppose Henry happens to believe “there is a barn” in the 
presence of the one real barn in the area. Goldman’s intuition is that Henry does not 
                                                 
29 I am reminded here of Davidson (1974): “[W]e cannot infer the belief without knowing the meaning, 
and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief” (pp. 310-11). However, the upshot of the 
present discussion is (roughly) that holding one of these fixed is insufficient for knowing the other. The 
skeptic thinks you cannot learn truths about the world, even if meanings are used unquestioningly—
whereas my Socrates thinks you could not discern meaning, even granting the truth of your beliefs. 
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know there is a genuine barn before him, given that Henry would not discriminate 
between the real barn and certain “relevant alternatives”, viz., the fakes. Yet with 
Socrates, relevant alternatives seem to be exactly what prevents him from knowing: 
Socrates does not know what ‘Pollux’ denotes, since other objects are “relevant 
alternatives” that are not discriminated from its actual object. 
I would agree that Socrates’ problem about denotation resembles Henry’s 
problem to a degree. In both cases, a person accepts certain truths, yet lacks knowledge, 
thanks to “relevant alternatives.” Nonetheless, there is at least one crucial difference. 
Unlike Henry’s problem, Socrates’ problem persists even if one is de facto able to 
discriminate between the object of ‘Pollux’ and all relevant alternatives. Knowing that 
‘Pollux’ denotes that [with the appropriate ostension] may be enough for you to 
discriminate the object of ‘Pollux’ from any other object. After all, knowing the 
ostensive definition would at least allow you to distinguish the object of ‘Pollux’ from 
other objects by its actual location. Nonetheless, we saw before that the ostensive 
definition would not settle Socrates’ question of what ‘Pollux’ denotes, when he 
antecedently recognizes the co-reference between ‘Pollux’ and the right-hand term of 
any interpretation. Thus, although he is de facto able to discriminate what ‘Pollux’ 
denotes from other objects, his means of discriminating it may be question-begging, 
when it comes to answering his question. 
 
VIII. Semantic Pessimism and Anti-Realism. 
Importantly, the problem with denotation is not specific to realism, as Putman 
might have hoped. After all, if the challenge is (very roughly) just to say which objects 
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our terms denote in the standard model, the metaphysics of these objects seems 
irrelevant. In particular, the argument would seem to work even if denoted objects are 
theory-dependent, in the way that Putnam’s (C3) suggests. Suppose, for example, that 
the ideal theory contains the sentence: 
        “  ‘Pollux’ denotes Polydeuces. ” 
Since it is part of an epistemically ideal theory, we can assume that this sentence has 
ideal justification. Nonetheless, the semantic point would remain that such sentences 
have nonstandard interpretations by (C1). Thus, even here there is an entrée for Socrates’ 
question—and that is apparently enough to get the argument going. This remains the 
case even if the denotation of ‘Pollux’ is fixed by what the ideal theory says it denotes. 
For Socrates’ question concerns what the theory says in the first place. 
 Indeed, the point would also apply if the denotation of a term is even more 
radically dependent on a theory. Consider the following: 
 (30) ‘This very sentence’ denotes this very sentence. 
In English, ‘this very sentence’ above would denote its own interpretation at (30). So the 
denotation of ‘this very sentence’ is utterly dependent on this little “theory” of what it 
denotes. Nonetheless, (30) is an uninformative homophonic interpretation, so it is fairly 
clear that cannot answer any questions about what ‘this very sentence’ denotes. And this 
just means the skeptic’s question about ‘this very sentence’ is viable here as well.  
In this chapter, I first argued that the model-theoretic considerations do not entail 
anti-realism, as Putnam claims. However, they do indicate something philosophically 
significant nonetheless. Namely, it seems both realists and anti-realists cannot answer 
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Socrates’ question about the denotation of ‘Pollux’, except perhaps by giving a 
“counterfeit” answer, articulated in a language used unquestioningly. 
 
IX. The Significance of Pessimism 
 Although semantic pessimism does not imply anything as metaphysical as anti-
realism, it does have philosophical import. One notable consequence, pointed out to me 
by Dorit Bar-On, is that the argument demonstrates that on a certain reading, it is false to 
say that a formal semantics “gives the meaning” of the object-language expressions. In 
particular, if a theory “gives the meaning” only if it answers what a term denotes in the 
standard model (as opposed to some non-standard isomorphism), then formal semantics 
cannot give the meaning of an object-language term. There are other ways of reading 
“gives the meaning,” however, where semantics succeeds in this task, e.g., when the 
metalanguage translates a different natural language. But in a more theoretically 
weighty sense, semantics cannot give the meaning of the target terms. 
 More importantly, however, the result of this Chapter checks the default 
optimism with which we approach semantics, viz., the optimism that any well-formed 
question about meaning is assumed to be answerable. Also, as I mentioned, the argument 
here vindicates Quine’s thesis of “ontological relativity,” where questions about 
denotation are, at best, answerable only relative to a “background language” whose 
terms are used unquestioningly.  
 Interestingly, Quine himself hints how this thesis has greater philosophical 
significance. Note the closing of “Ontological Relativity”: 
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 [B]oth ontology and satisfaction are matters of reference. In their elusiveness, at 
any rate in their emptiness now and again except relative to a broader back- 
ground—both truth and ontology may in a suddenly rather clear and even 
tolerant sense be said to belong to transcendental metaphysics. (p. 212) 
 
Quine’s reference to “transcendental metaphysics” invites thoughts of Kant, who held 
that the “things-in-themselves,” i.e., the objects of transcendental metaphysics, are 
unknowable. I do not wish to commit Quine or myself to such a sweeping claim—
nonetheless, Quine seems to see some important relation between the thesis of 
ontological relativity and the Kantian view. In fact, if questions about ontology are 
unanswerable except relative to a background language, this could be one manner in 
which the “things-in-themselves” are unknowable. (Though for Kant to say such objects 
are completely unknowable is probably to exaggerate the point.) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
SEMATIC PESSIMISM AD OTIC-IDIOMS 
 
 
 In the last chapter, we saw that there was no answer to the question “What does 
‘Pollux’ denote?” in certain model-theoretic contexts. This, I think, indicates a limit on 
what semantic theory may teach us, regarding the extension of our terms. In this chapter, 
however, I want to discuss a different limit concerning the intension of certain 
expressions. In particular, in this chapter I will argue that a semantic theory cannot 
answer unequivocally what the intension is of ontologically significant idioms [a.k.a.  
“ontic-idioms”] such as ‘exist’, ‘there is’, ‘actual’, ‘real’, and the like. I shall then draw 
out a philosophical consequence of this result, viz., that there is no unequivocal statement 
of Realism about x, for any x, in our language. 
The result here constitutes a further limit on the “default stance” in semantics, 
mentioned in the last chapter. That is, the inability to answer certain questions about 
ontic-idioms tempers the “optimistic” view that any well-formed question in semantic 
theory has an adequate answer (barring cases of presupposition-failure and the like). The 
present chapter, then, can be seen as a further development of the more “pessimistic” 
stance I take toward semantic theory. But as before, I adopt this stance not to belittle 
semantic theory and its many important accomplishments. Again, semantic pessimism is 
rather an acknowledgement of the limits of semantic theorizing, where this is meant to 
service our understanding of the epistemic position of human beings. 
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I. Five-and-a-Half Ways to be Innocent. 
Ontic-idioms, of course, are paradigmatically used to assert the existence of 
various entities, as in sentences such as ‘ I exist’, ‘There are black swans,’ ‘Santa Claus is 
real,’ and so forth. My primary concern here, however, is the fact that ontic-idioms have 
ontologically “innocent” or non-commissive uses (besides their usual “loaded” or 
commissive uses).1 That is, there are containing sentences which do not entail the 
existence of the object, to which the idiom applies. (I shall give examples shortly). 
Normally of course, no special philosophical problem arises when an idiom has more 
than one use. But in the case of ontic-idioms, things are different: I will argue that the 
multiple uses make it impossible to define an ontic-idiom unequivocally. And that will 
signify that a semantic theory cannot adequately articulate what the intension is of an 
ontic-idiom (on an occasion of use). 
How can an ontic-idiom be used innocently? First, it is notable that an ontic-idiom 
can sometimes be used without any ontological meaning whatsoever.2 For instance, 
‘really’ can be used as an “intensifier,” as in the following: 
(1) The Fonz is really cool.   
Here, ‘really’ serves to indicate a high degree of “coolness,” akin to the word ‘very’. 
‘Really’ is not used to indicate the bona fide existence of anything. 
                                                 
1 Azzouni (2007) in fact argues that every use of an ontic-idiom is non-commissive. (Thus, whether ‘I 
exists’ ontologically commits you to a “self” is not a semantic affair, but an illocutionary one). I am 
sympathetic to his view, especially since it also suggests that a criterion of ontological commitment is 
impossible. But I shall not pursue this topic here. My aim is rather to illustrate the various non-commissive 
uses—and to show that even if there are commissive uses, a criterion of ontological commitment is still 
impossible. 
 
2 I won’t discuss the use of ‘actually’ where it is merely a pragmatic device to indicate something 
unexpected: ‘Actually, artificial creamer is worse for you than coffee.’ On its natural reading, the sentence 
is equivalent to the same sentence minus ‘actually’; so there’s nothing semantic to discuss here.  
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A second kind of case, where an ontic-idiom has no distinctly ontological 
meaning, may be seen in the following: 
(2) Max bought canned fruit instead of real fruit. 
In this, ‘real’ is not used to distinguish fruit with one ontological status from those of a 
different status. Instead, ‘real’ is used to distinguish fruit by some other category.3 So in a 
vacuous way, ‘real’ is used in an ontologically “innocent” way, since here it lacks an 
ontological meaning per se.4 
Since these examples feature ‘real’ sans ontological meaning, the idiom is 
apparently ambiguous in the most robust sense. But even when an ontic-idiom is used 
with a distinctly ontological sense, we shall see that these idioms can still be read in more 
than one way. However, whether these additional readings show further ambiguity, as 
opposed to polysemy or mere context-sensitivity, is not something I shall address. I shall 
rather say in a rather neutral way that these ontic-idioms are equivocal.5 
When an ontic-idiom is used with an ontological meaning, we can identify at least 
three other ways the idiom can be non-commissive. A familiar example can be illustrated 
by the occurrence of ‘exists’ in the following: 
(3) Napoleon exists. 
Note that ‘exists’ can be read so that the sentence implies that Napoleon exists now. And 
if people do not survive their deaths, the sentence is false on that reading. But (3) also has 
                                                 
3 As a special case, ‘real’ might be used to distinguish fruit from fake (plastic) fruit. But since fake fruit 
exists just as much as real fruit, I assume this would also be a use without a “distinctly ontological” 
meaning. (If anything, ‘real’ in this case would have epistemic significance, where it contrasts fruit from 
objects that merely look like fruit.) 
 
4 One might object that the sentence nonetheless implies that the uncanned vegetables exist, so we cannot 
yet conclude that ‘real’ is devoid of ontological import. But in fact, (1) does not have this implication, since 
for all I’ve said, Max and his vegetables are fictitious. 
 
5 Here I follow Fodor (2006). See p. 99 n. 20. 
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an uncontroversially true reading, where Napoleon is contrasted with a fictional person—
where the sentence just puts Napoleon in a different ontological category than, say, Darth 
Vader. On that reading, then, the ontic-idiom would be used in a non-commissive 
manner, at least in the sense that it would not entail the existence of Napoleon at the 
present time.  
Another familiar example of non-commissive use is when an ontic-idiom is 
relativized to a non-actual world. Lewis (1986), in particular, taught us that ‘exist’ is 
world-relative, which implies that a containing sentence can be true even if the ontic-
idiom applies to a non-actual object. So for example, if we are talking about a world 
described by Greek Myth, in that context the following sentence will be true:  
(4) Pegasus exists. 
Yet there is no mystery here, since the English sentence in this context is plausibly 
shorthand for something more complex, such as “Pegasus exists in the world described 
by Greek Myth.” Nonetheless, since the bit in italics is omitted in (4), the result is that (4) 
can illustrate a non-commissive use of the ontic-idiom: In a context where it is true, (4) 
does not entail that Pegasus is a denizen of the actual world.6  
 An importantly different non-commissive use can also be illustrated by (4). We 
just read the ontic-idiom in (4) as applying to something in a non-actual world, but we 
can also read the idiom as applying to an actual imaginary object, an object that is 
created in the minds of actual people. This kind of reading is, at least, the most natural 
one if we are to read the following sentence as true: 
 (5) Pegasus exists as a creation of the imagination. 
                                                 
6 The world-relative use of ontic-idioms, I take it, would subsume those uses where an ontic-idiom is 
relativized to a fiction. So there is no need to mention “fiction-relative” uses as a separate category. 
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In (5), ‘exists’ applies to an object of the imagination, Pegasus, yet the sentence does not 
entail that Pegasus exists in the way that real, live horses do. Quite the contrary, the truth 
of the sentence implies that Pegasus is only imaginary. So in that sense, ‘exists’ is non-
commissive. And that is so, even though it is relativized neither to a time, nor to some 
other possible world. The ontic-idiom in (5) is non-commissive because of what Pegasus 
is in the actual world, viz., a mere object of the imagination.  
Some will balk at the suggestion that Pegasus exists in the actual world, since it is 
a truism that Pegasus does not exist. But I agree that Pegasus does not exist (where 
boldface type indicates the commissive use of an ontic-idiom). Yet if (5) has a reading 
where it is true, then Pegasus indeed “exists” as something imaginary, where “exist” here 
ranges over existing objects as well as the objects that actual people imagine. Still, some 
may demand further explanation concerning the “existence” of Pegasus in this sense, and 
I offer additional explanation in the next chapter. But my present aim is just to document 
the different non-commissive uses of ontic-idioms in the language. Suffice it to say, then, 
that (5) indeed uses its ontic-idiom in a non-commissive manner, even though the idiom 
is not relativized to some other world. That linguistic point stands, even though the 
metaphysics behind the point may be somewhat puzzling. 
 My section-header indicated five-and-a-half ways for an ontic-idiom to be 
innocent, and the “half” concerns the use of ontic-idioms in mathematical assertions: 
(6) There is an even prime. 
If (6) is asserted in an ordinary high-school math class, for instance, then the sentence 
will not commit the speaker to Platonism about the number two. (That is so even if the 
speaker happens to be a Platonist.) So is this a further type of non-commissive use? Well, 
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that depends on your view of numbers. If numbers are creations of the imagination (as 
Kant held?), then the use of ‘there is’ in (6) may be of the same kind as the use of ‘exists’ 
in (5). Or, if numbers are found in other possible worlds (but not the actual world), then 
(6) may use ‘there is’ in the same way that (4) uses ‘exist’. 
 But to take a different angle, suppose Platonism is true. Then, (6) would 
materially imply7 the existence of a number—and so in that sense, ‘there is’ in (6) would 
be commissive. Yet assuming Platonism would not be a necessary truth,8 (6) would not 
strictly imply the existence of two. And so in that sense, ‘there is’ would still be “non-
commissive.” But notably, this non-commissive use of ‘exist’ would different from the 
non-commissive uses mentioned previously. For in the other cases, the containing 
sentences did not even materially imply the existence of the relevant objects. Whereas, if 
Platonism is true (but not necessary), the truth of (6) would materially (though not 
strictly) imply the existence of two. So depending on how things work out with 
Platonism, (6) might indeed illustrate a further, non-commissive use of an ontic-idiom. 
 
II. Defining the Commissive Use.  
Now all this would be well and good, except there is a problem in separating these 
non-commissive uses from the commissive uses. As a first pass, we may say that: 
(*) An ontic-idiom is used commissively just in case a containing sentence entails 
      the existence of the object to which the idiom applies.  
                                                 
7 To be clear, p materially implies q iff ~(p & ~q) 
 
8 Incidentally, things get interesting if the Platonist holds that Platonism is necessary. For then, ‘exist’ in (6) 
would have to be commissive. So in that case, if the Platonist allows that one can assert (6) without 
committing to Platonism (as she should), then the Platonist would have deny that ontological commitment 
is a semantic affair. It might instead be an illocutionary affair, as Azzouni (2007) suggests. (See n. 1). 
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But the problem is that ‘existence’ in the definition is precisely one of the equivocal 
idioms in question—meaning that the definition is also equivocal.  
The equivocation is bothersome since, on some readings of (*), the ontic-idioms 
in (4) and (5) will count as “commissive” when clearly they are not. After all, (4) and (5) 
entail the “existence” of Pegasus in some sense (though each sentence would imply his 
“existence” in differing senses). Yet the sorts of “existence” in (4) and (5) were not 
intended when I defined the commissive uses of ontic-idioms. The sense of ‘existence’ 
intended was existence, the kind of existence that Obama, Seattle, and the rock of 
Gibraltar have—and that Pegasus does not. 
We could of course define the commissive uses of ontic-idioms using the term 
‘existence.’ But ‘existence’ merely indicates the commissive use of ‘existence,’ and the 
“commissive” use of an ontic-idiom was exactly what we want to define in the first place. 
Of course, a circular definition would be quite correct (“An ontic-idiom is used 
commissively just in case the containing sentence entails the existence of the object, 
where ‘existence’ is used commissively.”) But the circular definition is rather 
uninformative. We thus would prefer some independent way of defining ‘existence’ on 
its commissive reading, as it occurs in (*). 
It is worth noting, however, that the issue is not merely of interest to making the 
commissive/non-commissive distinction. In practice, philosophers routinely distinguish 
between ontologically committing assertions, and assertions which are ontologically 
innocent. So for instance, ‘There is a possible world where Madonna was never born’ has 
a reading where it entails modal realism about the relevant world. But of course, one can 
read it in an innocent way as well. But if we want to “regiment” the distinction here, one 
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would need to specify (in unequivocal terms) the meaning of ‘There is’ on its commissive 
or loaded use, versus its innocent use.  And that requires us to define the commissive use 
of ‘There is’ in unequivocal terms, for use in our regimentation. 
So generally philosophers have a reason to define the commissive use of ‘exist’—
or alternatively, the commissive use of ‘There is’ or some other ontic-idiom. Now one 
proposal here might be to define ‘exist’ as follows: 
(7) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff x is material. 
(8) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff x is in space and time. 
Yet the problem is that, in some possible worlds, certain non-existing objects have the 
status of being “material” and “in space and time.” In a world described by Greek Myth, 
for instance, Pegasus is a material object that is in space and time—yet still he does not 
exist (even if he exists-in-that-world). But this means (7) and (8) are extensionally 
inadequate. For when we go across possible worlds, (7) and (8) identify certain non-
existing objects as things which exist.9 In response, one might specify that, e.g., in (7), 
we mean existing material objects. But this would re-establish the circularity.10  
Perhaps the mistake was in trying to describe objects of a certain ontological 
status by their nature, e.g., by describing them as material. Instead, we might try to 
describe this ontological status directly. But of course, it will not suffice just to define 
‘exist’ by another equivocal ontic-idiom, as in the following: 
(9) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff x is real. 
 
                                                 
9 Of course, (8) also is problematic in implying that the mind does not exist, even though it refers to it. 
 
10 Circularity here would not result in completely uninformative definitions; the definitions would teach 
you, e.g., that existing objects are physical. But ‘existing’ is doing the real defining work, since it alone is 
sufficient to define ‘exist,’ whereas ‘physical’ and ‘mind-independent’ are not. 
 57 
After all, ‘real’ on the right-hand side is also equivocal between a commissive use and 
five-and-a-half non-commissive uses. A similar point apparently holds for other ontic-
idioms when they are used to defined ‘exist,’ such as ‘actual’, ‘nonfictional’, etc. But in 
fact, not every ontic-idiom is susceptible to all five-and-a-half non-commissive readings 
[e.g., ‘nonfictionally’ is not used as an intensifier in standard English)]. But it is enough 
for equivocation if there is more than one way to read the idiom. Accordingly, I submit 
the following proposed definitions of ‘exist’ would also be equivocal: 
  (10) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff x is nonfictional. 
(11) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff there is a y = x. 
(12) x satisfies ‘exist’ iff x is actual. 
For instance, all the idioms on the right-hand side can be relativized to non-actual worlds. 
E.g., ‘nonficitional’ in (10) has a reading where it is relativized to a world of Greek 
Myth—and if the idiom is read in that way, then the following is true: 
 (13) Pegasus is nonfictional. 
So Pegasus would satisfy ‘exist’ according to (10), since Pegasus is nonfictional in a 
world of Greek Myth. Yet Pegasus does not exist, not even at that world. After all, ‘exist’ 
is commissive, i.e., ‘exist’ is satisfied by existing objects and existing objects alone.  
In the same manner, if the conversation concerns a world of Greek Myth, the 
following sentences are true:   
 (14) There is a y = Pegasus. 
 (15) Pegasus is actual. 
And so without further qualification, none of these ontic-idioms can define ‘exist’, in the 
manner suggested by (11) and (12). 
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III. Lewisian Proposals. 
 Contemporary metaphysicians are unaccustomed to non-commissive uses of 
‘actual’, but it seems that English indeed permits these uses. Even David Lewis (1986) 
agrees that ‘actual’ can be used non-commissively, i.e., as a “blanket” term for what 
exists in various possible worlds. But this is of course not how he uses the term: 
I myself do not use ‘actual’ as a blanket term…I use it to mean ‘this-worldly’: It 
is an indexical, relative term, and as used by us it distinguishes our world and our 
worldmates from all the other worlds and their inhabitants. (p. 99) 
 
So Lewis uses ‘actual’ commissively, but he admits it is a matter of “terminology” (p. 
100) and that ‘actual’ has a use as a blanket term. 
But in this passage, Lewis may show us a different way to specify the commissive 
use of ‘actual’ (which would be equivalent to ‘exist’). The proposal would be: 
 (16) x satisfies ‘actual’ iff x is in this world.  
I do not doubt that we understand (16) univocally in most contexts. Even so, (16) itself 
does not make explicit which world the demonstrative is fixed on. And for that reason, 
(16) as formulated has multiple readings in English, some of which concern the actual 
world, and some of which do not. [One can imagine a context where a world of Greek 
Myth is the topic, and (16) introduces a term-of-art for denizens of that world.] Now 
again, none of this shows that (16) is inevitably equivocal in context. But it indeed shows 
that (16) fails to describe in unequivocal terms what ‘actual’ means.11  
 It is notable, moreover, that in some contexts the ostensive definition does not 
suffice for a univocal understanding of ‘actual’, even by English speakers who have some 
understanding of what the demonstratum is. Indeed, one such case occurs in Lewis’ own 
                                                 
11 The point also holds if we rely on pronominal reference, as in ‘actual objects are objects in our world,’ 
since ‘our’ is a contextually shifty term. 
 59 
discussion of modal realism. At one point, Lewis considers Lycan’s (1979) objection that 
modal realism implies the absurdity that “all possibilities are actual.” This would follow 
from his modal realism if ‘real’ means “actual.” Yet it is here that Lewis says ‘actual’ is 
not used as a “blanket term” to cover all possibilia, even though he calls all possibilities 
“real.” He takes it even further and says “Nobody could have thought I meant to use 
either ‘actual’ or ‘world’ as a blanket term” (p. 99).  
But first, note it is unclear what Lewis means by ‘real’. If ‘real’ is used non-
commissively, then it would be trivial to say that possible worlds are “real.” Yet since 
modal realism is not supposed to be trivial, it must be that ‘real’ is used commissively, 
just like how Lewis uses ‘actual’. Thus, since modal realism says that possible worlds are 
“real,” it would follow that all possible worlds are actual. So it is understandable if 
Lewis’ critics failed to grasp his use of ‘actual’. In order to avoid triviality, it seems his 
possibilia are meant to be “real” in a commissive sense, that is to say, actual, though he 
denies this.12 
In any case, for our purposes it is important that the confusion with ‘actual’ arises, 
even though Lewis defines ‘actual’ ostensively, akin to (16).  For even though the 
ostensive definition tells us that the “actual” objects are objects in this world, and we 
                                                 
12 In fact, there are non-commissive readings of ‘real’ which would make modal “realism” non-trivial, e.g., 
the reading where ‘real’ is equivalent to ‘exists’ in (5). For that would amount to saying that possibilia are 
objects created in the imagination of actual people. But of course, Lewis is no fictionalist. 
     Yet perhaps there is another use of ‘real,’ which makes modal realism non-trivial. Lewis apparently 
believes in a sort of “pluriverse” where possible worlds exist as spatio-temporally distinct entities. Thus, 
the actual world is just as real as any world—though of course only the actual world is actual. 
Unfortunately, I cannot properly address this “pluriverse” idea without getting far off topic. But I suspect 
the idea is intelligible only by the metaphor of restricting our discourse to a particular spatio-temporal 
location. (Cf. Lewis’ beer-in-the-fridge metaphor.) But the problem, then, is that possible worlds are not 
located, not even relative to other worlds, since a “common space” for worlds would itself individuate a 
world on Lewis’ view (an “überworld”). 
    In any case, this worry about Lewis is inessential for present purposes. My take-home message here is 
only that there are some contexts where an ostensive definition for the commissive ‘actual’ fails to establish 
a univocal understanding of the term, as seen in the debate between Lewis and Lycan. 
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have some understanding of what Lewis means here, there still arises an issue about what 
objects are in this world. And hence, there arises an issue about which world this world 
is. So in the relevant context, the equivocal phrase ‘in this world’ gets the better of us: 
The ostensive definition thus fails to transmit a univocal understanding of what Lewis 
means by ‘actual’ in that context. So the ostensive definition of ‘actual’ does not always 
suffice for a univocal understanding of the idiom. 
 
IV. Another Proposal from Lewis. 
I have made this side-trip through Lewis scholarship to bring out that the 
equivocal nature of the ostensive definition is not an idle concern. One might have 
thought that strictly speaking (16) is equivocal, but within a conversational context it is 
not. Yet there are contexts where it remains equivocal, and philosophically important 
contexts at that. So continuing the search for an unequivocal definition is not an idle one. 
Notably, however, Lewis offers a second way to describe the semantics of a 
commissive ontic-idiom. In his Preface, he writes: 
[S]ome things exist here at our world, other things exist at other worlds...You 
might say that strictly speaking, only this-worldly things really exist; and I am 
ready enough to agree; but on my view this ‘strict’ speaking is restricted 
speaking, on a par with saying that all the beer is in the fridge and ignoring most 
of all the beer there is...If I am right, other-worldly things exist…though often it is 
very sensible to ignore them and quantify restrictedly over our worldmates. (p. 3) 
 
The idea here, then, would be to define a commissive ontic-idiom by construing it as a 
restricted quantifier—where the quantifier does not range over all possibilia but just over 
this-worldly things. But as the phrase ‘this-worldly things’ makes clear, restricting the 
quantifier uses the same strategy that (16) uses in defining ‘actual.’ Accordingly, the 
difficulty with the strategy in (16) carries over to the present case. 
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 However, a second strategy in this passage is Lewis’ iteration of ontic-idioms in 
succession. That is, instead of using ‘exist’ alone, Lewis goes commissive by using two 
ontic-idioms at once to obtain ‘really exist’. This iteration may seem to signal that the 
resulting expression is univocally commissive. 
But in fact, it does not. For the phrase ‘really exist’ and (similar ontic-phrases) 
can be relativized to a non-actual world just as much as any one ontic-idiom in isolation. 
Thus, the ontic-phrases in the following sentences can be relativized to a world of Greek 
Myth, so that in certain contexts, the following sentences will be true:  
 (18) Pegasus actually exists. 
 (19) Pegasus is really nonfictional. 
 (20) In reality, Pegasus actually is a nonfictional entity that truly exists. 
So again, when the topic is Greek Myth, (18) for example will be shorthand for “Pegasus 
really exists in a world of Greek Myth.” So we have not yet unearthed an ontic-expression 
in the language which is unequivocally commissive.13 
 
IV. The Significance of the Preceding. 
 However, Lewis may not be to blame for these circumstances. We have been 
reviewing a few options for defining the commissive use of an ontic-idiom, in an 
extensionally adequate, unequivocal, and non-circular manner. But in fact, there is a 
general argument to the effect that such a definition is impossible. First, I think it can be 
said that: 
                                                 
13 Someone might suggest there would be no reason for a speaker to use an iterative construction, other 
than to identify an ontic-phrase as commissive. So we should see these phrases as only having a 
commissive use. But the fact is that redundancy is always possible in English, even if there is no reason for 
a speaker to do it. And that means iterating ontic-idioms does not guarantee an ontic-phrase that is 
univocally commissive. 
 62 
(21) To define an ontic-idiom unequivocally, one must employ an unequivocal 
       ontic-idiom.  
 
However, if (21) is established, we can then observe in addition that every ontic-idiom 
seems equivocal.14 For it always seems possible for context to relativize the use of an 
ontic-idiom to a fiction, as in the Greek Myth examples. After all, in these fiction-
centered contexts, it is not as if we are forbidden from using some of these idioms. Yet if 
all ontic-idioms are thus equivocal, then given (21), it would follow that an unequivocal 
definition of an ontic-idiom (used commissively) is impossible. 
The argument for (21) is this: Let us say that OI is an ontic-idiom which applies to 
an object a. (Notation:  a_OI.) Suppose, moreover, that Z is an idiom which interprets OI 
in a univocally commissive manner, in the interpretation ‘‘OI’ applies to a iff a_Z.’ Now 
since ‘a_Z’ is supposed to be equivalent to ‘a_OI’ where ‘OI’ is commissive, this 
interpretation will be adequate only if ‘a_Z’ entails that a exists. But if ‘a_Z’ entails that 
a exists, then by definition ‘Z’ is a commissive ontic-idiom (and univocally so). 
 The impossibility of defining a commissive idiom has, I think, important 
philosophical consequences. Some of these consequences will be discussed in the next 
chapter, where I discuss further the non-commissive use demonstrated by (5). But the 
immediate consequence is that, in fact, there is no way to make explicit the 
commissive/non-commissive distinction in unequivocal terms. Be that as it may, we of 
course understand this distinction implicitly—it is what we understand when we 
distinguish the controversial and the uncontroversial reading of ‘Napoleon exists.’15 
                                                 
14 Azzouni (in progress) also makes this point. 
15 Azzouni (2007) also emphasizes that terms can be used even if they lack precise definitions (e.g., color 
terms). 
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A second consequence is that no sentence of the language would univocally 
express Realism about an entity, property, relation, or what have you. For even a sentence 
like ‘God really and truly exists’ can be properly asserted by an atheist, if the context is 
(say) a heated dispute about whether God exists in Star Trek V. Conversely, no sentence 
of the language univocally expresses Anti-Realism about some x. Even a Berkelyean 
claim like ‘The world is nothing but ideas in the mind of God’ could be asserted by a 
Realist, if the context relativizes ontic-idioms to a Berkeleyan world. 
 But again, none of this shows that we cannot understand an ontic-idiom 
univocally, in some contexts. Yet if there is no defining what it is we understand, then 
our understanding cannot be a matter of knowing an unequivocal definition or 
interpretation. So the rule for commissivly using an ontic-idiom is, apparently, a perfect 
illustration of Wittgenstein’s (1953) dictum “there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation” (§201). But in the present case, this dictum is not shown by 
considering skeptical hypotheses for the meaning of unequivocal terms (‘plus’ vs. 
‘quus’). For in the case of ontic-idioms, the alternatives are relevant alternatives, since 
the commissive and non-commissive uses actually occur in the language. So inter alia, I 
take the present chapter to provide a more robust argument for the Wittgensteinian 
dictum. 
 But the most interesting lesson, I think, is the limitation this reveals on semantic 
theory. Given and ontic-idiom OI, if the question “What does OI mean on its commissive 
use?” is raised during the process of “regimentation,” there will be no adequate answer. 
For any answer will use an equivocal ontic-idiom, as I’ve shown. Some may be willing to 
overlook this as long as the answer is understood unequivocally, yet “regimentation” in 
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semantics typically aims for unequivocal answers about meaning. And so, in this kind of 
context, “optimism” about an adequate answer is misplaced. It is another instance of how 
semantic theory is limited in what it can accomplish.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
SEMATIC PESSIMISM AD OTOLOGY 
 
 
The preceding chapters argued for a view called “semantic pessimism” where one 
cannot appropriately answer certain questions about a language’s ontology. In the present 
chapter, however, I want to deal with “ontology” in a narrower sense, since (for reasons I 
shall present) the domain of the language must contain objects which do not, strictly 
speaking, exist. Thus somewhat paradoxically, the ontology of a language does not just 
contain entities we are ontological committed to. But then the question arises as to which 
entities in the domain we are ontologically committed to. What makes an object part of 
our ontology, among the objects in the language’s “ontology”? 
 Here, I answer this question by offering a novel criterion of ontological 
commitment. This criterion shall derive from an independently-motivated semantics for 
negative existentials, i.e., sentences such as:  
(P) Pegasus does not exist. 
Naturally, since the semantics of negative existentials is no trifling matter, much of the 
chapter is devoted to this topic. Of course, philosophers like Frege and Russell have 
addressed this topic before; however these accounts and their difficulties are well-known, 
and I shall not review them here.1 Instead, I shall try to think through the problem anew, 
and develop a different account for a sentence like (P). 
                                                 
1 For these and related matters, the reader is directed to standard references such as Lycan (2008) and 
Soames (2003). 
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 Along the way, some limitations are discovered on any semantics for ‘exist’ and 
other “ontologically loaded” idioms like ‘actual.’ In particular, it is shown that any 
definition here will engage in circularity—and thus, they are doomed to be rather 
uninformative. Further, I argue that this circularity guarantees that the definitions will be 
ambiguous.2 Yet since we obviously can understand ‘exist’ and ‘actual’ unambiguously, I 
conclude in the spirit of Wittgenstein that there is a way of understanding such terms 
which does not consist in knowing an interpretation. The Wittgensteinian view then 
forms the basis for a new criterion of ontological commitment. 
 
I. The Problem and a Proposal. 
Historically, the problem with negative existentials is given in something like the 
following manner. A subject-predicate sentence is true only if the subject-term is 
meaningful—and a subject-term is meaningful only if it refers to something. But the 
subject-term (P) does not refer to anything. Thus, ‘Pegasus’ is not meaningful in (P)—
and so (P) is not even truth-apt, much less true. But apparently, (P) is true—if you search 
the world high-and-low, you won’t find Pegasus anywhere. 
 The historical formulation of the problem may be objectionable, however, since it 
assumes that a subject-term can be meaningful only if it refers to some existing thing. Yet 
‘Pegasus’ would be precisely the sort of term which falsifies this, since it apparently 
refers to a nonexisting thing. For this reason, I prefer to put the problem in a somewhat 
different manner, where the problem is given in an inconsistent triad: 
                                                 
2 Here, I use the term ‘ambiguous’ like a logician, rather than a linguist. The logician’s use of ‘ambiguous’ 
indicates that the reference- or satisfaction-condition of an expression varies from use-to-use, whereas the 
linguist uses it to indicate that the sense or meaning of an expression varies. (Of course, if a term is 
linguist-ambiguous, it is logician-ambiguous, but the converse does not hold.) 
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(1) If a sentence of the form 
┌ 
Φ(α)
 ┐
 is true in the actual world, then the open 
formula 
┌ 
Φ(x//α)
 ┐
 is satisfied by some actual object α. 
 
(2) (P) is a sentence of the form 
┌
∼Ψ(pegasus)
 ┐
and is true in the actual world.3 
 
(3) The formula 
┌
∼Ψ(x//pegasus)
 ┐
 is not satisfied by some actual object Pegasus. 
 
Individually, (1)-(3) are plausible—but jointly they are inconsistent. And here there is no 
dubious condition on meaningfulness; rather, the inconsistency turns on the fact that 
sentences which are actually true necessitate that certain formulae are actually satisfied. 
 Toward resolving the inconsistency, I first want to present (what I see as) a 
crucial observation about the metaphysics of nonexistents. Consider the following: 
 (4) Pegasus is a figment of the imagination. 
I take it that (4) is actually true. Yet this means, by (1), that there is an actual object O 
satisfying 
┌ 
Figment(x)
 ┐
, where 
┌ 
Figment(x)
 ┐
 is the predicate of (4) (at the level of 
logical form).4 But if this is correct, then what kind of object is O? Well, since O satisfies  
┌ 
Figment(x)
 ┐
, then of course O must be a figment of the imagination. Or more broadly, 
we might say that O is a merely intentional object,5 or “MIO” for short. Yet since O is 
actual ex hypothesi, O is an actual yet a merely intentional object that satisfies the 
predicate of (4). 
 Nonetheless, we should like to say that Pegasus is what satisfies the predicate, as 
it occurs in (4). If so, then Pegasus = O, since only one object satisfies the predicate, as it 
                                                 
3 Traditionally, ‘exist’ has been viewed as a quantifier, in such a way that (P) is assigned the logical form 
“~(∃y) y = Pegasus.” Yet the view that ‘exist’ is a predicate in logical form has re-emerged with Azzouni 
(2004), where (P) is assigned the form “~Exist(pegasus).” Thus, I have been attempted to be neutral as to 
the logical form of (P), leaving open whether 
┌
∼Ψ(x)
 ┐ is the negation of a quantified or unquantified 
formula. 
 
4 I do not mean to be wedded to ‘figment’ in particular appearing at the level of logical form. You can 
suppose any predicate you like to denote objects of the imagination. 
 
5 The term derives from Brentano (1874), though I am told it originates with the medieval scholastics. Such 
an object is “merely” intentional as opposed to being, in addition, a mind-independent object. 
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occurs in (4). Yet since O is an actual object, that means Pegasus is an actual object 
which seems absurd. However, the absurdity lessens if we keep in mind that Pegasus is 
not a mind-independent object in our world; rather, he is merely intentional. So Pegasus 
is indeed an actual object albeit a merely intentional one.  
 Still, something looks amiss. Even if we grant that Pegasus is an actual MIO, it 
also is true that Pegasus is not actual. Is he both actual and nonactual then? No—I submit 
that the term ‘actual’ is being used in two different ways here. Specifically: It seems that 
when we say that Pegasus is not actual, the extension of ‘actual’ consists of objects in our 
world, though not including MIOs. Whereas, if we say (truly) that Pegasus is an actual 
MIO, the extension of ‘actual’ obviously does include MIOs, in addition to other objects 
in our world. Hereafter, I shall use ‘actual+’ to indicate the latter use of ‘actual,’ whereas 
I shall put ‘actual’ in bold (“actual”) when it is used in the more restricted sense. (There 
is a hidden circularity here, but as I shall argue in section IV, this is pretty much 
unavoidable.) 
 This distinction in the uses of ‘actual’ seems genuine, since in general, it is 
ambiguous whether MIOs are “actual.” Consider: 
 (5) Mirages are actual. 
 (6) Hallucinated objects are actual. 
 (7) Imaginary objects are actual. 
Apparently, each of (5)-(7) can be read as either true or as false. On the true reading, for 
example, (7) says that figments of the imagination are part of our world (given that we 
have an imaginative faculty). But on the false reading, it says that these imagined objects 
are not merely intentional in our world. The ambiguity also seems to occur in (5) and (6) 
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as well. And in general, it seems that MIOs are “actual” in one sense of ‘actual,’ but not 
in another sense.  
 If we suppose ‘actual’ is equivocal along these lines, we can say that ‘Pegasus is 
actual+’ and that ‘Pegasus is not actual’ without contradiction. He is “actually 
nonactual” by which we signify that Pegasus is actually+ a MIO. Accordingly, we can 
resolve the inconsistent triad by refining (1)-(3) in the following manner: 
(1*) If a sentence of the form 
┌ 
Φ(α)
 ┐
 is true in the actual+ world, then the open 
       formula 
┌ 
Φ(x//α)
 ┐
 is satisfied by some actual+ object α 
 
(2*) (P) is a sentence of the form 
┌
∼Ψ(pegasus)
 ┐
 and is true in the actual+ world. 
 
(3*) The formula 
┌
∼Ψ(x//pegasus)
 ┐
 is not satisfied by some actual object 
       Pegasus. 
 
But to be clear: 
 (8) 
┌
∼Ψ(x//pegasus)
 ┐
  is satisfied by an actual+ object Pegasus. 
Thus, we can say that (P) is true in the actual+ world, in virtue of an actual+ object 
satisfying the predicate—without committing to the actuality of Pegasus. 
 Accordingly, none of this vindicates (P) as actually true. But this is how it should 
be: If we lived in a world containing only actuals, a term which denotes nothing actual 
would be meaningless to us. In that case, (P) would be like the sentence ‘Blurgaflurg 
does not exist,’ since both sentences would use a term which does not even refer to a 
MIO in that world. Of course, in our world (P) is true, and that means that our world 
(somewhat paradoxically) is not the actual world, strictly speaking. Yet by this, I just 
mean that our world also contains MIOs besides actuals—our world is home to all 
actual+ objects, and not just the actual ones. 
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II. The Metaphysics of MIOs 
Admittedly, however, MIOs are strange kinds of objects. But they do not have to 
be that strange. We can think of the situation like this: In creating fictions, we consider a 
set of descriptors, which are not jointly satisfied in the actual world. Nonetheless, we can 
imagine some object satisfying the descriptors, and the result is an actual+ MIO. It may 
be very mysterious how the mind is capable of imaginging an object, since it almost as if 
the mind can create certain objects at will. Regardless, it is clear that we do imagine 
objects, , even thought it may be mysterious what that consists in. 
Some may protest that my solution to the inconsistency smacks of Quine’s (1948) 
nemesis McX, who thinks that the object of ‘Pegasus’ is just the idea of Pegasus. But I do 
not mean to say that Pegasus, the MIO, is identical to the idea of Pegasus. Rather, I meant 
to say that the MIO is the object of the term ‘Pegasus’ as well as the object of the idea.  
Yet since Pegasus is merely an artifact of the imagination, there is a sense in 
which Pegasus is “of the mind.” But it is clear he is not an idea since it is not as if 
Pegasus represents an object in the way that an idea does. Of course, in the vernacular a 
person might say that Pegasus is “just an idea.” Yet this is misleading: Not only does it 
encourage us to think of Pegasus himself as representing an object, but it encourages the 
McXian idea that Pegasus is an idea representing Pegasus in particular.6  
 But if Pegasus is not an idea strictly speaking, what is he? Granted, he is a product 
of the imagination, and so, is “of the mind” in that sense. But more on the metaphysics of 
MIOs is desirable—and indeed, I wish I could say more. However, my primary aim was 
just to resolve the inconsistent triad at (1)-(3). And to this end, it suffices to note that 
                                                 
6 Thanks to William Lycan for bringing this point to my attention. 
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there really are MIOs in our world, figments of the imagination being a prime example.  
After all, who would deny that Pegasus is a figment of our imaginations? 
 Still, it is important what has not been said about Pegasus. Specifically, in saying 
‘Pegasus is actual+,’ I am not committed to some kind of Meinongian worldview. For in 
asserting ‘Pegasus is actual+’, I do not mean to suggest that there is a Platonic third-realm 
where Pegasus lives as an abstract, mind-independent object. Rather, I mean that Pegasus 
lives in the mind, as it were, as an actual+ MIO. And once we are clear on this, it seems 
quite plausible to say that Pegasus is actual+ (as a merely intentional object).  
Of course, eliminative materialists will not go along with MIOs, but they would 
reject a discussion of semantics in the first place. Yet other naturalists may also be 
troubled, since especially now I might sound like some kind of dualist. Lately, however, I 
have become wary of the ‘dualism’ label. In one sense, everyone is (or should be) a 
“dualist” since there is a distinction between mental and nonmental phenomena. But this 
is a trivial kind of dualism. It is somewhat like being a dualist about elephants, on the 
grounds that there are African and Asiatic elephants.  
But if dualism proper is a claim about what exists (where ‘exists’ can be 
exchanged with ‘is actual’), then the dualist position is an ambiguous one. I am not a 
dualist, if dualism is the claim that the actual world consists of physical objects and 
MIOs. But if the actual+ world is the concern, I am a dualist—dualism here would be true 
by the definition of ‘actual+’. One then might reply that there is only one sense of 
‘actual’, but this forgets the linguistic evidence which suggests otherwise. 
Alternatively, naturalists may be mystified by how ‘Pegasus’ comes to denote a 
MIO. But the project of naturalizing denotation presents many difficulties for nonempty 
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names as well. And what’s important, for my purposes, is that the name ‘Pegasus’ does 
denote a MIO, even if it is far from clear how the name does this. 
  Still, if Pegasus is a MIO, it seems we also want to say that: 
 (9) Pegasus is a horse with wings. 
But, an objector may say, Pegasus could not be both a MIO and a horse with wings. For 
MIOs are not horses; MIOs are “of the mind” whereas horses are not.  
However, (9) is plausibly shorthand for: 
 (10) Pegasus is a nonactual horse with wings. 
After all, in asserting (9), we do not mean to say: 
 (11) Pegasus is an actual horse with wings. 
Though, it would be appropriate to say: 
 (12) Pegasus is actually+ a non-actual horse with wings. 
Thus, I deny (9) if ‘horse’ means “actual horse;” yet I do want to say that Pegasus is a 
non-actual horse—where this horse is an object of the imagination. And if Pegasus is an 
non-actual horse, then in this sense he is both a MIO and a horse.7  
 Yet does this mean both actual and non-actual objects are in the extension of ‘is 
a horse’? That may seem odd—we usually think that this extension only contains actual 
horses. Of course, one can also ask whether Pegasus is even a horse, since it is unclear 
whether he is of the biological kind equus caballus—but let that pass. The main question 
is whether non-actuals are in the extension of nonempty predicates like ‘is a horse.’ 
                                                 
7 Kripke (1972) also observes that ‘Pegasus’ names a fictional entity (though it does not actually name 
anything). In our terminology, this would be the observation that ‘Pegasus’ names an actual+ entity but no 
actual entity. But because names are “rigid” on his view, Kripke thinks ‘Pegasus’ (in our language) 
necessarily names a nonactual object. However, even on Kripke’s view, this follows only if ‘Pegasus’ 
names an object that is essentially nonactual. And it is not obvious that this is true of what ‘Pegasus’ 
names. We can follow Kripke here if preferred, but the view does not seem compulsory. One might instead 
say that ‘Pegasus’ names a winged horse essentially (though not necessarily a fictional one). 
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 In response, I think it depends on our domain-of-discourse, as to whether non-
actuals figure into these extensions. Naturally, if this domain is the set of actual objects, 
then only actual horses will be in the extension of ‘is a horse.’ But in such a domain, (9) 
has no proper interpretation, thanks to the name ‘Pegasus.’ So if we want to interpret the 
sentence, we will need to go to a domain which has Pegasus as a member.  And in this 
domain, Pegasus can indeed be in the extension of ‘is a horse.’ (If this still seems odd, it 
may just reflect that fictional discourse is not our paradigm of discourse in general.) 
 Nonetheless, if you think Pegasus should never be in the extension of ‘is a horse,’ 
then you can define ‘is a horse’ accordingly, even in a Pegasus-domain. But there, (9) 
will come out false. Indeed, I think that there is a reading of (9) where it is false 
[assuming that (11) articulates one way of reading (9)].  But the point is that one cannot 
insist on the truth of (9) while excluding Pegasus from the extension of ‘is a horse.’ 
 In sum, if we hold that Pegasus is a horse and a figment of the imagination, as I 
think we should, it follows that some figments of the imagination are horses. This may 
sound odd in one sense, but we must remember that these horses are not actual horses 
but rather nonactual horses, where nonactual horses are actually+ MIOs. 
 
III. Modality and egative Existentials. 
Although ‘actual’ and ‘actual+’ are satisfied only by objects in our world, we can 
also acknowledge “world-relative” uses of ‘actual,’ akin to Lewis (1986), though ‘actual’ 
and ‘actual+’ would each have world-relative uses. This would help us understand the 
following as true when uttered by Macbeth: 
 (13) The dagger I hallucinated was not actual, though the murder weapon was. 
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Consider: If ‘actual’ in (13) is indexed to Macbeth’s world, then we can understand it as 
asserting (correctly) that only the murder weapon is a bona fide part of Macbeth’s world.  
 But there is a sense in which the hallucinated dagger is part of that world as well. 
After all, its presence makes Macbeth’s world different from a world in which Macbeth 
never hallucinates. Thus it appears we have two uses of ‘actual’ in Macbeth’s world as 
well, corresponding to the actual/actual+ distinction in our world. In his world, as well as 
ours, the distinction turns on whether an object is a MIO in that world.  
 Indeed, we can characterize all these uses of ‘actual’ just by distinguishing the 
notion of “actual-in-a-world” from “actual+-in-a-world.” In this, being actual would be 
a special case of being “actual-in-a-world,” where the world in question is ours. On the 
other hand, the hallucinated dagger is “actual+-in-Macbeth’s-world,” though it is 
nonactual-in-his-world. Though interestingly, the hallucinated dagger is also actual+-in-
our-world, since it is something created in our imaginations—though it is not something 
we ourselves hallucinate.8 
 With this in place, we can consider negative existentials which are true in worlds 
other than ours. Consider, for example, the fortunate world where the following is true: 
 (14) George W. Bush does not exist. 
                                                 
8 Many problems are avoided by the fact that one can imagine the very same MIO which another person 
hallucinates. An example by Thomas Hofweber: Suppose you are told that a certain drug causes 
hallucinations of a mythical creature called “Tedasus.” If you are uninitiated in the drug, you will still 
understand this report, even if you lack first-hand experience of this vision. Yet on the present view, such 
experience seems required if ‘Tedasus’ is to avoid the fate of ‘Blurgaflurg.’ However, in this case we must 
distinguish our imagining from our hallucinating Tedasus. To be sure, the two experiences may be 
different, since only the latter may involve a visual image of the creature. But even so, the object imagined 
can be the same as the object hallucinated. For the creature is not the image experienced (if any) but rather 
the object of these images.  
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If (14) is true in a world, then ‘x does not exist’ must be satisfied by an object in that 
world which is GWB. But GWB would not be actual-in-that world, assuming ‘exist’ 
covers actual objects. So he must be actual+-yet-nonactual-in-that-world.  
Now if there are worlds where people (somehow) imagine GWB, there will be no 
new problem here. We can say that (14) is actually+-true-in-that-world, in virtue of GWB 
being a MIO in that world. What is new, however, is that (14) will uncontentiously be 
true at GWB-less worlds where no one has even imagined GWB (or hallucinated him, 
etc.). And so at those worlds, there will be no appropriate truth-maker for (14), not even a 
MIO. So absurdly, it seems (14) cannot be true at those worlds.9 
 In reply, we first need to distinguish worlds which contain (14) qua sentence of 
English, and worlds which do not. To take the former case: If a world contains (14) as an 
English sentence, then (14) is meaningful at that world (since sentences qua English 
sentences have meaning). And so by compositionality, the name ‘George W. Bush’ is 
meaningful in that world. But if ‘George W. Bush’ is meaningful in that world (i.e., if it 
is not like ‘Blurgaflurg’), then the name must denote at least a MIO in that world. So if 
we assume that this world contains (14) as a sentence of English, then there must be at 
least an imaginary GWB in that world, contra assumption. Thus, the new problem is not a 
coherent one in worlds containing (14) qua sentence of English. 
 However: If a world does not contain the English sentence, it is ambiguous as to 
whether it will be true in that world. It would not be a true English sentence found in that 
world, since ex hypothesi the world now does not contain the sentence. Nevertheless, we 
can say (14) is true at a GWB-less world—after all, in our world, the subject-term 
denotes an actual object which is nowhere found in that world. And in saying this, the 
                                                 
9 My thanks to Meg Wallace for bringing this issue to my attention. 
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new problem does not arise. For (14) is true at that world, not because GWB makes it 
true in the GWB-less world, but because GWB in our world is not found in the GWB-
less world. 
 
IV. Some Limits on Interpretation.  
   There is a further difficulty with our treatment of negative existentials, when we 
defined ‘actual+’ and ‘actual.’ One can distill these definitions to the following: 
 (15) An object satisfies ‘actual+’ iff it is actual or merely intentional. 
 
 (16) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is actual.   
The issue is that the definition of ‘actual’ is clearly circular. This makes the definition 
uninformative; it tells you what is in the extension of ‘actual’ only if you already know. 
Of course, commonsensically we do know what is in its extension. Still, the circularity is 
frustrating if we want an informative account of what is common to actuals. 
 So instead, we might offer a different definition of ‘actual’ which avoids 
circularity. Consider: 
 (17) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is not merely intentional.  
Alternatively, one might propose: 
 (18) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is mind-independent. 
 (19) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is physical. 
But in the first instance, these definitions select objects by their metaphysical rather 
ontological status. That is, the extension is defined according to the nature of objects—
not according to whether objects really exist. Because of that, these will be inadequate to 
define ‘actual.’ For in some possible worlds, certain non-actual objects have the status 
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of being “not merely intentional” or “mind-independent” or “physical.” In a world 
described by Greek Myth, for instance, Pegasus is mind-independent, physical, and is not 
a merely intentional object. Yet still he is not actual (though he is actual-in-that-
world).10  But this shows (17)-(19) are inadequate as definitions of ‘actual’; for when we 
go across possible worlds, these definitions count certain non-actuals as actual. Of 
course, one might clarify that, in (17)-(19), we have in mind actual mind-independent 
objects, actual physical objects, or actual objects that are not merely intentional. But this 
would be to use ‘actual’ in the definition of ‘actual.’11    
 So if the metaphysical-idioms fail, we might go to an idiom that is clearly 
ontologically-loaded such as ‘exist,’ or better, ‘truly exist:’ 
(20) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it truly exists. 
Yet as with the metaphysical idioms, ‘truly exist’ can apply to nonactual objects in other 
worlds, e.g., (P) is true at some worlds, even though Pegasus is nonactual. And so, it is 
non-equivalent to ‘actual’ across possible worlds. (Of course, in (20) we were probably 
thinking of objects that actually exist, but this reintroduces the circularity.) 
Another proposal may be gleaned from David Lewis (1986). The idea would be to 
define ‘actual+’ ostensively, and then use ‘actual+’ to define ‘actual:’ 
 (21) An object satisfies ‘actual+’ iff it is an object in this world. 
 (22) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is actual+ and not merely intentional. 
                                                 
10 This kind of consideration also poses a problem for the definition of ‘actual+’ at (15), where Pegasus 
potentially gets excluded from the extension of ‘actual+.’ 
 
11 These would not be completely uninformative; they would teach you, e.g., that actual objects are mind-
independent. But ‘actual’ is doing the real defining work, since it alone is sufficient to define ‘actual,’ 
whereas ‘mind-independent’ is not. 
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Yet crucially, the demonstrative in (21) must be “rigidified”—it must be fixed on the 
demonstratum it has in the actual+ world. Otherwise, in a world with different MIOs than 
ours, it will count the MIOs in that world as actual+. But only MIOs in our world are 
actual+.12, 13 
 However, the “rigidified” demonstrative is clearly defined as fixed on its actual+ 
object, when we take its containing sentence to other possible worlds. Yet this definition 
of a “rigidified” demonstrative uses ‘actual+;’ hence, we cannot use such a demonstrative 
when defining ‘actual+,’ at least not without circularity. 
There are a number of other idioms one might use in defining ‘actual.’ Idioms 
such as ‘real’ and ‘nonfictional’ come to mind. These form a family of idioms, along with 
‘exist’ and ‘actual, which we might call “ontic-idioms”—idioms that attribute a “robust 
ontological status” to objects. But it seems ontic-idioms can always be rightly used in 
relation to nonactual objects. Thus, in the world of Greek Myth, it is true that:   
 (23) Pegasus is real. 
 (24) Pegasus is nonfictional. 
Even if we amass ontic-idioms together, the result will be true in a world of Greek myth: 
 (25) Actually, Pegasus is nonfictional. 
 (26) Pegasus really and truly exists. 
 (27) Pegasus actually is a nonfictional entity that truly exists in the real world. 
                                                 
12 The point also holds if we rely on pronominal reference, as in ‘actual+ objects are objects in our world,’ 
where ‘our’ must rigidly designate us. 
 
13 It may be problematic to speak of “MIOs not of our world.” If that phrase is to avoid the meaninglessness 
of ‘Blurgaflurg,’ it must denote something actual+. But by definition, it would denote MIOs that are not 
actual+. So it seems the phrase denotes MIOs that are both actual+ and not actual+; contradiction. 
      Yet even if we cannot speak of nonactual+ MIOs, they may be metaphysically possible. If so, then the 
point would still hold that the demonstrative must be rigidified in (12), so that nonactual+ MIOs do not get 
counted as actual+. (In fact, I think further issues remain even here, but I shall not pursue them further.) 
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So these constructions also cannot define ‘actual;’ for in some possible worlds, 
nonactuals satisfy those constructions.  
 Surprisingly, there are even contexts in our world where ontic-idioms correctly 
apply to nonactuals. Suppose someone is adamant that the fairies in A Midsummer 
ight’s Dream are ruled only by a Queen, Titania. Then, you might stammer in reply: 
(28) There really is a King of the fairies, Oberon. 
 Here you have said something true, though you have asserted the existence of something 
which is not actual. Or in discussing the characters in the “play-within-a-play” (Act V.i), 
if someone avows that there is no lion, you may respond: 
(29) I’m not making up this up; there really and truly is a lion, Snug. 
Again, in the right context, you would be saying something true, even though you have 
asserted the existence of something that is not actual, not even in Titania’s world. 
 Speaking generally, the problem is that different objects in different situations 
will qualify as having “ontological status.” Thus, the idioms which attribute such status 
will apply to different objects in different contexts. Since some of these objects will be 
merely possible objects, such idioms cannot define ‘actual.’ For regardless of what 
scenario we are dealing with, ‘actual’ is satisfied by actual objects alone. 
 Here is a final attempt to get rid of circularity. Let us say that boldface-type 
indicates the commissive use, so that a sentence stating that the object is actual entails 
that it actually exists (insert foot stomp). This use of ‘actual’ differs from the various 
noncommissive uses where this entailment does not result, as with ‘actual+.’ Now the 
above remarks show, in effect, that ‘physical,’ ‘real,’ ‘nonfictional’ etc. can be used 
noncommissively, in addition to their commissive uses. ‘Pegasus is real,’ we saw, can be 
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read as not entailing the actual existence of Pegasus, though of course it could be read 
that way too. If so, then we might define the set of actual objects as the set of objects that 
are real (nonfictional, worldly, etc.), where the relevant idiom is read commissively.  
 However, the commissive uses are defined by whether the idiom is satisfied only 
by objects that actually exist—where ‘actually exist’ is co-extensional with ‘actual.’14 
But in saying this, we already need to have the extension of ‘actual’ defined before we 
can define the commissive reading of this idiom. And that means we cannot define 
without circularity the extension of ‘actual’ using an ontic idiom, read commissively. 
 I have been canvassing a few options for defining ‘actual’ in an extensionally 
adequate, non-circular manner. However, Chapter Two presented a general argument to 
the effect that there is no way to define ‘actual’ in this fashion. In particular, it was 
shown that if we are to define/interpret an ontic-idiom on its commissive use, we must 
employ a commissive ontic-idiom. If so, this means circularity will always be an issue. 
(Either the idiom will interpret itself, or it will be interpreted by some idiom which 
interprets itself, or several of the idioms will be interdefined.) 
 Earlier I said that circularity is a problem because it makes for a relatively 
uninformative definition. But circularity turns out to even more serious in the present 
case. If ontic-idioms have commissive and non-commissive readings, this means ontic-
idioms are ambiguous taken as they are. Yet as the previous paragraph shows, if we want 
to interpret an ontic-idiom as commissive, then we must use a commissive ontic-idiom. 
But all ontic-idioms are ambiguous on the commissive/non-commissive dimension. 
(After all, it is not as if we are banned from using certain idioms in writing a novel.) 
                                                 
14Interestingly, an ontic-idiom could conceivably be “non-commissively commissive” iff a sentence using 
the idiom entails that the relevant object is actual+. The truth of the sentence would guarantee that the 
object is in our world, rather than some other possible world, though not that the object is actual. 
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Hence, it seems any attempt to disambiguate an ontic-idiom will use an ambiguous ontic-
idiom, meaning that the disambiguation will fail. And if we try to disambiguate the 
second idiom, we shall use a third ambiguous ontic-idiom—and thus a regress. So 
apparently there can be no explicit disambiguation of ontic-idioms. 
 
V. Wittgensteinian Understanding and Primitive Ontic-Idioms. 
 Nonetheless, we obviously can understand an ontic-idiom as unambiguously 
commissive. But if there is no disambiguating an ontic-idiom, then our understanding 
cannot be a matter of knowing an unambiguous interpretation. In this, our view of ontic-
idioms is congenial to Wittgenstein’s (1953) claim about usage-rules for idioms: “there is 
a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” (§201). So even though we may 
not be able to explicitly disambiguate an ontic-idiom, we can still implicitly understand 
such an idiom unambiguously, on an occasion of use.  
Yet if the Wittgensteinian view is correct, then in one sense we can interpret 
‘actual’ as unambiguously commissive. Namely, if we utilize an ontic-idiom which is 
understood (in the Wittgensteinian sense) to be commissive, then an interpretation of 
‘actual’ can be understood unambiguously—though the interpretation per se will be 
ambiguous, strictly speaking.  
In the spirit of this proposal, one might suggest: 
 (30) An object satisfies ‘actual’ iff it is real. 
Here, ‘real’ is undefined, though understood commissively in the present context. This 
seems legitimate for our purposes, since our aim was not to define commissive ontic-
idioms in general. We just wanted a non-circular (and unambiguous) definition of 
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‘actual’ in our account of negative existentials. So we might let (30) stand, and just rely 
on the contextual cues (e.g., the use of italics) to prompt speakers into understanding 
‘real’ commissively.15 
But in taking ‘real’ as primitive, one may object that the Paradox of Analysis (or 
some variant) seems particularly compelling. Since ‘real’ is (roughly) just another word 
for ‘actual,’ then interpreting ‘actual’ by ‘real’ seems fairly uninformative. It would be 
like defining ‘moral person’ as follows: 
 (31) x satisfies ‘moral person’ iff x is an ethical person.  
 It is informative to be given (31) in that one at least can deduce that the term ‘moral 
person’ is interchangeable with the term ‘ethical person’ (in extensional contexts). Yet 
beyond this, the informative worth of (31) seems fairly trifling. Certainly no moral 
theorist would tout this as a worthwhile account of what moral persons are. 
Still, in some cases this issue does not arise: ‘H2O’ interprets ‘water’ 
informatively, even though ‘H2O’ may be “just another word” for ‘water.’ Yet these 
terms clearly have a different “mode of presentation” (“MOP”). 16 ‘Water’ “presents” a 
clear, odorless liquid (around here)—while ‘H2O’ “presents” a certain kind of chemical 
compound. Of course, ‘H2O’ cannot be used to give the meaning of ‘water,’ if the MOP 
constitutes part of a term’s meaning. But in the present discussion, I am not concerned to 
define the meaning of terms—it is enough if we can define extensions in an informative 
way. And ‘H2O’ can informatively define the extension of ‘water.’ Indeed, it is precisely 
                                                 
15 Of course for Wittgenstein, our understanding of ‘actual’ would not be a matter of knowing (30) either. 
(30) is only meant to fill out the account of negative existentials, in as much as this is possible. 
16 As argued by Fodor (1998), a MOP is apparently not a term’s intension, since the MOP does not fix 
extension. Thus ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ have disjoint extensions, though they may “present” identical-looking 
trees. Still, it remains mysterious what a MOP is, but I assume we can commonsensically judge sameness 
and difference of MOP in the present cases, even if we do not have a filled-out metaphysics of MOPs. 
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the difference in MOP which makes ‘ ‘Water’ denotes H2O’ informative—this teaches us 
that the word for a clear, odorless liquid denotes a certain kind of chemical compound. 
 Yet the point is, unlike ‘water’ and ‘H2O,’ the difference in MOP between ‘moral 
person’ and ‘ethical person’ is fairly thin. At worst, there is no difference in MOP—both 
just “present” people who follow right rules of conduct (or some such thing). Similarly, 
although (30) at least informs us that the sign-designs ‘actual’ and ‘real’ are 
interchangeable, the informative worth of (30) seems negligible. 
 Apparently, then, there is no substantial way to define the extension of ‘actual.’ 
Since ‘actual’ is a commissive ontic idiom, it must be interpreted by a commissive ontic 
idiom, as was demonstrated earlier. But if (30) is any indication, this interpretation will 
be fairly uninformative, even if the second idiom is understood commissively. 
 Certainly, one could define ‘actual’ extensionally by a list of objects, though 
given the number of actual objects, such a definition would (of practical necessity) be 
incomplete. So if our hope is for an extensionally adequate, informative interpretation of 
‘actual,’ it seems we will be frustrated. And if an account of negative existentials 
requires the use of ‘actual,’ as I think it does, any account will have to suffer this 
limitation. 
  
VI. Ontological Commitment. 
 As advertised, I shall now illustrate how the foregoing remarks influence a 
criterion of ontological commitment. I shall argue here that (i) ‘y is ontologically 
committed to x’ will be ambiguous in the same ways that the ontic-idioms are, (ii) as a 
result, there can be no criterion of ontological commitment in the standard sense of 
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‘criterion,’ yet (iii) there can be criterion of ontological commitment in a nonstandard 
Wittgensteinian sense. 
First, I assume it is fairly uncontentious that: 
 (32) A person is “ontologically committed” to an object x iff the person accepts (if 
        only tacitly) that x exists, in some sense of ‘exist.’ 
 
Now it may seem that we would want to specify a commissive reading of ‘exist’ in (32). 
Indeed, I think this correctly defines ontological commitments for most purposes. Yet it 
seems clear that ‘exist’ in (32) should sometimes be read noncommissively. For instance, 
it is plausible to say that: 
(33) Macbeth is ontologically committed to his murder weapon. 
Yet (33) is true not because Macbeth holds that his murder weapon exists, i.e. that it is an 
object of our (nonfictional) world. Rather, (33) is true because Macbeth accepts (at least 
tacitly) that the murder weapon exists-in-his-world, the world of the Shakespearean play. 
(Of course if asked, he might say that the weapon “exists” in the commissive sense. But 
interpreted charitably, this remark uses the noncommissive ‘commissive;’ see n. 12.) The 
upshot is that, if accepting x’s existence-in-Macbeth’s-world sometimes suffices for 
ontological commitment, then ‘exist’ should not always be read commissively in (32). 
This noncommissive variety of ontological commitment is exemplified in 
different kinds of cases as well, e.g. 
 (34) The author of this work is ontologically committed to MIOs. 
There is a reading of (34) where it is true. But if ‘exist’ were read commissively in the 
definition at (32), the statement at (34) would be false, I assure you.  For the author is not 
committed to the existence of Pegasus, though he is ontologically committed to Pegasus 
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as a MIO in our world, the actual+ world. But again, this indicates that in (32), ‘exist’ 
should not always be given the commissive reading. 
Plausibly, what’s going on here is that ‘y is ontologically committed to x’ is 
context-sensitive. In the standard cases, only an acceptance of x’s existence will suffice 
for ontological commitment—thus, paradigmatically, only the theist is ontologically 
committed to God. But (33) and (34) occur in contexts where acceptance of x’s existence-
in-Macbeth’s-world or existence+ suffices. Thus we might propose: 
(35) A person is “ontologically committed” to an object x iff the person accepts (if 
        only tacitly) that x exists, in a sense of ‘exist’ selected by context. 
Ideally, however, we would now describe the principles and parameters by which context 
selects a reading of ‘exist.’ Without this, a contextualist view is not so much a bona fide 
account of ontological commitment, but the promise of such an account. However, 
entering into the details of the pragmatics is beyond what I can accomplish here. Suffice 
it to say that ‘y is ontologically committed to x’ is indeed context-sensitive, though the 
details of this context-sensitivity may be unknown at this stage. 
 But whatever the pragmatic details, other sections show what we cannot 
accomplish in an account of ontological commitment. Specifically, if a context assigns 
‘exist’ a commissive reading on an occasion of use, our account will be unable to describe 
unambiguously this reading of ‘exist.’ And further, if context reads ‘exist’ as ‘exist+,’ 
this also seems to be something we cannot describe unambiguously.  
Crucially, however, this also indicates that no filled-out version of (35) can stand 
as a criterion of ontological commitment, if such a criterion must be free from ambiguity. 
Again, (35) uses an ontic-idiom, and by the previous section, all ontic-idioms are 
inevitably ambiguous, strictly speaking.  
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 Nonetheless, this problem isn’t special to (35). I assume that any adequate 
criterion of ontological commitment will make use of an ontic-idiom (directly or 
indirectly) at some point. But then, such criteria will be equivocal, insofar as ontic-idioms 
are equivocal. And that means any criterion will fail as a criterion of ontological 
commitment, if such criteria need idioms to be explicitly disambiguated. 
 Still, I think (35) can function like a criterion, for practical purposes. For we can 
univocally understand ontic-idioms (in Wittgenstein’s sense), even if we cannot 
univocally articulate this understanding. Thus in paradigm cases, we can understand 
unequivocally that ontological commitment a matter of accepting that something is 
actual. And so (35) would function a kind of criterion, though we should acknowledge it 
does not offer an unambiguous formula which such criteria are standardly thought to 
provide. 
 
VII. Closing Remarks. 
 In this chapter, I have defended a solution to the problem of negative existentials, 
and pulled from this a new criterion of ontological commitment, where we understand 
‘exist’ in (35) only in the Wittgensteinian sense of ‘understand’. From the present point-
of-view, then, a pessimistic view emerges of philosophical ontology, the project of 
specifying what exists. If there is no substantive, unambiguous interpretation of ontic-
idioms, then it seems there is no unequivocal, substantive answer as to what existing 
objects have in common. Thus, if philosophical ontology hoped to win to this kind of 
answer, its hopes will be frustrated.  
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Nevertheless, the upshot of this chapter is not all negative. Since we are 
competent in using ontic-idioms commissively, we exhibit a kind of “understanding” of 
what exists. But this will be a kind of Wittgensteinian understanding. It will be an 
understanding which does not include knowledge of answers to what existing objects 
have in common—nor to which particular objects exist (when the model-theoretic 
considerations are in play). This kind of understanding will just reflect our linguistic 
competence with ontic-idioms, rather than some philosophical insight into what the world 
is really like.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
FOURTH CHAPTER:  
SEMATIC PESSIMISM AD TRUTH-CODITIOAL SEMATICS 
 
 
 In the First Chapter, I articulated the pessimistic view that no interpretation 
answers the question of what a term denotes, when certain model-theoretic alternatives 
are under consideration. At best, we can get a kind of “counterfeit” answer to this 
question, formulated in terms that are used unquestioningly. But although the pessimistic 
approach indicates a certain limit on our theories of language, I think this awareness also 
helps dispel certain problems for truth-conditional semantics (“TCS”). 
The chapter proceeds by first abductively arguing that sentential meaning is to be 
understood at least partly in terms of truth-conditions. (This is done in light of the fact 
that, as far as I can tell, the view has no obvious deductive argument from 
uncontroversial premises.) I then raise the well-known objection that, even under this 
weak version of TCS, we are forced to characterize truth and meaning in a circular 
manner (the “Tarski-Davidson circle”). It is at this point I appeal to semantic pessimism 
to show that in lieu of a circular account, we can instead give a non-circular and 
informative account of all semantic notions from one language, if we use a different 
background language for the account.  
 
I. The Determination Argument. 
 Perhaps there are many ways in which one could argue for TCS, but the best case 
for the view, I take it, stems from what Bar-On et al. (2000) call the “Determination 
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Argument.” The argument here is attributed to David Lewis (1972) based on the 
following passage: 
In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then 
find something that does that.  
A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions under 
which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth-value of the sentence in 
various possible states of affairs, at various times, at various places, for various 
speakers, and so on. (p. 22, italics original) 
 
The argument which Bar-On et al. pull from this passage is (essentially) the following: 
(1) Given a possible world, a meaning for a sentence determines its truth-value in 
that world.           [Assumption] 
 
(2) So, a sentence-meaning is a function from possible worlds to truth-values.  
       [From (1)] 
 
(3) Such a function is a truth-condition (as conceived in intensional logic). 
           [By Definition] 
 
(4) So, a sentence-meaning is at least a truth-condition.   [From (2)-(3)] 
 
Lewis is of course a believer in TCS, though I am a bit unclear on whether the particular 
passage above expresses this argument. But regardless, Bar-On et al. nonetheless do an 
admirable job of defending the argument from several objections. And indeed, the 
argument does seem to capture something about what makes TCS appealing. The first 
premise is just the virtual truism that a sentence’s meaning determines whether it is true 
in a possible world. This makes meaning a function from sentences to truth-values, and 
such a function just is a truth-condition (in intensional logic). Admittedly, however, (4) is 
weaker than what is usually claimed in Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics, viz., that 
a sentence’s meaning is nothing more than a truth-condition. But (4) would at least show 
that truth-conditions are nonetheless essential to sentential-meaning. 
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 As Bar-On et al. are aware, however, the present formulation of the determination 
argument occurs in the paradigm of Carnap’s (1971) intensional logic. Yet the authors 
suggest that there is an epistemic version of the argument that does not presuppose such a 
logic (n. x). But before considering this, it is useful to consider whether the basic idea in 
the non-epistemic version can be captured without assuming Carnapian logic. Suppose 
that instead of (3), we just think of a truth-condition (rather trivially) as a condition under 
which a sentence is true. Thus the truth-condition for ‘Snow is white’ (in English) would 
just be the condition or state-of-affairs where snow is white (where this condition occurs 
in several possible worlds).  Note that you do not need to accept that such a condition is a 
metaphysical robust condition in a really existing world—the idea is simply that, 
whatever states-of-affairs are, the state-of-affairs where snow is white is the truth-
condition for ‘Snow is white’ (in English). Then, one may plausibly suggest: 
(5) A meaning for a sentence determines the condition under which the sentence 
is true (i.e., its truth-condition).       [Assumption] 
 
(4R) So, a meaning for a sentence is at least a truth-condition.                [From (5)] 
 
The premise is plausible if we accept the natural thought that a sentence’s truth-value is 
determined entirely by its meaning and the states-of-affairs in a world. For since non-
linguistic states-of-affairs themselves do not determine whether they are the truth-maker 
for some sentence, it must be that the sentence’s meaning does.   
But the problem is that the inference from (5) to (4R) is patently invalid. It is 
valid only if we add the premise that: 
(6) If x determines y, then x is at least y. 
But this premise is susceptible to counter-example. For instance, the radius of a circle 
determines the diameter, but it does not follow that the radius is constituted at least by the 
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diameter. [Of course, the diameter also determines the radius and the diameter is at least 
the radius—but we only the earlier instance to show (6) is false.]  
 So at this point, it seems the determination argument is either controversial qua 
piece of Carnapian logic, or it ends up requiring a false premise. So it seems to me that 
TCS would need some other version of the argument to support it. It is here that the 
epistemic version of the argument in Bar-On et al. becomes crucial.1 Consider: 
(1.1) If you know a sentence’s meaning and you are omniscient as regards 
        nonlinguistic fact in a world,2 then you know the sentence’s truth-value in 
        that world. 
 
(2.1) So, knowing a sentence’s meaning is at least knowing enough to assign the 
sentence a truth-value in a world, given omniscience about nonlinguistic 
facts in that world.         [From (1.1)] 
 
(3.1) To know enough to assign the sentence a truth-value in a world, given 
        omniscience about nonlinguistic facts in that world, is to know a truth- 
        condition.         [Assumption] 
 
(4.1) So, knowing a meaning is at least knowing a truth-condition. 
      [From (2.1), (3.1)] 
 
Bar-On et al. recognize that premise (3.1) is not definitional in the way of (3), and so they 
spend a bit of time defending it. But one concern they do not address is that (4.1) 
apparently does not suffice for weak TCS. One would need to add the further premise: 
 (6.1) If knowing x is at least knowing y, then x is at least y. 
 Yet the same kind of counterexample exists for (6*). Knowing the radius may be enough 
to know the diameter of a circle. But again, it would not follow that radius is constituted 
at least by the diameter.  
                                                 
1 Bar-On et al. cite Lycan (1984) and Field (1977) as proffering the epistemic argument as well, though to 
me it seems easier to read instead into these texts the abductive inference (discussed below). 
 
2 If omniscience of the non-linguistic world is crucial here, the argument would be concerned with only 
non-metalinguistic sentences. But of course, one could see easily enough how the argument might extend to 
metalinguistic sentences. 
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 But even if the argument is unsound, I think the premises cite phenomena that 
make for a good abductive argument for (4). In the simplest case, (5) is given a fairly 
plausible explanation by (4) [i.e., (4R)].  Of course, the strength of an abductive argument 
comes in degrees, and ideally, we want the argument to be not only an inference to a 
plausible explanation, but also to the best explanation available. But there are no obvious 
alternate explanations that provide serious competition, and indeed, it simplifies our 
ontology to assume that truth-conditions are simply part of meaning, rather than that they 
are assigned to a sentence as some independent thing. 
 [Note: If a truth-condition is a state-of-affairs, then from (4), it follows that a 
sentences’s meaning partially constituted by a non-linguistic state-of-affairs. This may be 
a counterintuitive result, since the tradition has been to think of meanings as “in the 
head,” though I find the anti-individualist arguments on the matter convincing (see the 
Fifth Chapter).] 
 Yet why settle for the weak version of TCS? Why not say that truth-conditions are 
wholly constitutive of meaning? Perhaps that would be an abductive inference with some 
weight, but it would not have as much weight, thanks to Fregean intuitions. Even if we 
are not Fregeans, we would like an explanation of (at least) the appearance of there being 
more to sentential meaning than truth-conditions, before we completely dismiss the issue. 
That is, we would want an error theory of why some of us are inclined to say that 
‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ are different in meaning, despite 
having identical truth-conditions.3 (Of course, one can say that the first sentence is 
                                                 
3 Bill Lycan points out that for Russell (and arguably for Frege himself), the two Frege-sentences do not 
have identical truth-conditions—Russell’s view is that there are worlds where ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ is 
true and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is false. Thus for Russell, TCS could still be a full account of meaning, 
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uninformative while the second is not, but then we’d want an error theory for why it is 
intuitive to say that the difference in informativeness counts as a difference in meaning.) 
Without such an error theory, there seems to be little reason at this stage for thinking it is 
the Fregeans who are in error, rather than TCS.4 My own view is that the Fregeans are 
not in error, although I will not be able to defend this here.  
 A final worry is this: How can we rule out the alternative hypothesis that 
sentential meaning is partly constituted not by truth-conditions, but by the sentence’s 
Fregean “sense”? The Fregean sense of a sentence, as I understand it, would be a function 
which takes a world as input and outputs a truth-value. Considering the worlds 
collectively, then, the function determines which conditions make the sentence is true, 
i.e., the function determines its truth-conditions. Thus, if sentential-meaning consisted 
(partly?) in such a Fregean sense, we could explain why sentential-meaning determines 
truth-conditions, without assuming that sentential-meaning is partly constituted by truth-
conditions. Thus, weak TCS would not be the only abductive inference available from 
(5); there is the competitor hypothesis that sentential meaning is (partly?) constituted by 
these Fregean senses. 
 I suspect, however, that the issue is merely verbal. Since the Fregean sense of a 
sentence is identical to a function’s input-output pairs (where each pair consists of a 
world and a truth-value), such a function can be viewed as partly constituted by the pairs 
consisting of a world and the truth-value “True”. Moreover, those worlds (I assume) are 
                                                                                                                                                 
and still assign different meanings to the Frege sentences. However, I assume the Russellian spin on TCS is 
now archaic; this is why I assume the Frege sentences threaten TCS directly. 
 
4 Barwise and Perry (1981) exhort us to reclaim our “semantic innocence,” claiming that Frege corrupted us 
into confusing epistemic differences with differences in meaning. But when asked whether the Frege 
sentences are same or different in meaning, my undergraduates overwhelmingly side with Frege. So it 
seems that if our intuitions are corrupted, it isn’t due to Frege.  
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partly constituted by the condition under which the sentence is true (i.e. its truth-
condition). So by transitivity of the “parthood” relation, the Fregean function is partly 
constituted by the sentence’s truth-condition.  Thus, even if you view a sentential 
meaning as partly constituted by a Fregean sense, this does not preclude weak TCS—
quite the contrary, it entails weak TCS. 
  
II. Tarski-Davidson Circles. 
 Again, although (4) is weaker than Davidsonian TCS, the Davidsonian 
programme would still be (at least) a part of the theory of meaning (and an important part 
at that). For the machinery Davidson uses defines the truth-conditions for any sentence in 
a given language, which according to (4) is to define (at least part of) the sentence’s 
meaning. Nevertheless, there is an important difficulty with this machinery which I will 
be discussing in this section.  
 Davidson’s machinery is of course borrowed from Tarski’s (1935), (1944) theory 
of truth; this theory entails, for given a language L, all instances of the following schema, 
where S is an arbitrary sentence that means p: 
 (T) S is true iff p. 
For Tarski, then, the theory tells us what it is for a sentence (with a specified meaning) to 
be true. Davidson’s observation, however, was that instances of the (T)-schema also 
might tell us what a sentence (with certain truth-conditions) means. So given a Tarskian 
theory of ‘true’ relative to L-sentences, Davidson proposed that such a theory might stand 
as a theory of meaning for L, by generating the truth-conditions for any sentence in that 
language. [Under (4), however,  we would say that the Tarskian truth-theory for L can act 
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as at least part of a meaning-theory for L.] To dig into this further, then, we need to look 
at the Tarskian definition of ‘true.’ 
Tarski begins by classifying the various uses of ‘true’ into different orders of 
language, so that no language at any given order contains its own truth-predicate. (Thus, 
Liar Paradoxes are avoided.) Consequently, given an object-language and a well-ordering 
of metalanguages, we can say in a metalanguage ML what the predicate ‘true’ means, as 
it applies to sentences of a language L. Thus, for a particular ML, we define ‘true’ but 
only with respect to L-sentences.  
For a particular ML, Tarski analyzes the truth-predicate into the notion of 
satisfaction. Specifically, he defines the extension of ‘true’ as the set of L-sentences 
where the predicate is satisfied by the object(s)5 substituted in for the variable(s). But, as 
we have indicated, a predicate is satisfied by the objects(s) just in case replacing the 
variable(s) in the predicate with the object(s) results in a true sentence. The upshot would 
be that, given language L, an L-sentence is in the extension of ‘true’ iff it is true, which 
seems quite an uninformative analysis. Yet in lieu of this, Tarski proposes an alternative, 
recursive definition of ‘satisfaction.’ 
 In brief, given an n-place predicate and n objects, the recursive definition of 
‘satisfaction’ will output the conditions under which the predicate is satisfied by the 
objects. (Thus, as one application, if we input the predicate ‘x is white’ and the object 
snow, the recursive definition of ‘satisfaction’ will output that the predicate ‘is white’ is 
satisfied by snow iff snow is indeed white.) The recursive definition, specifically, first 
                                                 
5 I have some discomfort with Tarski’s talk of objects being substituted in for such variables rather than 
terms. It is not as if the result of a substitution is some kind of hybrid between linguistic and non-linguistic 
objects. However, such talk may be shorthand for substituting the variable with a term denoting that object. 
In any case, this is how I would like to be understood when I adopt Tarski’s way of speaking. 
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lists the satisfaction-conditions of (finitely) many predicates, and then gives rules which 
determine the satisfaction-conditions of more complex predicates. (Example: If ‘Fx’ is 
satisfied iff x is F, and ‘Gx’ is satisfied iff x is G—then ‘Fx and Gx’ is satisfied iff x is F 
and G.) As a special case, Tarski notes that for a predicate with no free variables (i.e. a 
sentence), any sequence of objects will satisfy this expression iff it is true, whereas no 
sequence of objects will satisfy this expression iff it is false. Tarski then defines a true 
sentence as a predicate with no free variables that is satisfied by all sequences; otherwise 
it is false. 
In sum, then: To give a nonparadoxical analysis of ‘true,’ we must define ‘true’ 
relative to a particular language L (not containing its own truth-predicate); and in 
particular, define a set of things (in this case, a set of L-sentences) as its extension. 
Tarski’s proposal is that we define this set as the set of sentences which is satisfied by all 
sequences of objects. And since the recursive definition of ‘satisfaction’ defines the truth-
conditions for such sentences, we can then substitute ‘is true’ in for ‘is satisfied’ in the 
recursive definition, and derive an instance of the T-schema for each sentence. 
Again, Davidson’s key observation is that these T-schema instances suffice as 
interpretations for every sentence of the language, at least in the sense that they assign a 
truth-condition to each sentence. However, it seems that TCS would only be a (partial) 
theory of sentential meaning at best. Regarding subsentential content-words (i.e. terms), 
the Tarskian definition of ‘true’ simply presupposes a list of reference- and satisfaction-
conditions for (finitely many) such words. We might very well ask then “what defines the 
reference- and satisfaction-conditions for terms?” It seems that TCS might talk of these 
conditions as conditions under which certain sentences are true. But  then, the question 
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gets pushed back onto the notion of truth. Moreover, we could not appeal to Tarskian 
truth-theory to resolve the matter, on pain of circularity. Since ‘true’ in Tarskian theory is 
defined by the reference- and satisfaction- conditions of terms, our inquiry would land us 
back where we started. 
But instead, one could use ‘denotation’ to define the satisfaction-conditions of a 
predicate, so that what satisfies the predicate just is the denotation of the predicate.  
Moreover, we can see reference-conditions as a special case of satisfaction-conditions—
after all, the reference-conditions for a singular term X are those conditions where X 
satisfies the predicate ‘is identical to X.’ If so, then TCS seems able to use ‘denotation’ to 
define the reference- and satisfaction-conditions of terms. And this would still allow TCS 
to draw upon the Tarskian theory of truth, without the circularity from before. 
This is a view which so far takes ‘denotation’ as primitive. But then again, one 
can go further and define ‘denotation’ in terms of truth. Yet at that point it should be clear 
that our theory has re-engaged the circularity. To understand meaning, TCS utilized the 
notion of truth, which in turn, was analyzed into satisfaction-conditions and  denotation—
but now denotation would be analyzed back into truth. (See Figure I).6  [Note that under 
weak TCS, meaning per se is not given a circular analysis; rather, its analysis will use 
notions which are themselves given a circular analysis.]  
Yet is the circularity vicious? David Wiggins (2002) suggests that the account of 
‘true’ is only meant to map out the “conceptual connections” that truth bears to other  
                                                 
6 In Strawson (1969), the circularity between Tarskain truth and TCS is that we can generate instances of 
the (T)-schema only if we are given the meaning of sentences—but we would get the meaning of sentences 
only from instances of the (T)-schema. I avoid this way of putting the circularity, however, since one can 
derive instances of the (T)-schema without sentential-meanings, described as such. In Tarski’s own theory, 
one derives T-sentences from the denotation of terms plus the compositionality rules. Nonetheless, the 
basic problem is the same, viz., that semantic terms are (sooner or later) analyzed into a circle. 
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Figure 1. Tarski-Davidson Circles. Semantic terms such as ‘satisfies,’ ‘true,’ etc. seem interdefined in 
various ways, resulting in a circular definition for each term. [Arrows here are used as conditional and 
biconditional arrows.] Note that since we are assuming (4) instead of Davidsonian TCS, the arrows only go 
one direction away from ‘ ‘Fa’ means Fa’. 
 
 
semantically interesting notions, e.g. the notion of meaning. These conceptual 
connections may form a circle, yet the claim is that mapping out these connections is 
theoretically illuminating nonetheless. 
I am willing to grant that knowing the connection between truth and meaning is 
theoretically important in a certain respect. It is informative to know that the notion of 
truth has a strong conceptual tie to meaning (and vice-versa), as opposed to having a 
conceptual tie with, say, desire. But in other respects, this circular analysis seems 
impotent. For instance, it seems we will run into circular explanations of an 
uninformative sort, akin to the explanation “water is wet because water is wet.” E.g., we 
will explain the truth of a sentence by citing the denotations of its containing terms, but 
explain these denotations via the notion of truth. All told, this seems less than ideal. 
 
III. A Proposal. 
 Perhaps a circular, Wiggins-style theory is the best we can do. But as inquirers we 
are pushed to search for something better before giving in to this pessimism. So how 
might we better deal with all this circularity? The most popular option is to break out of 
the circle by defining one of the semantic notions into non-semantic terms, in the style of 
     ‘Fa’ means Fa  
                              Fa iff ‘F’ denotes a   Fa iff a satisfies ‘F’ 
  Fa iff ‘Fa’ is true 
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naturalized semantics. Thus, following Kripke (1972), one could define ‘x denotes y’ as 
“x bears the right kind of causal-historical relation to y”—and one might further unpack 
‘the right causal-historical relation’ in the style of Fodor (1990), or Millikan (1984), or 
whatnot. There is no consensus, however, on how the relevant causal-historical relation is 
to be understood, and all such accounts face difficulties, such as the problem of empty 
names. (Even going by the Third Chapter, it is not obvious how a MIO would enter into a 
causal-historical relation with a term, since MIOs are not even actual). 
But suppose that there is a way to analyze ‘denotes’ into non-semantic terms, in 
line with the Causal Theory. Of course, assuming circularity is not an option, there will 
eventually be some term or other which goes unanalyzed. This is just the semantic 
pessimisist’s point that non-circular interpretation has to end somewhere. Yet part of the 
point here is that certain fundamental questions thus go unanswered by the theory. So for 
example, in the Causal Theory, if a “cause” is understood as an “actual sufficient 
condition” or perhaps an INUS-condition [in the sense of Mackie (1965)], it may turn out 
that the notion of a “sufficient condition” goes unanalyzed. And so, any question about 
the nature of such conditions goes unanswered. Of course, we could go on to identify a 
sufficient condition as what the antecedent of a material conditional expresses, but 
‘expresses’ here would be just another word for “means”, and we would end up back in 
the circle. 
 Davidson’s own (1996) preference seems to be to take ‘true’ as primitive. Thus 
constructed, TCS would still nicely illustrate (at least in part) how sentential meanings 
“depend on” the meaning of the parts. Nonetheless, this choice requires the unhappy 
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stance that ‘true’ is unanalyzable. And besides, the longer we can stave off theoretical 
primitives, the better. 
 But is it any better to take a different term as primitive? In fact, I think there is a 
way to avoid making a tough choice for any given language. In the case of English (or 
more properly, metaEnglish), we can always define (at least one) of the semantic terms 
using a different language. That way, we would not be stuck with circular interpretations 
of metaEnglish semantic terms, though of course we would be taking as primitive a 
semantic notion in some other language. 
 To illustrate, weak TCS might first analyze just the metaEnglish predicates  
‘meansOL’, ‘trueOL’, and ‘satisfiesOL’ in metaEnglish. Where ‘x is F’ is an atomic sentence: 
(10)  a) ‘x is F’ meansOL p only if [‘x is F’ is trueOL iff p] 
 
         b) ‘F’ meansOL x only if ‘F’ is satisfiedOL by x 
 
 (11)  ‘x is F’ is trueOL iff ‘F’ is satisfiedOL by x. 
 
(12) ‘F’ is satisfiedOL by x iff ‘F’ denotesOL x 
 
[The predicates would then get defined on composed sentences in the expected way.] 
Now at (10)-(12 denotation is primitive since ‘denotesOL’ goes unanalyzed. And so, even 
though the other metaEnglish semantic predicates are all defined in metaEnglish, thus far 
there is no circle if we take the stance that the clauses on the left are defined by the 
clauses on the right (and not vice-versa). When it comes to ‘denotesOL’, then, the idea 
would be to define this term in a different language. But note that we cannot define 
‘denotesOL’ in metametaEnglish using metametaEnglish semantic terms, as in: 
 (13) ‘F’ denotesOL x iff ‘F’ denotesML x. 
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In this case, (13) is false, since ‘denotes’ defined on object-language expression is non-
equivalent to ‘denotes’ defined on metalanguage expressions. (That is how paradox is 
avoided in a classical system.) More concretely, (13) is false since ‘denotesML’ is defined 
on compound phrases that use ‘denotesOL’, but ‘denotesOL’ is not defined on such phrases. 
Thus, if ‘denotesOL’ is to be defined in metametaEnglish, it apparently must be 
defined by non-semantic terms, assuming such a thing is possible.7 But instead of waiting 
on an adequate naturalistic semantics, in the meantime we can simply use a different 
natural language such as French to do the work. Thus, (10)-(12) might be supplemented 
with the following thought: 
 (14) «‘F’ denotesOL x » est vraiAnglais si, et seulement si, «F» dénoteAnglais  x. 
Here I assume that ‘vraiAnglais’ and ‘dénoteAnglais’ are defined on expressions of 
metaEnglish. But beyond that, we can leave these terms unanalyzed if we wish. For at 
this point, all semantic terms in metaEnglish have been given non-circular 
interpretations. Of course, we could subsequently go on to analyze ‘vraiAnglais’ and 
‘dénoteAnglais’ as well. Though at some point, if circularity is not an option, eventually 
some semantic element will go unanalyzed. This is of course what we’d expect under 
semantic pessimisism. But under pessimisism, we should also acknowledge that our 
interpretations of semantic terms merely function as “counterfeit” answers to what these 
terms mean. After all, our entire analysis of semantic terms would hang on the 
                                                 
7 Actually, though, if we called such a naturalistic definiens for ‘denotesOL’ “D”, D would still have to be 
equivalent to ‘denotesOL’ (since D is used to define that term). But apparently, anything which is equivalent 
to ‘denotesOL’ must not occur in the object-language, on pain of paradox. This is a bit odd, since ex 
hypothesi D is supposed to be free of semantic terms. So it seems more than just semantic terms must be 
eliminated from OL, assuming there is such a D. In fact, I do not mean to be wedded to this argument here; 
I need to think more about it; but I mention it for the reader’s consideration. 
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interpretation of one semantic term taken as primitive—though qua primitive, the theory 
would say nothing about which relation the term expresses.  
 In addition, since some semantic element goes unanalyzed, our theory will not 
constitute a general analysis of semantic notions. This in fact is why Dummett (1974) 
objects to Davidsonian TCS: The complaint is that TCS is not a theory of Meaning-In-
General, but only for a particular language L. But according to semantic pessimisism, one 
cannot give a General Theory of Meaning since you are eventually forced to use a 
“background language” whose semantics go unspecified. It is understandable why some 
might be critical of a semantics which ultimately uses a set of unanalyzed terms, but this 
is the kind of limitation which semantic theory seems to face in general. 
 
IV. Semantic Explanation. 
Again, if we accept (10)-(13), we would essentially have a theory of all 
metaEnglish semantic terms without falling into circularity. To be clear, though, it is not 
as if one is forced to define ‘denotes’ and ‘satisfaction’ in the manner I have suggested. 
One can always settle for circular interpretations. But again, it seems to me that circular 
interpretation cannot offer the explanatory power which non-circular interpretation can. 
To illustrate this, let us consider three characters, François, Francis, and Frank. 
François speaks only French, let us assume, while Francis speaks French and English, 
whereas Frank only speaks English. Suppose for his amusement, one day François goes 
to Germany and tries to acquire the language, à la the radical translator. (François has a 
sick sense of what a good time is.) Suppose that his success is almost nil, except he 
manages to observe that the sentence ‘Der Schnee is weiss’ is asserted if and only if snow 
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is white. (I leave the details of how François discovered this to the reader’s imagination.) 
Now François wants to boast his new discovery to his friend, Francis. And after telling 
Francis the details of his observations, François concludes, in the style of a radical 
translator: 
(15) ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ veut dire que la neige est blanche en L’Allemand, 
        parce que ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ est vrai en L’Allemand si et seulement 
        si la neige est blanche.8 
 
Now Francis knows that François is an intellectually careful fellow, and would not make 
such a claim unless the evidence was strong. So he comes to believe François as concerns  
(15). Nevertheless, François wants to prove his skills at radical translation—and so, he 
looks up the words in a German-French dictionary he happens to be holding. After a few 
moments, François shows Francis that the dictionary vindicates his claim. 
 Frank, who overhears them talking excitedly, asks Francis about what was the 
matter. Francis replies: 
 (16) François discerned that in German the sentence ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true 
        if and only if snow is white. And his observation was correct, since ‘Der 
        Schnee ist weiss’ just means that snow is white in German. 
 
Now from Francis’ point of view, the meaning of ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ was explained 
by appeal the truth-conditions of the sentence. Yet Francis then appeals to the meaning of 
‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ to explain to Frank why François’ assessment of the truth-
conditions was correct. So in one sense, meaning is explained by truth-conditions, which 
is then explained by meaning. But despite the appearance of a circle, these explanations 
are each substantive, even from Francis’ point of view.  
 One might think the need for such explanations is relatively rare. But perhaps it is 
rare to invoke such explanations, but I think the need for some explanation here is quite 
                                                 
8 Again, François’ inference doesn’t deductively follow here, but presumably it is a good abductive one. 
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real. Or more modestly, these explanations at least offer us something theoretically 
significant. And crucially, the kinds of semantic explanations are possible only on the 
views which give noncircular definitions of semantic terms. Such explanations thus 
constitute the primary advantage of our approach semantic terms, over theories that 
define semantic terms in circles. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
WHAT DOES THE SLOW-SWITCH ARGUMET SHOW? 
 
 
The previous chapters concern the semantics of linguistic representations, and our 
limitations in answering certain questions in that domain.  In the present chapter, 
however, I consider a pessimistic argument regarding the semantics of mental 
representations. Specifically, I consider the slow-switching argument from Burge (1988), 
which purports to show that we cannot know a priori what content our mental 
representations have. And although I conclude the argument is non-demonstrative, I think 
the argument can be extended to create an interesting skeptical problem, which is 
somewhat analogous to the epistemic problem discussed in Chapter One.  
To start things of, consider (what we might call) the “inverted beetle-in-the-box.” 
Suppose that a group of speakers have lived their entire lives in a windowless box, and 
suppose they use ‘beetle’ to represent whatever is on the ground nearest to the Northwest 
corner, outside the box. Then, even if they are able to use ‘beetle’ to represent whatever 
that is, in one sense they have no idea what they are talking about. ‘Beetle’ could 
represent any number of things, for all they know—a hat, a motorcycle, a dead body, etc. 
 According to some philosophers, if semantic externalism is true, this would be the 
situation we are in, as regards knowledge of what we mean by ‘beetle’. More exactly, the 
externalist view may make it impossible to gain a priori knowledge of the content of my 
own use of ‘beetle’ and the correlative concept. (Hereafter, I shall call this knowledge of 
content a priori “self-knowledge”). According to externalism, the content of a natural 
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kind term like ‘beetle’ is determined in part by the world around us. But in a priori 
contemplation, we shut ourselves in our mental “box” in a way that occludes the external 
world. And from this position, it may seem that if externalism is true, we could not know 
a priori what content is expressed by ‘beetle’, since this would depend on features of the 
external world, which are inaccessible from inside the “a priori box.”  From that position, 
it seems that the term ‘beetle’ could be about (say) flies, for all we know. 
The issue here is important, since it seems to be nothing less than a clash between 
two landmark ideas in philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes convinced many of us that 
we can know mental contents introspectively, in a way that is independent of our 
knowledge of external objects. On the other hand, Frege convinced many of us that the 
content of ‘beetle’ (and of the correlative concept) determines what it denotes in the 
external world (or to use Frege’s dictum, that its intension determines its extension). Yet 
this seems to conflict with the Cartesian idea, since (as we’ll see) Frege’s claim implies 
the externalist view that content of ‘beetle’ is partly individuated by the external 
environment. In which case, knowledge of the content of ‘beetle’ would apparently 
require knowledge of its object—meaning you could not get knowledge of content just 
from inside the “a priori box.”  You’d have to go out into the external world and have a 
look. The upshot is, apparently, one of philosophy’s long-standing intuitions has to go: 
Either Cartesians were wrong to think we could know contents by mere introspection, or 
Fregeans were misguided to think that content is what determines denotation. 
 However, I believe there is a way out of this dilemma. I think we can keep both 
the Cartesian and Fregean ideas (roughly) by giving up the idea Cartesian knowledge of 
content requires knowledge of denotation. In this paper, I shall first consider Burge’s 
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(1988) “slow-switching” argument, an argument which presents the Descartes-Frege 
conflict in one of its guises. Many writers (including Burge) have come to reject the 
argument—but in fact, I think there is more to it than is commonly assumed. I eventually 
agree, however, that the argument’s force is limited, due to an independently-motivated 
semantics for ‘knowing wh-’ locutions from Boër and Lycan (1986). More exactly, with 
this semantics in hand, we will see that although one variety of self-knowledge is 
threatened by Frege-cum-externalist, the Cartesian variety is not. 
 
I. Externalism and Anti-Individualism. 
Externalism, to be precise, is the view that the content of a subject’s natural and 
artificial kind terms/concepts is determined at least partly her social and physical 
environment.1 The arguments for the view are based in the Twin-Earth thought-
experiments in Putnam, (1975), Burge (1979), (1982), which I presume familiar. For our 
purposes, however, it will best to focus not on the positive thesis of externalism, but 
rather on its negative, anti-individualist consequence that: 
(AI) Psychological states (described individualistically) do not wholly determine 
       the content of a kind term/concept. 
 
The psychological states I have in mind here are those individuated by physical states of 
the neurological system, which are (roughly) those states describable independently of 
the subject’s social and physical environment.2  
                                                 
1 The view may also extend to singular terms/concepts, and others as well. But of course, a term such as 
‘individualistic psychological states’ would be an exception to the view. 
 
2 N.B., Burge (1979) simply assumes that (AI) is an anti-Cartesian view, though since Descartes was a 
dualist, he could grant (AI) if narrow states are individuated physicalistically. However, Descartes himself 
plausibly individuates these states phenomenologically, so in that sense, (AI) would be anti-Cartesian. 
Nonetheless, to make the discussion more relevant to contemporary philosophers, I shall assume the 
physicalistic individuation of narrow states is appropriate. 
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In the case of kind terms, the thought-experiments purport to show (AI) on the 
Fregean assumption that a term denotes what it denotes in virtue of its content, so that: 
(1) Content determines denotation. 
I do not doubt that there are different senses of the term ‘content’, so that “content” is not 
always what determines extension. But it is the extension-determining sense of ‘content’ 
I intend here. So really, (1) is really more stipulative than anything. (This just expresses 
my commitment to the Fregean dictum.) 
Now the thought-experiments suggest that for two uses of a kind term:  
(2) Sameness of psychological state (described individualistically) does not 
determine sameness of denotation.3 
 
Thus it follows from (1) and (2): 
 
(3) Sameness of psychological state (described individualistically) does not 
determine sameness of content. 
 
So from (3), (AI) would follow in the case of terms. And since the content of a term just 
is the content of the concept it expresses, the point easily carries over to concepts. 
 
II. The Slow-Switch Argument. 
 In Burge (1988), the apparent difficulty for (AI) plus a priori self-knowledge 
arises from a different sort of thought-experiment. There, we are to imagine that Oscar (a 
normal, adult English speaker) is unwittingly switched to Twin-Earth. Now immediately 
after the switch, Oscar’s thoughts about water will presumably continue to be de water 
                                                 
3 Do we really need the thought-experiments to show (2)? The claim strikes me as plausible in its own 
right. Arguably, even Descartes in the first two Meditations grants that individualistic states do not 
determine whether a term/concept denotes an external object vs. an object in a dream; cf. Burge (2006b). 
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(i.e., H2O), even though he is now in an environment that houses XYZ instead.
4 But 
many anti-individualists have the intuition that, over time, those thoughts will eventually 
become de XYZ—even if he continues to be unaware of the switch. After all, Oscar will 
acquire the habit of using ‘water’ in the presence of XYZ rather than water, and he will 
thereby succeed in various language-games he plays with Twin-Earthians. But the 
intuition is also that Oscar will not know, at least not by introspection alone, that his 
thoughts are now de XYZ rather than water. 
There may be several confusing features of the “slow-switch” example; but the 
point is supposed to be that in a slow-switch scenario, Oscar would not have introspective 
knowledge of his own mental contents. For he could not know introspectively whether 
thoughts using the concept expressed by ‘water’ (hereafter, “W-thoughts”) are de XYZ 
vs. water. Officially, we can formulate the slow-switch argument as follows: 
(4) If slow-switched, Oscar knows introspectively what content his W-thoughts 
have only if he can know introspectively that these thoughts are de XYZ vs. 
water.          [Assumption] 
 
(5) Oscar cannot know introspectively whether his W-thoughts are de XYZ vs. 
water.             [Assumption] 
 
(6) If slow-switched, Oscar does not know introspectively what content his W-
thoughts have.                  [From (4), (5)] 
 
It is then presumed that (6) indicates a conflict between anti-individualism and 
introspective self-knowledge.  
                                                 
4 I talk of thoughts as being “de” water, but this does not mean we can substitute co-referring terms in 
ascriptions of these thoughts. E.g., ‘S thinks that water is wet’ and ‘S thinks that H2O is wet’ each ascribe a 
thought that is de water (on Earth), but I assume these ascriptions are non-equivalent. After all, the second 
ascription (but not the first) suggests that S deploys the concept H2O rather than WATER. Even so, both 
thoughts are de water, since their truth depends on the properties of water as opposed to some other stuff. 
And to be clear, even though the thought-ascriptions themselves are opaque, we can substitute co-referring 
terms to say instead that S’s thoughts are de H2O instead of de water. For this substitution does not alter the 
truth-condition of our claim about which stuff determines the truth-value of S’s thoughts. 
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The current literature on this argument primarily offers two objections. Some 
object that (6) is irrelevant to our self-knowledge. In the next section, however, I argue 
that this criticism, the “Relevance Objection” as I shall call it, is not entirely successful. 
Others (e.g., Burge himself) object to the argument by pointing to self-verifying second-
order judgments, to show by example that slow-switching does not preclude a priori self-
knowledge. In the end, I conclude in favor of the “Objection from Self-Verifying 
Judgments,” though with some important qualifications. 
 
III. The Relevance Objection. 
The Relevance Objection to the slow-switch argument is levied by a number of 
writers, e.g. Warfield (1992) and Brown (2004). The complaint is that it is unclear how 
(6) bears on us—after all, unlike Oscar, we are not victims of covert slow-switches. At 
best, (6) is relevant only if we add something like the following: 
(7) If (6) and you have not “ruled out” the possibility of slow-switching, then 
     you do not know introspectively the content of your W-thoughts. [Assumption] 
 
This would mean that if you have not ruled out the possibility of slow-switching, you 
would lack self-knowledge, regardless of whether you have actually been switched. But 
of course, (7) is highly contentious. It is at least prima facie plausible that knowing p 
does not require you to rule out all skeptical scenarios where ~p. To borrow the example 
from Dretske (1994), it seems you can know that a certain animal in the zoo is a zebra 
even if you cannot rule out that it is a cleverly painted mule. For in the usual cases, 
cleverly painted mules are not “relevant alternatives” to zebras. Similarly, in the case of 
self-knowledge, I can apparently know that a thought is about water, even if I have not 
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ruled out the skeptical possibility of a slow-switch to Twin Earth. For XYZ is not a 
relevant alternative to water; XYZ is just a fictional stuff made up by Putnam in the 70s.5 
The relevant alternatives model is of course not accepted by everyone, but the 
point is that it indicates a gap in the slow-switch argument. If slow-switching is to show 
an incompatibility6 between (AI) and introspective self-knowledge, it appears we must 
also show that either that twins are relevant alternatives, or that the relevant alternatives 
model is incorrect.7 But thus far, we have not seen an argument for either claim. 
Ludlow (1995), however, contends that sometimes twins are relevant alternatives. 
He considers the term ‘chicory’ which denotes chicory in American English and denotes 
endive in British English—though the two salad greens are indistinguishable to the 
untrained eye.8 Thus one can easily imagine an American expatriate in England who is 
unaware of the different usage, and is effectively the victim of a slow-switch. However, 
Warfield (1997) argues (and I concur) that such cases are quite rare.9 Slow-switching not 
only requires a term that actually switches denotation from place-to-place—it also 
requires that the denotations swapped are indistinguishable to the lay person. But the co-
                                                 
5 A Moorean may also suggest on commonsense grounds that you do not need to rule out the cleverly 
painted mule. But since the relevant-alternatives response is more prominent in the literature, I focus on 
that instead. Besides, I eventually grant what the Moorean wants, viz., that commonsense knowledge of 
contents is ubiquitous. 
 
6 The relevant sense of ‘incompatible’ is “materially incompatible,” where p and q are materially 
incompatible iff ~(p & q). I thus agree with Ludlow (1997) that Warfield (1992), (1997) frames the issue 
incorrectly when asking if is a possible world where externalism is true and we have a priori self-
knowledge. 
 
7 Or show that the Moorean arguments are faulty (see n. 5).  
 
8 Ludlow himself talks of arugula instead of endive in his example, though I am told that it is actually 
endive which ‘chicory’ denotes in England. (P.S. It may be helpful to know I speak American English.) 
 
9 Ludlow also cites examples of philosophical terms, such as ‘realism’, ‘pragmatism’, etc., whose 
extensions vary between philosophical circles. But I would typically think of these as causing  “fast 
switches” rather than slow-switches, though I suppose a slow-switch could conceivably occur with these 
terms. However, that would also seem quite rare in the actual world. 
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incidence of these two factors is fairly uncommon; if so, then in the majority cases, there 
is no need to consider twins as relevant alternatives.  
My own response to the Relevance Objection is to reject the relevant alternatives 
model, at least for the Cartesian variety of self-knowledge. In this, Cartesian knowledge 
is understood as skeptic-proof knowledge—you Cartesian-know that p only if you have 
ruled out every skeptical scenario where ~p. So in particular, in order to Cartesian-know 
that your W-thoughts are de water, you must rule out any skeptical possibility where 
those thoughts are about something other than water, as in a slow-switch scenario. As 
concerns Cartesian knowledge, then, it seems (7) is correct to say that ruling out a slow-
switch is necessary in order to know.  
Yet we now seem to avoid the Relevance Objection by restricting the slow-switch 
argument to a very unusual type of self-knowledge. Yet I think this is apt, since in Burge 
(1988), the slow-switch argument was only meant to target Cartesian self-knowledge 
anyway (p. 653).10 And lest this sound too parochial, recall that externalism generally 
gained notoriety for challenging the Cartesian conception of mind specifically. So in this 
way, we can see the slow-switch argument as one manifestation of this challenge.  
Thus, it may be true enough that, commonsensically, we do know the content of 
our concepts—given that twins are almost always irrelevant alternatives. Things are 
different, however, when it comes to Cartesian knowledge. For in the context of the 
Meditations, you Cartesian-know that p only if you have ruled out every skeptical 
                                                 
10 Burge’s term on p. 653 is ‘basic self-knowledge’, though it is clear this is meant to be Cartesian self-
knowledge (see p. 649).  
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scenario where ~p .11 But on the relevant-alternatives model, you can know p while 
presupposing (quite reasonably!) that some deviant scenario in the external world does 
not obtain, e.g., that zebras in the zoo have been replaced with cleverly painted mules. 
Yet this just means that the relevant-alternatives model is not a model of Cartesian 
knowledge; hence, contra the Relevance Objection, that model does not bear on the self-
knowledge at issue in the slow-switch argument. 
 
IV. The Objection from Self-Verifying Judgments. 
Thus, since it is best to see Cartesian self-knowledge as the target of the slow-
switch argument, I conclude that the Relevance Objection is unsuccessful. The objection 
indeed shows that non-Cartesian self-knowledge is possible under externalism. But again, 
the slow-switch argument is concerns Cartesian self-knowledge.  
Even so, it may be unclear why anyone should care about Cartesian self-
knowledge. After all, super-strong Cartesian knowledge is generally seen as quite 
unattainable—and so, it may be immaterial if (AI) precludes that kind of knowledge. I 
shall say more in the last section about why the issue is of interest. But for now, I take it 
to be intuitive that we do have Cartesian knowledge of content, for our own kind 
terms/concepts, even if such knowledge is otherwise unattainable. More exactly, the 
intuition is that is you can know what you are thinking, even when entertaining 
hyperbolic doubts about the external world.  
The challenge for the anti-individualist, then, would be to find an example of 
introspective self-knowledge which is unaffected by slow-switching doubts. If we can 
                                                 
11 Strictly speaking, this is true only in the context of Meditations One and Two, and so my talk of the 
“Meditations” really only concerns these. 
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find such an example, it would show that slow-switch argument is unsound (though it 
would take further reflection to say which premise is false). In any case, a putative 
example of such knowledge is the judgment expressed by (8): 
 (8) I am thinking that water is wet. 
The idea is that when I judge such a thing, then even in the context of the Meditations, it 
seems I just can’t be wrong about that. Sure, I might accidentally use the wrong words if 
I try to articulate my judgment. But as Burge (1988) suggests, there is something self-
verifying about my judgment—it seems that if I occurrently judge I am thinking water is 
wet, then I really am thinking that water is wet.12 For the first-order thought that water is 
wet is, as it were, “contained” in the second-order judgment. That is, if you token this 
second-order judgment, you must “run through” the first-order thought in the process. 
And so, if you token the former, you ipso facto end up thinking the latter. But since my 
thinking the latter is what the second-order judgment claims, that judgment is self-
verifying; tokening the judgment creates the condition under which it is true. (Hereafter, I 
shall refer to such judgments as “SVJs.”) The existence of SVJs is defended by several 
writers besides Burge, such as Heil (1988), Bar-On (2004), and Parent (2007).13 
Yet what of Freudian repression? Repression phenomena illustrate that 
introspection can mislead us, suggesting (at the very least) that skeptical doubts can arise 
                                                 
12 In this, the verb ‘think’ is non-equivalent to ‘believe’. If you “think” that p, this only means that you are 
in a state with the content p; it does not entail that you have any particular attitude toward p. See my (2007) 
for an elaboration of this. 
 
13 If  the slow-switch argument (in Burge) concerns skeptic-proof self-knowledge, then I assume self-
verifying judgments in Burge are meant to constitute this kind of knowledge. This reading is supported by 
his claim (on p. 647) that our knowledge of content is sometimes has the “certainty” of the cogito. 
However, SVJs are not claimed to constitute skeptic-proof knowledge in Heil (1988) and Bar-On (2004); 
these writers are more concerned with a broader sort of epistemic “privilege” we have to our own thoughts.  
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when I judge (8). And if so, then it appears that introspective knowledge of (8) would not 
count as Cartesian self-knowledge, thus undercutting the Objection from SVJs. 
 However, I think we need to be careful in identifying the kind of introspective 
knowledge for which Freudian repression occurs. Let us distinguish between: 
(a) introspecting that you are currently thinking that water is wet,  
(b) introspecting that you are currently thinking nothing but that water is wet,  
 -and- 
(c) introspecting that you have a thought that water is wet which has been a 
     standing thought for some period of time.  
 
I would submit that failures of introspection, due to Freudian repression and the like, 
occur only when you attempt to know exhaustively your current thoughts, as in (b)-type 
cases, and when you attempt to know what you have been thinking for a period time, as 
in (c)-cases. But if you introspectively judge only that you have the occurrent thought 
that water is wet, then that judgment seems to be sufficient for its own truth. 
Be that as it may, it seems that only an extreme reliabilist would say there is 
knowledge in this case, even if the judgment is self-verifying. I shall say more about the 
reliabilist view in the next section. But as it stands, note that others besides reliabilists 
could count some SVJs as knowledge. For instance, if you token an SVJ while aware that 
such a judgment is self-verifying, then a more internally-minded epistemologist might 
count such SVJs as knowledge. And that may be enough to show that the slow-switching 
argument is non-demonstrative against all Cartesian introspective self-knowledge.14 
 
                                                 
14 Bill Lycan reminds me that further conditions may need to be in place, before we have bona fide 
Cartesian self-knowledge, e.g., perhaps your awareness that the judgment is self-verifying must be clear 
and distinct. Regardless, the point still stands that at least some SVJs may constitute Cartesian self-
knowledge, for all that has been said so far. 
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V. Brown’s Reply. 
 So far, then, it seems that the Objection from SVJs may have a point. At least, it is 
not obvious at this stage that the slow-switch argument undercuts all Cartesian self-
knowledge. Yet Jessica Brown (2004) offers further considerations on behalf of the slow-
switch argument: Brown first observes that (8) would express an SVJ in both English and 
Twin-English. That is so, even though the judgment expressed would concern different 
first-order thoughts. In one case, it would concern a water-thought—and in the other 
case, an XYZ-thought. In addition, even if SVJs are perfectly reliable about their 
respective first-order thoughts, Brown claims that the switching victim is unable to 
discriminate between water-thoughts and XYZ-thoughts, without empirical investigation. 
And inspired by Goldman’s (1976) barn façades example, Brown further maintains that a 
discriminatory ability is necessary for knowledge of one’s thoughts. 
 Essentially, we can see Brown as suggesting a variant of the slow-switch 
argument, which makes discriminatory abilities key to self-knowledge. Let us call an 
“(8)-judgment” a judgment which the subject would express using (8), where this 
expresses different SVJs in Twin-English vs. English. Then, the argument runs: 
(4′) If a subject is slow-switched and tokens an (8)-judgment—then she 
       introspectively knows what content her (first-order) thought has, only if she 
       can introspectively discriminate water-thoughts from XYZ-thoughts.   
  [Assumption] 
 
(5′) A subject cannot introspectively discriminate water-thoughts from XYZ- 
      thoughts.           [Assumption] 
 
(6′) If a subject is slow-switched and tokens an (8)-judgment, she does not 
      introspectively know what content her (first-order) thought has.  
          [From (4′), (5′)] 
 
If we want to apply this to the Meditator’s case, we may add: 
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(7′) If (6′) and the Meditator has not “ruled out” the possibility of slow- 
      switching—then even if she tokens an (8)-judgment (and is aware that it is 
      self-verifying), the Meditator still does not introspectively know what content 
      her (first-order) thought has.       [Assumption] 
 
(I speak of the “Meditator” here just to keep clear that Cartesian self-knowledge is the 
concern. Of course, in this I do not mean to do Descartes exegesis, but rather to discuss 
whether externalism precludes the kind of self-knowledge claimed in the Meditations.)  
As with (7), premise (7′) would be contentious if we were dealing with someone 
other than a Cartesian Meditator. For the switching possibility seems to be something we 
normally do not need to rule out. But with the Meditator, this seems necessary. 
Otherwise, since the Meditator takes seriously any skeptical scenario, it would be a live 
question for her as to which of two stuffs her thoughts are about. And in that case, it 
appears that the Meditator would not know what content she harbors. 
 So given (7′), it looks as though the Meditator would not introspectively know 
what content she harbors, even in tokening an (8)-judgment. That is so, given she cannot 
rule out slow-switching from her assumptions (or rather lack thereof). The upshot, then, 
would be that the Meditator lacks introspective knowledge of content. Thus, if Brown’s 
refined slow-switch argument is successful, the Objection from SVJs would be wrong to 
hypothesize that an (8)-judgment can constitute a piece of Cartesian self-knowledge. 
 Now the refined argument relies heavily on the notion of a “discriminatory 
ability,” but what is that exactly? Brown first considers Goldman’s (1986) view that this 
ability is an ability to form reliably true beliefs. (Definition: The belief that p is reliably 
true iff, in relevant alternative situations where ~p, the believer does not believe p.) So on 
Goldman’s view, a discriminatory ability is basically an ability to “track the truth,” i.e., 
track state-of-affairs where a belief is true, as distinct from those where it is not.   
 118 
Brown grants, however, that the subject is indeed perfectly reliable in her SVJs 
about which first-order thoughts she has. So why say that a switching victim cannot 
discriminate water-thoughts from XYZ-thoughts? Given the subject’s impeccable ability 
to “track” her own water-thoughts as distinct from XYZ-thoughts, why think the victim 
cannot discriminate between them, as (5′) suggests? 
Well, contra Goldman, Brown’s contention is that reliability is insufficient for an 
ability to discriminate between thoughts. She has more than one argument for this, but I 
believe her most compelling point is that a slow-switch victim would deny that any shift 
in content has occurred, if we asked her. Even so, there is a slight infelicity here since our 
concern is not the victim’s ability to notice changes in thoughts per se, but rather in her 
ability to notice whether her thought is de water in particular, as opposed to something 
that merely looks like water. But no matter. One could instead ask the victim which of the 
two liquids her current W-thoughts are about. The claim, then, would be that the 
switching-victim (once she is informed of the switches) would be unable to answer such a 
question. If so, then it may seem that the victim cannot discriminate water-thoughts from 
XYZ-thoughts, at least not without empirical investigation.  
 Yet now a different problem arises, noted by Brueckner (1999), (2003). Suppose 
the switching victim is asked ‘Are your W-thoughts currently de water or something that 
merely looks like water?’ Then, even if she is ignorant of which planet she is on, the 
victim could know a priori that the answer here must be ‘water’. That is so, regardless of 
which stuff her thoughts are about. After all, “W-thoughts” are by definition thoughts 
that are de whatever she currently calls ‘water’. But that means ‘water’ must be the 
correct answer to the question to what her W-thoughts are about. (This assumes that the 
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victim and the inquisitor mean the same thing by ‘water,’ but that is required for he 
victim to understand the question in the first place.)  
 Thus, apparently the victim is able to answer the question, and so nothing here 
shows she cannot discriminate water- and XYZ-thoughts. However, Brueckner (1999) 
identifies an alternative way to present the question so that it is not so easily answered. 
Suppose we say to the switching victim: 
Your W-thoughts were originally de one kind of liquid; call it “home-water.” But 
at least once you were unwittingly switched to a different planet, where your W- 
thoughts eventually became de a liquid that only looks like water from home. The 
question is then: Are your present W-thoughts de home-water or not? 
 
It seems the switching-victim would not be able to answer this question, at least not 
without some empirical knowledge.15 Thus in this sense she is unable to discriminate 
introspectively between thoughts of the two kinds. Of course, Goldman may again insist 
that she is able to discriminate them, thanks to her infallible SVJs. But it seems there is at 
least one sense of ‘discriminate’ where the victim cannot “discriminate” between these 
thoughts, given her inability to answer the challenge-question a priori. (Or if preferred, 
we may just give the word ‘discriminate’ to Goldman, and use some other term to express 
what the subject cannot do epistemically speaking, viz., answer our question.) 
 
VI. Cartesian Self-Knowledge and “Knowing What” 
So in one sense, it seems (5′) is correct to say that the Meditator could not 
discriminate introspectively between water-thoughts and XYZ-thoughts. But does that 
mean Cartesian self-knowledge is impossible? Falvey & Owens (1994), as well as 
Goldberg (1999), suggest that an (8)-judgment would suffice for knowing what she 
                                                 
15 N.B., Brueckner also argues that the ability to answer this question is unnecessary for a priori self-
knowledge. But as I argue below, it depends on one’s purposes as to whether this ability is needed. 
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thinks nonetheless, though they concede it would be a non-discriminating sort of 
knowing. But Brown, of course, would say “non-discriminating” knowledge is a 
contradicto in adjecto. 
So who is right? Note that the issue concerns whether the Meditator would “know 
what” she thinks in virtue of an (8)-judgment. And here, it is important that the semantics 
for “know wh-” attributions are highly purpose-relative, as argued by Boër and Lycan 
(1986). In other words, the truth of a “know wh-” attribution depends on the purposes set 
in a context. To illustrate, consider that we would ordinarily say a five-year-old “knows 
what” water is. After all, the child has the kind of knowledge which enables him to fetch 
a glass of water (as opposed to orange juice, soda, molasses, etc.). Yet if asked what 
water is on a chemistry exam, the same child may not count as “knowing what” water is, 
if he cannot select the correct chemical formula among the answer-choices. Thus we 
might say that the child knows what water is for ordinary purposes, though not for the 
purposes of the chemistry exam. And so we get a purpose-relativity in “knowing what.”16 
If this is correct, then whether the Meditator “knows what” she thinks will also 
depend on her purposes. If the aim is specifically to answer our challenge-question, then 
the Meditator apparently cannot “know what” she is thinking, at least not introspectively. 
For she cannot answer, without empirical investigation, if her W-thoughts are de home-
water vs. something that merely looks like water from home.  
                                                 
16 Note that the purpose-relativity in “knowing what” is different from the context-sensitivity which some 
have argued in the case of “knowing.” Epistemic contextualism [as defended by Lewis (1996), DeRose 
(1995)] is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions are conditioned by how high the 
evidential “standards” are in a context. However, the purpose-relativity in “knowing what” is different from 
the contextualist’s context-sensitivity. No matter what the evidential standards, a person “knows what” 
water is, for the purposes of a chemistry exam, if she knows that water is H2O. It’s just that, in a skeptical 
context, the antecedent might not be satisfied, due to high evidential standards—whereas the antecedent 
may be satisfied when lower standards are in place. But whether or not the antecedent is satisfied, the fact 
remains that for the purposes of the exam she knows what water is if she knows water is H2O. 
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Still, the Meditator might have other purposes which do not require her to answer 
our question. For example, an (8)-judgment may qualify her as knowing what she thinks, 
at least for the purposes of being infallible on the matter. Infallible knowledge is indeed 
one aim of the Meditations—and relative to that particular purpose, absolute reliability 
may be enough for “knowing what,” contra what Brown would suggest. 
However, this kind of point is probably easier to make in relation to an SVJ that is 
more “descriptive.” Suppose that instead of (8), the Meditator asserts the following: 
(8′) I am thinking about a colorless, odorless liquid.  
 
Even though (8′) does not specify a complete first-order thought, (8′) still looks self-
verifying: If the Meditator judges that she is thinking about a colorless, odorless liquid, 
then it seems she really is thinking about such a liquid. Again, in order to judge she is 
thinking about this liquid in the first place, she needs to “run through” her descriptor ‘a 
colorless, odorless…’ in her mind. But that is sufficient for thinking about such a liquid. 
Again, with this “descriptive” SVJ, it is easier to say the Meditator “knows what” 
she thinks, at least for some purposes, even if she cannot answer the challenge-question. 
For her use of the descriptors suggest she is able to answer other, substantive questions. 
Thus when she tokens (8′), she seems well-positioned to answer questions like “Are you 
thinking of something red? Are you thinking of a solid body? Are you thinking of 
something sweet-smelling?” And so, for the purpose of answering these kinds of 
questions, it seems she indeed “knows what” she is thinking.17  
                                                 
17 The point holds, even if the Meditator cannot answer “Are you thinking of something that exists?” In the 
context of Meditation Two, she probably cannot answer that question, though she can still answer whether 
she is thinking of something red, solid, etc. 
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Importantly, the Meditator is well-positioned to answer these other questions even 
if she has actually been slow-switched. For it is unnecessary to distinguish a content that 
is de water from one that is de XYZ, for the purposes of answering those questions. Thus, 
if the task is just to identify whether the object of thought is red, solid, sweet-smelling, 
etc., then the Meditator may indeed “know what” she is thinking when she judges (8′).18 
Apparently, then, this shows that (4′) is succeptible to counter-example. If the 
Meditator judges (8′) by introspection, it may be that this qualifies her as knowing what 
she thinks (for at least some purposes) even if she actually has been slow-switched. That 
is so, even if she cannot know introspectively whether her thought is de water vs. XYZ. 
Of course, if the Meditator explicitly has the aim of answering the challenge question, 
then it seems she would be required to know whether her thought is de home-water or 
not. And for that purpose, it may indeed be impossible to “know what” she is thinking 
just by introspection. But ruling out slow-switches is just one of many goals which the 
Meditator might have—and oftentimes, the Meditator’s purposes might indeed qualify 
her as “knowing what” she thinks in virtue of her (8′)-judgment. At the very least, 
nothing has been said to defeat this kind of claim. 
Nevertheless, it may sound odd to suggest that the Meditator could know what she 
thinks, even though (for all she can tell) her thoughts may have one of two contents. Yet 
this may just re-enforce that, for some of her purposes, the Meditator isn’t required to 
distinguish a content from a twin. Oddly, then, “knowing what” in the Meditations can be 
similar to knowing what water is for ordinary purposes. (But of course, there would be 
                                                 
18 The claim is congenial with contrastive accounts of knowledge [see Schaffer (2005)]: What the 
Meditator knows would contrast with the proposition that she is thinking about, e.g., a red ball. (Still, with 
contrastive accounts, I would argue that purpose-relativity can explain the relativity to certain contrast-
propositions.) 
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stark differences as well.) In particular, both kinds of “knowing what” would not require 
the individual to know something that distinguishes water from a twin. Nonetheless, a 
child positively does know what water is, for ordinary purposes. Similarly, the Meditator 
may indeed know what content she thinks, for some of her purposes. 
Thus, I conclude the Objection from SVJs is successful against the slow-switch 
argument. At the very least, the Objection shows that the argument is non-demonstrative: 
Even if a victim is slow-switched, some variety of Cartesian self-knowledge might 
remain, relative to some purposes. Nonetheless, I have also concurred that: 
(9) The argument indeed shows that the Meditator fails to know what mental 
     content she harbors, for the purpose of answering the challenge-question.  
 
But I have also shown that:  
 
(10) The argument does NOT show that the Meditator’s (8′)-judgment is 
        insufficient for knowing what content she thinks for every purpose—even if 
        she is slow-switched. 
 
And so, I claim the slow-switch argument fails to show that anti-individualism precludes 
Cartesian self-knowledge. So, for all that has been said, a Fregean-cum-externalist can 
embrace the kind of self-knowledge claimed in the Meditations. 
I should also like to add that:  
(11) (9) is no cause for philosophical anxiety. 
I take it to be unsurprising if the relevant kind of introspective self-knowledge is 
impossible, viz., when the purpose is to answer our challenge-question. Who would have 
thought you could identify what the actual truth-maker is for your W-thoughts, from 
inside the “a priori box”? Certainly not Descartes. For all he claimed to know a priori, 
his W-thoughts might have been about a non-existent stuff.  Perhaps W-thoughts are de 
facto determined partly by a certain kind in the world, but this is not something Descartes 
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assumed a priori. I doubt, then, that Cartesian self-knowledge itself was ever meant to 
answer our challenge question. 
 
VII. The Charitable Skeptic. 
 I promised earlier to say more about why skeptic-proof knowledge of contents is 
of interest. To repeat, the issue is of interest partly because we do have an intuition that 
we can know what we think, even when entertaining skeptical doubts. Furthermore, if the 
the slow-switch argument is sound, that would demonstrate one anti-Cartesian 
consequence of (AI), the kind of putative consequence which made anti-individualism 
famous. Even so, the problem is that, today, many philosophers have no interest in 
skepticism and whether certain bits of our knowledge are skeptic-proof. Skepticism is 
often seen as an embarrassment to contemporary philosophy, an exaggerated and arcane 
anxiety from the 17th century. Now it is true that there are similarities between the usual 
skepticism and the skeptical problem about content we have discussed. [See Bar-On 
(forthcoming) for many of these similarities.] Both utilize arguments of the following 
form [featured in DeRose (1995)], where ‘H’ is a skeptical hypothesis, and ‘O’ is 
something you ordinarily take yourself to know: 
(i) If I know that O, then I know that ~H. 
(ii) I do not know that ~H. 
(iii) So, I do not know O. 
H for the external-world skeptic will be something like “I am a brain-in-a-vat” and O will 
be some external-world proposition like “I have hands.” Whereas, the content-skeptic’s H 
would be the slow-switching hypothesis, and O would be something like “My current W-
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thoughts are de the liquid from home.” In both cases, the idea would be that you don’t 
know what you think you know, on the assumption that you do not know ~H. 
 However, there is an important difference which, I think, makes content-
skepticism the more interesting one. External-world skepticism feeds off the paranoia that 
you may be in total error about the external world. Yet content-skepticism, even when 
generalized to all thoughts, need not suggest you may be in massive error. Indeed, it 
seems to me the content-skeptic can grant the truth of virtually all of your assertions—
and do so even when their justification is a posteriori. In the a priori case, of course, we 
saw that the challenge-question can be pressed even if (8) is true. Basically, that’s 
because (8) turns out to be true both English and Twin-English. But notably, the 
following a posteriori claims would also be true in both languages: 
(12) My W-thoughts are de the clear, odorless liquid found in lakes around here. 
 (13) My W-thoughts are de that [where the local watery stuff is ostended]. 
Since all these are true on both planets, that means that the skeptic can grant their truth—
yet given the slow-switch hypothesis, he can still press the question of whether your W-
thoughts are de home-water or not. Thus even granting these truths, the content-skeptic 
suggests you still do not “know what” your W-thoughts are about, for the purpose of 
answering his challenge-question.  
Notably, if the slow-switch hypothesis is deviant enough, the skeptic could even 
grant you the truth of the following assertion as well:  
 (14) My W-thoughts are de hydrogen oxide. 
That’s because the skeptic might raise the possibility that (14) is also true in both English 
and Twin-English. Indeed, model theory illustrates that one can reinterpret English to 
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preserve the actual truth-value of each sentence, while changing the denotation of its 
terms. Thus we could imagine that Twin-English has all English names for water as 
names for XYZ, and also that any English predicate satisfied by water on Earth is a 
predicate XYZ satisfies on Twin-Earth (and vice-versa). In this way, the model for Twin-
English would be isomorphic to the model for English, meaning that not only would (14) 
as well as (8), (12), and (13) be true in both languages—but also the following: 
 (15) My W-thoughts are de the watery stuff on Earth (and not on Twin-Earth). 
We could suppose (15) is true in Twin-English if ‘Earth’ refers to Twin-Earth and ‘Twin-
Earth’ refers to Earth. Consequently, the content-skeptic could grant the truth of (15)—
yet still, this leaves open which of two stuffs your W-thoughts are about. And more 
generally, given the isomorphism, it seems that virtually anything you say could be 
granted by the skeptic, without harming his point.  
The skeptical argument, then, bears a striking similarity to the pessimistic 
argument from Chapter One. Both arguments are raising the possibility of non-standard 
denotations for your (linguistic or mental) representations (In the present case, the non-
standard isomorphic model being considered one which simply swaps H2O with XYZ, 
and makes minor adjustments to the extensions of certain predicates.) Subsequently, both 
arguments raise a question about what is denoted by some representation and its co-
referring representations—and both indicate a limit on providing an answer which truly 
settles the question. 
 However, as things currently stand, there is a crucial difference between the 
linguistic and the mental cases. Chapter One demonstrated there cannot be an answer 
which settles the question of what a term denotes in the standard model. Socrates, if you 
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recall, could grant the truth of every assertion about the denotation of ‘Pollux’, yet still 
have a question concerning its standard denotation. But in the mental case, although the 
skeptic can grant virtually all of your assertions regarding the object of your W-thoughts, 
there is one exception. When asked by the skeptic whether your W-thoughts are de home-
water or not, one response that could settle the issue is: 
 (16)  My W-thoughts are de water from home. 
The reason why this might settle the issue is that the skeptic cannot raise two possible 
interpretations of ‘home.’ After all, that term was key to raising the challenge-question in 
the first place. (The question assumed that ‘home’ was used to denote home as opposed to 
some other place.) So if a skeptic started to question this answer, he would be 
inconsistent to assume and not assume a unique interpretation of the term.19 
 Now there is a question of whether the Moorean is entitled to his anti-skepticism, 
in both the case of content and the case of the external world. But that is not something I 
mean to discuss. My point is rather that, since content-skepticism does not depend on the 
possibility of systematic error, the content-skeptic is importantly different from the 
external-world skeptic. The content-skeptic is vastly more charitable. And that makes 
him a bit more interesting, I think, than his external-world cousin. 
 
                                                 
19 However, I think that the content-skeptic could ask a similar question which has no adequate answer. In 
particular, we can make the parallel with Chapter One strict, where the content-skeptic instead asks “What 
are your W-thoughts about (de re)”? This formulation of the question avoids treating the term ‘home-water’ 
as having special status. Moreover, we can obviate introducing the term ‘home-water’ by just defining the 
standard model by using the term ‘water.’ Granted, however, you could correctly respond the skeptic in this 
case by saying “My W-thoughts are de water.” Still, it may not be an appropriate answer since it is rather 
uninformative to say “The thoughts I express using the term ‘water’ denote water.” However, this line 
requires further development, and it is undesirable to attempt this at the present time. But for the record, I 
think one could make a sound argument in the case of mental representations that is more strictly parallel to 
the Chapter One argument vis-à-vis linguistic representations. 
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